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Abstract
Agricultural research and development (R&D) has enjoyed public support for much of the 
twentieth century. For most of this time the agricultural research service (ARS) has 
experienced growing levels o f public expenditure. However, in the latter part of this century 
radical changes have occurred to both its funding and research focus. Accordingly, there Is 
a need to re-evaluate the role and purpose o f publicly-funded agricultural R&D. This 
encompasses a number o f issues which have to be explored.
First, there have been numerous studies assessing the returns to public investment in 
agricultural R&D and, in general, these have found high rates o f return which have pointed 
to under-funding of research. However, these studies have been questioned recently on a 
number of conceptual and empirical grounds. Taking account o f these criticisms, but still 
using the traditional production function approach, this study has found that the returns to 
agricultural R&D remain high, but only for certain areas o f the agricultural research service. 
This has questioned the conventional wisdom that public agricultural R&D is under-funded.
Second, the role that the private sector has to play is in need o f further investigation. Little 
is known about private sector activity in agricultural R&D and its motivations as regards 
funding it. As part o f this research, a survey was conducted and this found that the private 
sector, in recent years, has reduced rather than increased research expenditures to 
compensate for the decline in public funding for applied and development work. Moreover, 
only a small proportion o f private R&D expenditure is devoted to collaborative activity with 
the public sector, so that any recent shift towards promoting funding o f agricultural R&D 
has been at the expense o f research cohesion.
Third, the fundamental theoretical basis for public support o f agricultural R&D has been the 
concept of market failure. However, most o f the arguments advanced only offer strong 
support for the public funding o f basic research. Therefore, a number o f other approaches 
have been employed to understand the reasons for continued public support o f agricultural 
R&D. Significantly, the relatively recent body of theory connected with transaction cost 
economics provides some justification for continued public funding of applied research and 
development work. This, along with arguments advanced by policy analysts, has helped to 
establish that the ARS still has a role in providing publie good research and in ensuring a 
cohesive framework for the funding of basie, applied researeh and development to meet 
effectively the demands o f society.
Ill
In summary, there is no question that the private sector cannot act as a complete and perfect 
substitute for publicly-funded agricultural R&D and without a publicly-funded UK 
agricultural research service would be at a severe disadvantage. Instead, emphasis should be 
placed on trying to integrate private and public research in this area, as so far the evidence 
suggests that this has not been very successful.
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Introduction
Throughout this century the organisation and administration o f public science has undergone 
radical changes with regard to its structure and purpose. The Government scrutiny exercise, 
initiated in 1994, is the most recent addition to a set of measures aimed at imposing 
questions o f relevance and applicability on the allocation o f funding towards public sector 
science institutes. The Agricultural Research Service (ARS), whieh is taken to include all 
public bodies involved with the creation and diffusion of agricultural research and 
development (R&D), has changed both as a result o f these shifts in the science system and 
as a remit o f an inereased emphasis in agricultural policy on more environmental and rural 
objectives.
In general, there has been a trend towards creating greater accountability, which has latterly 
been coupled with changes in the perceived role o f publicly-funded research and its size 
relative to its private sector counterpart. This has been conducted against a background 
whereby funds for agricultural research have been redirected towards basic science for the 
benefit o f other industries. Accordingly, the role and purpose o f public sector agricultural 
R&D needs to be appraised in light of these changes.
There seems to be no unified definition of agricultural R&D. The OECD (1994a) definition 
provides the basis for the definition used in this analysis. Thus, agricultural R&D is taken 
as R&D concerned with the areas of crops and livestock, as well as with related 
environmental and rural issues. It includes R&D targeted to the development o f pre- 
production inputs, on-farm production and post-farm processing o f food and industrial raw 
materials.
Theoretically, the traditional justification for public support, market failure, has relied on 
static assumptions about the economy and has tended to support the need for public R&D 
only at the basic end o f the spectrum. After protests from the ARS over cuts in applied near­
market research, these assumptions have to be re-evaluated in order to assess whether there 
are any valid reasons for public intervention in the areas o f applied research and 
development. If there is no justification then it raises a question about the role o f such 
publicly-funded research.
At the same time, the majority o f studies which have sought to develop an ‘objective’ basis 
for public funding have focused on the apparent returns to research, which have generally 
suggested that there is under-funding (see for example Thirtle and Bottomley, 1988; 
Echeverria, 1990). Most have adopted an econometric approach which measures research 
expenditure against changes in agricultural productivity. However, this methodology lacks 
credibility, as the dropping of variables or the imposition of restrictions causes a high
variance in the estimates o f research benefits gained. Moreover, whilst previous studies 
have seen high rates o f return to public sector research as a justification for continued public 
support, little work has been conducted on whether the public sector has been made less 
effective as a result of recent changes in the nature and level o f funding. Equally, little 
attention has been given as to whether the private seetor has the motivation or ability to 
substitute for areas previously supported by public funds.
Considering the policy issues outlined above, the analysis which follows aims to understand 
the reasons for and the role of public funding in relation to agricultural R&D. It aims to 
accomplish this in a number of ways:
i) by reviewing the development o f the agricultural research service in order to fully 
delineate the major issues which have occurred in its history;
ii) by questioning and re-evaluating the effectiveness o f public agricultural research both in 
terms o f its ability to create wealth and to improve the quality o f life;
iii) by examining the assumptions behind public funding o f agricultural R&D and 
ascertaining whether there are any reasons whieh validate the continuation of support in 
the context of the future development o f UK agrieulture; and
iv) by ascertaining the activities o f the private sector and evaluating the attitude o f agri­
industry toward the recent changes in public agricultural research.
In order to fully understand the key issues involved in assessing the role o f public 
agricultural R&D, it has to be placed into its historical context. A number o f conflicting 
themes can then be seen to emerge in the evolution of the ARS eoncerning its management, 
funding and organisation. Specifically, there are four areas which need to be addressed and 
which are intrinsic to understanding the forces which impinge on the role o f agricultural 
R&D. These are i) changes to the level o f Government involvement in agricultural R&D, ii) 
the evolution o f the institutions which conduct agricultural R&D, iii) the ehanging
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relationship between agricultural policy and agricultural R&D, and iv) the increasing 
influence o f the private sector in agricultural R&D. This is the concern o f the first chapter 
of the thesis.
Seeondly, the stated objective of changes in the management, funding and organisation of 
the ARS has been to increase the effectiveness of public funds (Rothschild, 1971; OST, 
1993). Consequently, it is worth investigating the mechanisms which supposedly facilitate 
these changes in order to assess whether there has been an improvement in public 
investment. These mechanisms can be classified under three headings, namely i) the 
imposition of ‘steerage’ to a previously autonomous research system, ii) reductions to and 
changes in emphasis in respect o f the funding o f agricultural R&D, and iii) the 
encouragement o f private sector participation in agricultural R&D. Consequently, Chapters 
2, 3 and 4 aim to test whether the following hypotheses hold:
Hi: Public agricultural R&D is under-funded and expenditure should he increased;
H 2 : Increased Government steerage has improved the efficiency o f  investment in
agricultural R&D; and
H 3 : Private sector agricultural R&D is more effectively funded than the public sector.
The aim of Chapters 2,3 and 4 are therefore to establish whether there are any indieations of 
improved effectiveness of public funding in terms of the cost-effectiveness of the research. 
The concept of effectiveness can be approached in a number of ways. Firstly, by reviewing 
the literature on the anticipated benefits o f management, funding and organisational changes 
to research systems, indications may be obtained regarding how output is affected. This can 
be further explored by measuring and comparing changes in agricultural productivity growth 
in other countries which have experienced similar structural changes to their ARS as that in 
the UK. Secondly, the changes to the ARS can be evaluated formally using econometric 
methods. By dividing the history o f public funding into periods, it allows for trends and 
permits an assessment o f whether continued funding is justified.
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These changes have had implications for the role and activities of both the public and 
private sectors as regards agricultural research. Consequently, the remaining two chapters 
seek to assess what changes have occurred to these two sectors and what should be their 
future roles. Thus, the public sector has experienced shifts in its role and purpose because 
of changes in research management and, consequently, the fifth chapter seeks to address 
whether there is currently a role for public sector agricultural R&D and what that role 
should be. Specifieally, the hypotheses which require testing are:
H p Basic agricultural R&D is only justified in terms ofpublic support; and
Hs: Agricultural R&D in the public sector should concentrate on enhancing the public
good.
Chapter 6 is concerned with the activities o f the private sector and its relationships with 
public research. The private sector has been called upon to replace areas o f applied and 
development funding which were previously conducted by the public sector (Read et a l,  
1988). Similarly, firms have been eneouraged to foster a closer relationship with public 
research institutions in order to provide more industrially relevant solutions to commercial 
problems. Specifically, there are two further hypotheses which require examination:
H^: The private sector has replaced public funds in near-market areas; and
H?: Government policies fo r  increased public-private collaboration have been a
success.
In order to investigate these hypotheses an extensive survey was undertaken with firms 
involved in the area of agricultural research. Specifically, the questionnaire had three 
general aims, namely i) to quantify the level and trends in private research expenditure, ii) to 
understand the level o f collaborative R&D activity between public and private seetors, and
iii) to assess how the agricultural industry views the changes to the public sector in terms of 
the quality and relevance of its research output.
By evaluating the reasons for support which have emerged both from economic and policy 
analysis, a framework has been developed which can assess the validity o f continued 
research in the agricultural sector. Overall, this analysis aims to address the central question 
of whether public support for agricultural R&D should continue. As the agriculture sector 
experiences removal o f public funding, public agricultural R&D has to find justification for 
a role which underpins the activities of this industry.
CHAPTER 1
THE PUBLIC SUPPORT OF AGRICULTURAL 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
1.0. The Public Support of Agricultural Research and Development
The majority of studies concerned with agricultural R&D have advocated some degree of 
continued public support. It is usually argued that the Government has a role, because in a 
free market economy resources tend not to be allocated in a socially optimal way. Thus, the 
belief is that by correcting economic distortions the Government can improve the welfare of 
soeiety. However, as early as the 1960s some economists and, more recently Government, 
have questioned the assumption that public intervention in the market is required and can 
offer social benefits (Friedman, 1962; Demsetz, 1969). While these ‘Government failure’ 
arguments are just as applicable to agricultural R&D as they are to other seetors, the bulk of 
commentators on public agricultural R&D funding have argued that it is a special case and 
requires continued support (see for example Umali, 1992; Alston, Norton and Pardey, 1995). 
Similarly, the bulk of these arguments emerge from abstract economic theory and have been 
applied to agricultural R&D with little consideration for the proeess o f research itself, and 
then only in the form of theoretical support for basic research (Thirtle, 1986).
Accordingly, the central concern o f this introductory chapter is to outline the arguments that 
could be forwarded for the public support o f agricultural R&D. More critically, it aims to 
evaluate which areas o f agricultural R&D merit continued public funding and whether there 
are areas which could viably be funded by the private sector. Consequently, the first section 
outlines the shifts that have occurred in science policy since the early 1970s. This gives an 
overview of how the Government has sought to manage its agricultural research system and 
how it has favoured certain areas over others. This is followed by a critique o f the more 
prominent arguments which have been forwarded for the public support o f agricultural 
science. In this way, the underlying basis for these changes in science policy are examined 
to test their validity in respect o f agricultural science. Finally, the most important arguments 
are considered in terms o f the research process itself, in order to establish the key areas 
whieh the public sector should continue to fund.
1.1. Changes in the Balance o f Science Policy
Prior to 1970, the agricultural research service (ARS) had enjoyed expanding expenditures. 
However, the changes that occurred to the research system after this date began to put into 
question both the area and activity of public sector agricultural R&D. Specifically, these 
changes raised issues in relation to the balance o f research funds between particular areas of 
the researeh process. Whilst discussed in more depth in Chapter 2, these issues can be 
summarised into four, namely i) basic versus applied R&D, ii) productivity versus non­
productivity enhancing R&D, hi) agricultural R&D versus agrieultural extension, and iv) 
agricultural R&D versus general R&D.
1.1,1. Basic Versus Applied Research and Development
The first imposed divide between basic and applied R&D emerged with the publication of 
the Rothschild Report in 1971. However, this divide was brought into sharper relief with 
the removal o f funds for applied ‘near-market’ R&D in 1988 and their eventual reallocation 
to basic research. This latter research area has traditionally been held as the domain o f the 
public sector (see for example Nelson, 1959; Umali, 1992). This is because knowledge is 
difficult to protect, and its dissemination within society is considered to be desirable, as 
advances for the benefit o f society can be developed from extending the frontiers of 
knowledge. Thus, the changes that have appeared since the mid-1980s have seen the public 
sector increasingly as a conductor of basic research and this position has gained in 
importance at the expense o f applied research and development.
1.1,2. Productivity versus Non-Productivity Enhancing R&D
The earlier emphasis in agricultural R&D on securing productivity gains has declined in the 
last decade, as reflected in statements by both MAFF (1996) and the Scottish Office (1994), 
both o f whom now allocate only around half their expenditure towards productivity- 
enhancing research. This is in sharp contrast to the situation before the mid-1980s, when 
budgets were directed solely at increasing the productivity o f agriculture. Similarly, the 
goal of enhancing agricultural productivity has been questioned within EU policy, which 
now directs growing R&D support for farmers away from areas which increase output 
(CEC, 1998). That R&D has caused productivity growth in UK agriculture seems to be 
irrefutable. However, coupled with output-enhancing policies, the costs to society in terms 
o f the wastage of natural resources, as well as the side-effects o f residues in food products, 
has led to questions over the social desirability o f continuing to encourage these increases.
1.1.3. Agricultural R&D versus Agricultural Extension
A phenomenon which has been observed in the UK and, to some extent, in other developed 
countries, has been the commercialisation o f the extension service. However, the effective 
transfer of research results ensures that the private sector does not concentrate solely on 
innovations which can be appropriated to the exclusion o f improvements related to animal 
welfare and the environment. The privatisation of the market-based activities of the
Agricultural Development and Advisory Service and its subsequent replacement with the 
Farming and Rural Conservation Agency (FRCA) in 1997, established to concentrate on 
public-good advice, is obviously aimed at correcting this.
1.1.4. Agricultural R&D versus General R&D
Alston and Pardey (1998) have contended that a major issue in the economic justification of 
publicly-funded agricultural R&D is the level o f inter-industry spill-overs which have been 
o f benefit to agriculture, principally from the chemical and biological industries. It could be 
argued that the recent extension o f research interests o f the Biotechnological and Biological 
Science Research Council into non-agricultural areas strengthens public support for non- 
strategic basic research, i.e. without a principal target group, and is associated with 
reductions in funding for specific agriculturally directed projects.
1.1.5. Summary
Analysing trends in science policy since the 1970s seems to infer that the UK Government 
has sought to manage the agricultural research system (ARS) by re-balancing the funding for 
various parts. Thus, there has developed an explicit divide between basic and applied R&D. 
Similarly, more recent emphasis has been placed on withdrawing public funding from 
specific areas, such as extension and near-market research, with a renewed concentration on 
basic and public-good fields.
Given the prevailing mood of change it seems that the arguments put forward for the public 
funding o f the agricultural research service need to be re-examined. This is especially 
pertinent, as recent changes have involved a sharp reversal o f the post-war view of 
agricultural R&D as intrinsic to achieving increased productivity. Consequently, what 
follows is a test o f the main arguments advanced for the public support o f an ARS, with a 
view to testing their validity and applicability to UK agricultural R&D at present. It also 
serves to outline the role publicly-funded agricultural R&D and extension should arguably 
play within society.
1.2. Arguments for the Support o f Agricultural R&D
Arguments, which have developed for the support o f public sector agricultural R&D, can be 
grouped under two headings. There are the general welfare arguments, which seek to justify 
the presence o f the public sector in certain fields o f production, and the more specific
arguments which emerge from the implementation of agricultural policy. The former tend to 
offer more abstract justifications for intervention. Thus, whilst applicable to agricultural 
R&D, they tend to be based on reasons for the general intervention o f the public sector 
within society. In contrast, the latter emerge from the dynamics o f agricultural policy and 
justify public funding o f agricultural R&D in terms o f the specifics o f the UK farming 
industry. Testing these two conceptual approaches against examples of public agricultural 
R&D practice helps to give an understanding o f their applicability in terms of the UK. The 
arguments that apply from general welfare analysis will be analysed first and are the concern 
o f the next section.
1.2,1. General Welfare Approach
Economic thought is divided over the degree to which the public sector should be involved 
within the economy. Those arguing for support generally regard Government involvement 
as necessary for improving social welfare, whereas those opposed champion the free market 
on the basis o f its allocative efficiency. The most prevalent viewpoint, which supports state 
intervention, rests on the belief that the market fails to allocate all its resources efficiently 
because o f a divergence between public and private objectives. The Government therefore 
has a role in filling the gaps left by the private sector (Arrow, 1962). This raises the 
question of why markets should fail, which is the focus o f a more recent body of literature 
(Arrow, 1969; Williamson, 1985). Specifically, markets are imperfect due to the costs of 
transacting. Under this conceptual approach the Government has a purpose in investing in 
R&D in order to reduce prohibitively high transaction costs in certain markets. Linked to 
this, there are other arguments based on analysis o f technological policies and which see the 
public production o f R&D as an essential means to increasing economic growth. All these 
issues are explored below.
1.2.1.1. Market Failure
Market failure is a deviation from a hypothetical situation where all resources are allocated 
in a socially optimal way. This requires that markets for all goods, including those delivered 
in the future and under different circumstances, must exist. The main reason why this does 
not occur is considered to be due to the existence of ‘mixed goods’. These are commodities 
which carry both public and private attributes. The public aspect o f these goods offers a 
social benefit, as they can be used without reducing another person’s consumption o f that 
good. Consequently, their presence in an economy leads to a divergence between private
and social goals. Goods with a high public content will be produced sub-optimally in a free 
market economy, because of the low chances of sufficient private gain. Therefore, due to an 
inability to protect the knowledge implicit in the creation of a product, various areas of 
research will not be produced by the commercial sector. Accordingly, whilst some firms do 
invest in creating knowledge, the central argument of market failure theory is that, where the 
gain from R&D cannot be captured by private industry, it can only be produced with the 
support o f public funding. More specifically, there are four circumstances in which market 
failure is relevant to the production o f a public good like research and development. These 
are, namely i) inappropriability, ii) externalities, iii) increasing returns to scale, and iv) 
uncertainty. The effects are analysed individually to test their validity as regards their 
justification for Government funding of agricultural R&D.
1.2.1.1.1. Inappropriability
Increasing the level of knowledge is socially desirable, primarily because its application 
will advance the understanding and solution of problems that society may face. However, 
where the social return exceeds the private one from research, private investment will be 
limited. Instead it will only occur in areas where protection is feasible. As a result areas 
that offer high returns to society, such as environmental protection and the social sciences, 
but result in products that cannot be easily patented, will not attract private investment.
Accordingly, Deinsetz (1969) has argued that appropriability is largely a matter o f effective 
institutional arrangements, e.g. patents, combined with adequate enforcement. Whilst he 
accepted that public goods exist, he contended that a bargaining solution between producers 
and consumers will solve the problem of appropriability. Furthermore, Peacock (1979) has 
argued that technological innovation can eliminate the public nature o f some goods by 
solving the problem of non-excludability. Thus, the introduction o f hybrid corn in the 
United States led to a large expansion o f the seed industry. Previously, seed was produced 
through open pollination which could be reproduced on farm. The private seed industiy 
was concerned with merchandising 'college bred' or publicly-funded varieties, the price of 
which would not deviate from bulk grain prices. This lack of appropriability, therefore, 
resulted in limited incentives for private growers to produce better varieties. With the 
development of hybrid corn, which offered patentability o f lines, there was a rise in private 
research investment from the 1920s onwards.
Consequently, ‘appropriability’ is not a static concept. In their study o f US agriculture, 
Goodman et a l  (1987) saw its development in terms of growing industrial appropriation of
rural and natural resources. Consequently, if firms continue this trend of capturing returns 
from agriculture, the role of the public sector should be correspondingly reduced. The 
recent developments in bio-technology, which offer the patentability o f biological 
processes, has caused large investment by firms in basic research and led to questions 
concerning the role o f the state in this area. This has been outlined by James and Persley 
(1990), who found that, before a landmark ruling allowing micro-organisms to be patented 
in 1980, around 80 firms concerned with biotechnology existed in the United States. 
However, this grew to around 1,000 firms by 1990. Similarly, larger firms such as 
Monsanto and Dupont began to invest substantial amounts o f funds in bio-technological 
applications in the medical, plant and animal areas.
As industrial appropriation increases the inability o f private firms to capture gains from 
R&D may become a weaker justification for state involvement. At present the areas which 
show little possibility of industrial appropriation seem to be where public goods are 
paramount. Accordingly, certain areas o f environmental and aesthetic research offer little 
chance o f commercial exploitation, as the benefits from these goods are difficult to quantify 
and sell. Thus, MAFF (1996) funds work into countryside management and environmental 
protection which is impossible to protect. However, in the future this may not be the case, 
as technology develops which may enable some of these benefits to be captured. For 
instance, the emergence of information technology has led to the development of improved 
management for agronomy systems. Thus, as profits are captured by companies from the 
sale o f software, there is an incentive for commercial development in the area of agronomic 
management, an area which is usually considered inappropriable.
Therefore, conditions have to be applied, if the appropriability argument is to remain 
applicable as far as agriculture is concerned. If  the public sector can respond to changes in 
the industrial environment and shift programmes away from areas which have become 
industrially appropriable to novel ones, then it is justified. How easily this can be achieved 
is questionable. Thus, the US grain manufacturers resorted to lobbying Government for the 
public sector’s removal from the development o f commercial corn lines. Kloppenberg 
(quoted in Goodman et ah, 1987) stated that, whilst undermining smaller companies entry 
into the industry, the “emasculation o f  public breeding programmes created an important 
new space fo r  the accumulation o f  capital’’ (ibid., pp. 42). The inference o f all this is that 
the government only has a role in funding research in agriculture, where social returns are 
high and, more critically, private returns are low.
1.2.1.1.2. Externalities
Mixed goods produce spin-offs, or externalities, from their production or consumption. 
Pigou (1932) first posited the idea that the indirect nature o f a positive or negative 
externality means that payment cannot be exacted, nor compensation enforced for these 
third party effects. If  R&D were produced solely by private firms, their search for 
maximising profits generally would lead to an over-production o f negative externalities and 
an under-production o f positive externalities (Umali, 1992). There is, therefore, an 
argument for the public production of R&D which reduces the level of negative 
externalities or, conversely, produces positive externalities.
In the case o f negative externalities, Coase (1960) questioned this assumption as a basis for 
public intervention. He argued that, where these effects were well defined, the producers of 
externalities and the individuals affected could negotiate amongst themselves for 
appropriate compensation for these spill-overs. In a variation on this, Phipps (1989) 
asserted that the external effects o f new technologies could be internalised when and if the 
benefits from internalisation exceeded the costs. He illustrated this by examining the 
externalities which occurred with the introduction o f an agricultural pesticide. These were 
i) residues in food, ii) discharge into groundwater, and iii) discharge into surface water. As 
regards residues in food, he cited the case o f Californian grocers who employ a private 
service to test for pesticide residues. Market prices might be expected to change to reflect 
differences in the cost o f alternative production and the premium consumers are willing to 
pay for pesticide-free produce. If the damage to ground water affects the farmer’s drinking 
supply, then to some degree the externality will be internalised. However, in the case of 
surface water there will be little incentive to protect rivers and streams, unless they affect 
fishing rights owned by a farmer. Therefore some, and not all, areas o f externalities merit 
public intervention.
Related to this issue Rausser and Zilberman (1991) have maintained that, where there are 
pecuniaiy benefits, the private sector will invest in areas which produce positive 
externalities. For example, drip irrigation can increase the value o f land and the user of the 
technology makes a return from the sale of the land. This is a point raised by Harvey 
(1987), who stated that the price of land will rise as the technological relationship between 
inputs and outputs improve. He went on to suggest that land-owners should bear a degree 
o f the cost o f R&D, pointing to a similar Tand-tax’ which is used in France. Accordingly, 
the argument has to be modified, as the public sector should only be concerned with 
negative externalities which affect large groups, i.e. the general public and not the farmer.
This is supported by Umali (1992), who contends that, where negative externalities were 
extremely high or taxes did not seriously damage the producer’s profitability, the state has a 
role in assuming absolute control of that activity.
However, the role o f the Government as a producer of ‘positive’ technology has to be 
questioned on a number o f grounds. Firstly, it relies on a belief that the state can allocate 
resources effectively in the long-run to maximise social welfare. There is an argument that 
Government may not be concerned with the ‘public interest’, but consist of self-serving 
individuals. As such decision making will be distorted by an official’s private agenda or by 
the power of lobbying groups. The US Government in the 1940s invested in the 
development of systematic agricultural herbicides. However, a growing interest in 
biological warfare led to the development o f the weed killer ‘2, 4-dichloro phenoxyacetic 
acid’ which was subsequently used as ‘agent orange’ in the Vietnam War (Peterson, 1967). 
Generally, Demsetz (1969) asserts that a failure in Government may lead to a less socially 
beneficial outcome than even market failure, because o f the leviathan nature o f public 
spending programmes.
Regardless o f the decision-making process it also requires a belief that Government has the 
foresight to allocate resources to the correct programmes in order to effectively reduce 
negative externalities. Public research in the US was directed towards increasing 
productivity o f tomato harvesting in the 1940s and 1950s. A tomato harvester was 
eventually developed by the University sector into a commercial machine and, when 
introduced, became a phenomenal success. In 1963 1.5% o f the tomatoes grown in 
California for processing were harvested by machine, but by 1968 this had expanded to 
become 95%. However, it was found that those gaining from the technology were not 
compensating those who had become unemployed by the introduction of the new 
technology (Schmitz and Seckler, 1970). Schuh and Tollini (1979) have argued that it is 
important to identify which groups benefit and lose and then relate this to the goals of 
research programmes. However, it is debatable whether agricultural policy has promoted 
positive externalities. For the bulk of the post-1945 period. Government policy has been 
associated with developing output-enhancing technology, leading to increased 
intensification and wide-spread environmental damage. Similarly, the crisis caused by the 
possibility o f human infection from Bovine Spongiform Encelopathy was not foreseen be 
the UK Government. Accordingly, it has to be questioned whether the same body can 
provide the correct portfolio of research programmes, which would increase positive 
externalities in the future.
Another distinction has to be drawn between the public provision o f R&D and the 
regulatory devices which negate some of the effects of these externalities. Regulation has 
had a significant effect in the area of restricting polluting emissions from private industry. 
Imposing heavy penalties against environmental effects may be more effective in reducing 
externalities than producing substitutes for the industry and, arguably, encourages private 
industry to produce public good research itself (Rosegger, 1980). For instance, regulation 
against the emissions of CFC’s has advanced the industrial development and use of safer 
substitutes. Similarly, the ban on using offal in animal feed has led companies to invest in 
other alternatives. However, regulation itself tends to be reactive, emerging as a direct 
response to the damage imposed on a society. Investing in public R&D in a certain 
direction can be seen as a means o f offering a quicker response or, in the best case scenario, 
preventing the damage altogether.
An important caveat which also impinges on this argument is that the private sector will 
create positive externalities when there is a high possibility o f return on their investment. 
The argument for public R&D to produce externalities must therefore be compared against 
the subsidisation o f an industry which is already producing them. For instance, the 
Philippine Government supported industrial investment into developing a ‘geo-thermal’ 
power industry, thus reducing reliance on oil burning plants as a source o f energy 
(Grandstaff and Balagot, 1986). However, this cannot be applied in areas where positive 
externalities are impossible to identify. Accordingly, the level and direction of subsidy in 
these circumstances cannot be fairly allocated to industiy. This strengthens the argument 
that, when the boundaries o f these effects cannot easily be determined, the state has a role 
in intervening between the two parties.
The whole concept o f externalities is therefore a complex issue. It is exacerbated by its 
application to R&D which, with the introduction o f new products and processes, changes 
the environment in which society operates and therefore alters the balance of beneficiaries 
and victims (Rosegger, 1980). In theory, state-funded research is justified in the socially 
desirable fields o f agricultural production, where there are unclear boundaries regarding 
beneficiaries and losers as evidenced by R&D into public aesthetic values in rural areas, 
which will benefit local businesses from increased tourism. However, the public provision 
of R&D has to be considered against the numerous caveats and beliefs outlined above. 
What is clear is that investment in technology, whether public or private, will create 
externalities which cannot be foreseen, but in itself offers no unequivocal support for state 
funding o f research.
to
1.2.1.1.3. Increasing Returns to Scale
The size of the investment in research leads to indivisibilities or 'increasing returns to 
scale’. Government subsidisation o f an industry may be economically justified if it is 
uncompetitive in the initial stages o f its development, but shows clear evidence of 
profitability in the long run. Economies o f scale and time will ensure the sector’s 
competitive position in the long run. An argument against this has been made by Friedman 
(1962), who opposed Government intervention, because it frequently helped monopoly 
power to emerge. Bell et a l  (quoted in Chang, 1996) questioned the application of support 
due to asymmetries of information between the state and the funded body. They pointed to 
industries in developing countries which persistently failed to grow out o f their ‘infancy’. 
Accordingly, support for an industry over a long period by the community, as a direct 
objective of making it competitive, is a weak justification for state involvement. The real 
justification for supporting an industiy is that other industries or the community at large 
gain. It is therefore reasonable for the community to pay a price in terms of protection for 
that industry to mature (Wells, 1969). That this can work is evidenced by the Philippine 
seed industry.
The major restriction on private investment in the seed industry o f the Philippines was the 
problem of downy mildew on higher yielding corn hybrids. Research in the public sectors 
o f several Asian countries led to the development o f resistant open-pollinated corn hybrids 
and a way of treating the seed. These two discoveries allowed the possibility o f cultivating 
higher yielding corn. Similarly, the Government initiated a corn production programme - 
‘Masaganang M aison’- which required farmers to use only approved hybrids or varieties. 
This, along with several schemes to keep the domestic corn price higher than the World 
price, created a profitable market for hybrid corn production. As a consequence the 
industry is now self-supporting and dominated by four players, namely i) a wholly owned 
subsidiary, ii) a Philippine-based multinational, iii) a joint venture with a foreign firm, and 
iv) a foreign owned multinational, indicating the possibility o f economies o f scale (Umali, 
1992). This example negates the preceding concerns about market and informational 
distortions. Instead, it suggests that public agricultural R&D, when it is directed towards a 
small developing industry, can be justified as a device for increasing the social welfare o f a 
country.
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1.2.1.1.4. Uncertainty
Investment in the research process involves a high degree o f uncertainty concerning the 
economic viability of its outcome. As profit-making enterprises are generally risk-averse 
they will discriminate against projects where the uncertainty is large. Research with an 
unknown level o f public, as opposed to private, gain will experience under-investment 
within an economy. This is because it generally does not offer enough profit to cover the 
risks involved. However, the costs o f gathering accurate information for a project may 
outweigh the benefits o f market correction. This phenomenon has been observed in 
centrally-planned economies, where only the minimal amount of information can be 
processed before the writing of a project (Dobb, 1970; Brus, 1972). Consequently, the level 
o f risk may not be averted, but may have grown. This has to be considered against a 
growing demand for accountability for funds administered by the Government. Similarly, 
Thirtle (1986) has argued that the choice of Government projects will be deliberately biased 
away from the private sector and pointed to the case o f forestry which has attracted much 
public funding.
However, Government involvement can be justified by its effect on social welfare in the 
short run. Whilst every investment has the potential for failure, if the intentions are to 
increase social welfare, then it should not deter public funding. Genetic engineering 
evolved from the public sector as a means o f transferring foreign genes into other bodies 
and thus producing novel genetic combinations. As this needed a high initial investment, 
the private sector did not see fit to undertake such risks. Similarly the degree o f technical 
knowledge needed for this process led to public researchers acquiring a high level of 
expertise. The possibilities for genetic development were realised by the public sector and 
the majority o f exploratory work was conducted in the universities. However, the specific 
applied and development aspects o f work were adopted by the sponsoring firm and 
exploited in the market place (James and Persley, 1990). Genetic engineering and other 
fields of biotechnology have led to the introduction of biologically based alternatives, 
which have less short-term harmful effects on the environment than previous chemical 
pesticides and fertilisers. However, its effect in the long-run, judging the adverse reaction 
to genetically modified foods in Europe, may prove socially unacceptable. The uncertainty 
element is therefore large in new fields and it takes the public sector to open up the 
possibilities for the private sector and spread the risks of researching into new areas. 
Accordingly, where there is high uncertainty in socially beneficial research, the state has a 
role in providing investment and absorbing the risks.
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1.2.1.2. Transaction Costs
Whilst market failure theory has become the cornerstone o f theoretical work on public 
intervention, a more recent strand o f economic thought has developed and this can be 
applied to the problem of public funding. The essence o f this theory stems from the 
inability o f individuals to co-operate with each other. This leads to the establishment of 
contracts to transfer, capture and protect ownership rights to property. The cost of 
establishing and enforcing these contracts, defined here as ‘transaction costs’, can be 
prohibitively high. Chang (1996) has stated that in the real world both state intervention 
and market transactions are costly. Therefore, the argument is whether the state can 
achieve the same allocative efficiency at lower cost than the free market. Accordingly, this 
approach offers insights into why firms will not invest in certain areas o f agricultural R&D, 
and whether there is any justification for Government involvement. Douma and Schreuder 
(1998) have outlined a number of factors which can create transaction costs. In terms o f the 
argument relating to agricultural R&D these can be divided into two areas, namely i) 
opportunism and ii) asset specificity.
1.2.1.2.!. Opportunism
Williamson (1985) has stated that, in general, contracts are formed because some 
individuals try to exploit a situation to their own advantage. A profit-maximising firm in a 
highly competitive market typifies this behaviour. This leads to a non-optimal allocation of 
research spending, as companies will deliberately not disseminate knowledge gained from 
the creation o f products and processes. Accordingly, a justification emerges for the public 
sector as a distributor of this knowledge.
During the 1960s the Chilean Government developed a national plan for the fruit sector. 
This included gathering a wide variety of information, such as analysis o f foreign markets, 
and establishing production goals, as well as the introduction of new varieties and storage 
techniques. In order to facilitate this a ten-year co-operative scheme was initiated between 
the University of Chile and the University o f California. This involved technical co­
operation and student exchange. These programmes strengthened the domestic research 
base and were crucial factors in the acceleration of the growth in fruit exports after 1974. 
The Government also passed legislation that allowed public sector staff to engage in 
consulting. The onus was therefore imposed on the private sector to utilise this information 
and gave an adequate incentive to develop technologies with this expertise. As a
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consequence Chilean temperate fruit exports grew by around 20% per annum between 1974 
and 1991 (Umali, 1992).
A key mechanism in this growth was the transfer o f information and expertise from the USA 
to Chile. This was initiated by public institutions, in this case the universities. 
Opportunistic behaviour encountered in private firms would not have allowed the 
knowledge acquired to be freely distributed to other companies. However, the public 
dissemination o f the research results led to the grovrth o f firms, increasing social welfare. 
Accordingly, as private firms are opportunistic in nature, a public R&D base may be 
essential to provide for transfer of knowledge to the widest possible audience.
1.2.1.2.2. Asset Specificity
Asset specificity is concerned with ‘transaction-specific’ assets. An asset is transaction 
specific if it cannot be re-deployed without a significant reduction in the value o f that asset 
(Douma and Schreuder, 1998). In terms o f technology, often an advance in one area cannot 
be fully exploited until there is an advance in another area. Therefore, given the nature of 
farming, with its reliance on long-term capital investment, farmers will not be able to adopt 
new technology, which does not conform to conventional processes or machinery used on 
the holding, without further large investment. Consequently, this may be a disincentive for 
a private firm to invest in some areas which may be socially beneficial. For example, the 
US Congress funded an integrated research programme in 1946 for cotton growers. This 
was because, with the development o f an efficient mechanical picker, the cotton plant had 
to be adapted to the machine. Accordingly, research was conducted into modifying the 
cotton plant to grow higher and open over a shorter time. Thus, the breeding o f this seed 
was given over to the public domain in order to avoid exploitation by an individual firm. In 
around twenty years mechanised cotton cultivation was successfully adopted and became 
widespread (Fite, 1980). Whilst farmers would willingly pay the costs o f developing the 
seed if  benefits exceeded costs, this would lead to under-investment in areas where benefits 
are not so tangible, e.g. in pest management schemes or in aspects o f environmental 
improvement.
More critically, however, companies may obstruct socially beneficial research by restricting 
the opportunities for fanners to adopt other forms o f related technology. Stuckey and White
(1993) have highlighted a situation where one or both parties invest in equipment that can 
only be used by these parties and which has a low value in alternative uses. Thus, firms may 
tie in other aspects of their product through technology. This has been observed recently
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with large seed breeding firms producing genetically modified strains which are only fully 
responsive to pesticides manufactured by the same firm. In addition, companies, such as 
Monsanto, have initiated a trend whereby farmers sign agreements to use a firm’s specified 
pesticide before they can obtain and grow the seed itself. This could be negated by the 
spreading o f basic research results through the public domain. However, as genetic 
modification has emerged in the public sector, as typified by cotton breeding in the US, a 
more integrated programme of applied and development work would be better justified to 
prevent this abuse.
An argument against this is the emergence o f co-operative buying rings which, through 
group buying and shared use, buy or rent equipment that a single farmer cannot afford. 
Thus, if the costs o f ‘tied-in’ technology are too high, this could be spread over a number of 
farmers who each benefit from the technology. However, the majority o f buying rings that 
exist in the UK only concentrate on the purchase of farming machinery (Thirkell, 1993). 
This would again suggest that farmers will only invest in areas where benefits are highly 
tangible. Therefore, it seems that some justification exists for publicly-funded integrated 
programmes in areas of benefit to society, in order to avoid the problems of asset specificity.
1,2.1.3, General Policy Arguments
There are several other reasons which underpin the justifications o f public production 
which are more practically based. These tend to emphasise the role the public sector plays 
in providing technology which will accomplish the social good by its introduction. Thus, 
the first argument refers to the popular idea that R&D helps to promote growth, whereas the 
second argument refers to the ‘equity’ o f funding areas o f the economy which merit 
support.
I.2.I.3.I. Technology Promotes Economic Growth
The most persuasive argument which has emerged is that state funded R&D is essential to a 
nation’s economic growth. However, economic growth is a paradoxical concept. Rosegger 
(1980, pp. 314) refers to this as “an increase in the economy's capacity to produce more 
goods and services’’. Under this definition it relates to the concept of total factor 
productivity (TFP), namely the ratio o f change in output to inputs. However, TFP is a 
controversial issue as it does not include any improvement in the quality o f people’s lives. 
The OECD (1992, pp. 168) sees economic growth as “the sustained expansion o f  the
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productive potential o f  an economy which, in the long run, converges with the growth o f  
aggregate output”. In relation to agriculture, economic growth can meet growing needs, 
without the necessity of using more resources.
Against this background, it is possible to understand the argument which emerges from the 
wide range o f empirical work on the returns to agricultural R&D. By measuring public 
agricultural research expenditure against increases in supply or total factor productivity, 
very high rates o f return on investment have been recorded (see for example Echeverria, 
1990). However, within this framework, it is near-market productivity-enhancing research, 
rather than basic or non-market orientated research, which justifies public support. This is 
the view of the Australian government which consciously switched funding towards applied 
R&D (Hussey, 1996).
The link between basic research and economic growth is more tenuous. This is important as 
the majority of public agricultural research in the UK today is directed at the basic end of 
the spectrum. Martin et al. (1996) argued that there were six identifiable contributions of 
publicly-funded basic research to economic performance. These were namely i) increasing 
the stock o f information, ii) new instrumentation and technologies, iii) skilled graduates, iv) 
professional networks, v) technological problem solving, and vi) creation of new firms. 
Specifically, if the public sector invests in research it will, hopefully, increase the ‘stock of 
knowledge’. Traditional theories propound the idea that private firms will gain from this 
knowledge, primarily through academic papers, and so invest in embodying this knowledge 
into commercially exploitable goods. Arundel et al. (1995), in a survey o f various industrial 
sectors, found that pharmaceutical firms in particular favoured embodying knowledge 
through publications, informal contacts and conferences. Similarly, tacit, or person 
embodied-knowledge, is growing in importance within the high-tech industries, such as 
biotechnology. Thus, Zucker and Danby (1995) argued that, as the techniques for 
replication in high-tech industries involved tacit knowledge, then any scientist wishing to 
make use o f this new knowledge must acquire hands-on experience. Accordingly, the major 
argument for supporting basie research is that publicly available knowledge may eventually 
be embodied into the private research process and thus improve its competitive position. 
Whilst the level o f private basic research is low, new techniques can be taken on by a 
company, which will increase the options of the firm to exploit and grow.
However, more generally, there has been growing controversy over the whole concept of 
encouraging economic growth. This questions the desirability o f Government pursuing such 
a goal. There is the argument that, on the basis of resource availability, economic growth
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will not be sustainable in the future. This argument can be traced back to the 18th century 
and Malthus’s predications o f the growth in population and agriculture’s inability to meet 
growing food demands (Rosegger, 1980). It has been raised into prominence by debates 
over the limits to growth (Meadows et al., 1974; McCutcheon, 1979). In conjunction with 
this, the argument for R&D as a means o f achieving economic grovrth has led to another 
problem concerning the distribution o f incomes. Some groups have benefited more than 
others from economic growth. For example, technology may distort the market system and 
subject consumers to unfair pricing schemes. Thus, whilst technology may allow a nation to 
enjoy increased growth, the benefieiaries may not ultimately be the public paying for that 
research.
In contrast, an argument has developed whereby public research could be used as a means of 
creating competition and so reducing monopoly power. Ruttan (1982) suggested that public 
research could be seen as a means o f maintaining or enhancing a competitive structure. 
Accordingly, he maintained that ‘ ‘there is fo r  example, considerable evidence that the flow  
o f  new technology from  public sector R&D has contributed to competitive behaviour in the 
seed and fertiliser industries” (ibid., pp. 183). This, he suggested, helps to justify the 
distribution o f research findings within the public domain. However, it conflicts with a 
policy which supports increased public-private collaborative activity through the use of 
public funds, as directing resources towards any one firm may distort market power.
The majority of literature on economic growth views research and development within an 
overall policy for industry. Stout (1981) argues that rates o f growth in an economy are 
related to the speed of response by industry to market changes in the distribution o f labour 
and capital. Accordingly, the role o f Government and technology is to speed up the process 
o f re-allocation and re-design o f these markets. This could be achieved within the 
framework of an overall industrial policy which includes the public funding of R&D.
However, UK industrial policy since the 1960s has concentrated much of its financial 
support on declining industries and has, if anything, significantly slowed down the response 
to market changes. The nature o f agricultural production, with heavy capital costs means it 
can only respond slowly to these effects. Similarly, post-1945 agriculture is one o f the areas 
where Stout contends that the economic growth o f nations has been reduced, because o f too 
much price support for a low growth sector. Indeed, there has hardly been a time since the 
Industrial Revolution when farming has not been in decline and it seems a weak case for 
public support of R&D as a means of accelerating economic growth. However, Thirtle 
(1986) has noted that growth could be realised by using technology to open up newer
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markets for exploitation and supported this by using the example of biotechnology, which 
turns sugar cane alcohol into a substitute for use in the petro-chemical industries. Whilst it 
could be a matter of debate whether this is agricultural R&D in the strictest sense, or should 
be classified as industrial R&D, it does offer an alternative argument for public support. If 
agricultural R&D were to concentrate on industrial crops, it could be justified as a supplier 
o f cheaper materials to other industries and so seem to facilitate economic growth.
1.2.1.3.2. Agricultural R&D Only Deserves an Equitable Allocation of Public Funds
The basis o f allocation for public funds is finite and Government has to choose between 
projects which warrant support. Therefore, a fundamental issue must be whether taxpayer’s 
money should be allocated to the agricultural industiy, or whether other industries which 
show more potential should merit this support. Predominantly, any economic justification 
is weakened because agriculture has become a declining sector o f the economy. 
Furthermore, the fact that this decrease began in the mid-19th century indicates that the 
growing levels o f expenditure for R&D spending during the 1950s and 1960s may actually 
have been a mis-allocation o f public resources. Indeed, if it were in line with its 
contribution to GDP, the amount o f funds directed towards agricultural problems should 
have been declining long before the cuts of the 1980s.
Nevertheless, numerous studies have not only supported its continued funding, but the 
majority, especially in the case of the econometric work in this area, have suggested that it 
deserves an increase in public R&D expenditure. For this to be achieved there has to be 
confidence that funds are allocated appropriately within the research system. This 
confidence rests on the belief that the private sector produces the wrong portfolio o f projects 
(Nelson, 1982). However, this is not enough. There has to be a corresponding belief that 
public facilitators o f research have the means to correctly evaluate and eradicate the failure 
that occurs within markets. In practice this is a difficult task. Thornley and Doyle (1984) 
suggested that funding decisions should be considered in terms o f the past performance of 
research institutes. However, Harvey (1987) likened project spending to the process of 
backing horses and contended that R&D is more like a yearling, which offered limited 
information on form. Consequently, the issue o f growing public expenditure has to be 
considered against its ability to achieve set objectives, which increase social welfare.
I.2.I.4. Summary
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A diverse range of arguments emerge when considering the public funding of agricultural 
R&D. The most salient point from the above analysis is that the presence o f the public 
sector is desirable because o f its ability to correct an imbalance in social welfare. However, 
this tends to rely on a pragmatic belief in Government and, it seems from the above 
evidence, an argument can easily be put forward for the converse. Similarly, support of 
agricultural R&D production is complicated by the range o f alternatives available. Thus, an 
argument against public production is the regulation and subsidy o f private industry. 
Consequently, it seems that the arguments from welfare analysis are too general in nature to 
provide any convincing justification for the public support o f agricultural R&D. 
Accordingly, the next section examines the arguments which have emerged directly from the 
implementation o f agricultural policy in the UK.
1.2.2. Agricultural Policy Approach
Arguments which have evolved from agricultural policy perceive the provision of R&D in 
terms o f its underlying ability to achieve certain goals. Thus, the justifications advanced 
emerge directly from the development o f UK farming and related policy. It can therefore 
offer a dynamic perspective on the question o f state support and is the concern o f the next 
section.
1.2.2.1. UK Farming is Too Fragmented to Support Agricultural R&D
A dominant argument which emerges for the support of agricultural R&D relies on the 
belief that individual farmers do not have the ability nor the motivation to fund such 
investigations, because fanning is a small-scale activity. Thus, a low income level and a 
lack o f protection for new technological ideas are seen as the primary obstacles to the 
farming sector funding its own R&D. Whilst this may certainly have been true in the first 
part o f this century, because o f rural impoverishment, it has to be questioned in terms o f the 
developments which have occurred in the agricultural industry during the post-Second 
World War period. Principally this is because agriculture has received from 1945 onwards 
a growing level o f Government support, which has aimed at improving the income and 
structure o f the farming industiy.
Since the Second World War, an increased concentration has been observed in the UK 
farming industiy. This growth in the average size of fanns is not a new phenomenon, as 
farms have been growing consistently larger from the 18th century onwards (Grigg, 1989). 
However, this trend has been accelerated by support policies after 1945, which have aimed
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to improve the structure and efficiency o f  farming and which have led to the substantial 
observed growth in farm size from this period onwards. Thus, although the majority o f 
farms before the Second World W ar were only small in size and the sector was highly 
fragmented, during the 1960s and early 1970s there was significant amalgamation. Figure 
1.1 charts the changing distribution o f  farm by size over this period.
Figure 1.1. Size Distribution o f  Farm Units in England and Wales between 1946 and 1996, 
percentage
□  Large 
Medium
□  Small
Source: M AFF (Various Years)
Figure 1.1 reveals the distribution o f large, medium and small farms over the period 1946 to 
1996 in England and Wales. It indicates that large farms, i.e. farms over the size o f 300 ha, 
have increased from 3.1% o f all farms in 1946 to 22.7% in 1996. The proportion o f 
medium-sized farms, between 100 and 299 ha, whilst growing in the 1970s, is now seeing 
some reduction in overall share within the UK farming industry. The most significant 
decrease has been in small farms, i.e. farms o f  between 5 and 99 ha, which have declined by 
20% over the same period. Consequently, there has been some concentration within the 
industry, which may have implications for the argument that farming is too fragmented to 
support some agricultural R&D investment.
However, while growth has been achieved, this has not translated into an increase in sectoral 
income. The level o f  real farming income between 1946 and 1996 has fallen by around 13% 
(Harvey, 1987; CSO, 1998). However, to a degree, this masks a rise in average incomes as, 
despite a total decrease in farm income, the number o f  farm holdings has also been reduced 
by around 55%, or 291 thousand farms in absolute terms. The greater percentage decrease 
in agricultural holdings represents a substantial increase in average income per farm.
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specifically, Table 1.1 shows that annual average incomes per farm has risen by around £5 
thousand, in real terms, over the fifty-year period. Consequently, it seems that the overall 
financial position of the farming sector has improved from 1946 to 1996. However, in 
comparison to the average salaries of workers in most other industries and services, farm 
incomes are around 20 to 30% less (Marks, 1989). Therefore, whether the farming sector is 
any more able as a result o f these changes to fund R&D work is questionable.
Table 1.1. Farm Income per Holding in 1946 and 1996, in 1985 prices
1946 1996 Percentage Change
Number o f Holdings, thousands 525 234 -55%
Farm Incomes Per Holding, £ 5,257 10,226 94%
Source: After Harvey (1987) and CSO (1998)
A means to circumvent the fragmented nature o f the industry has been the establishment 
over the century o f various collective agricultural groups. This has been successfully 
implemented in several countries, particularly in Denmark, France and New Zealand. In the 
last of these countries, a system of co-operatives, the majority o f which are voluntary, exist 
representing all sectors. The voluntary system works as long as the gains captured by the 
members exceed the costs of collective action. However, co-operatives were formed on 
commodity lines and their purpose is not specifically related to the funding of agricultural 
research. There are, therefore, other incentives for voluntary membership. Consequently, it 
would seem that the marketing systems of a nation’s agriculture may be more conducive to 
gaining levy funds. Within the UK a number o f levy boards have been established after the 
Agriculture Act (1993), with an emphasis on marketing major commodities. These are 
funded by a levy on producers or processors o f that commodity. However, the amount of 
income allocated to R&D expenditure varies greatly from body to body. In the UK only 
around £17 million pounds o f levy funds were channelled to agricultural R&D in 1996. 
Consequently, its viability as a practical funding mechanism is weakened.
Accordingly, it seems that, whilst agriculture in the UK has changed quite radically in 
various aspects, the economic position of farmers has not substantially improved. Indeed 
the growth in average farm size and the adoption of ‘factory’ methods of production do not 
seem to have raised the economic importance o f farming within society and, certainly do not 
obviously allow farming the ability to support its own R&D system.
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I.2.2.2. Agricultural R&D Supports Self-Sufficiency
Several arguments for the public funding o f agricultural R&D emerge from agricultural 
policy itself. The predominant contention for public support in the first half o f this century 
was the need for self-sufficiency in food production. This was first voiced after World War 
One and became a major motivation behind the passing of the 1947 Agriculture Act (Tracy, 
1989). Self-sufficiency has always been a prominent area of debate for an island economy, 
such as the UK. Agricultural R&D could be seen as enabling the country to become 
sufficient in its own food supplies by i) allowing higher input productivity, as well as 
reducing the need for inputs from abroad, ii) preventing potential shortages, e.g. through 
outbreaks of disease, and iii) by modifying non-indigenous agricultural products to grow 
under local conditions, as with the introduction of sugar beet in the 1920s. Ritson (1977) 
separates the origins of the self-sufficiency argument into a debate about security and one 
about the terms of trade.
The security of food supplies argument, whilst questionable at its inception, has weakened 
considerably throughout the course o f agriculture’s post-Second World War development. 
From a purely practical point of view, any future global war potentially threatens the 
annihilation o f the human race and so concerns about the length o f sufficiency in food 
supplies may be spurious. However, both MAFF (1996) and the European Commission
(1994) do highlight the threat of a ‘Chernobyl type accident’ as an argument for the public 
support o f agricultural R&D. Specifically, MAFF (1996) allocated around £834 thousand in 
1996/7 towards research on the monitoring of food for radiological contamination. 
However, this is only a small proportion o f the total research budget (0.6%) and in all 
probability is indicative of the level o f justification that this argument merits.
Likewise the power of the terms o f trade argument for self-sufficiency has been reduced 
with the opening o f global markets, advances in transport technology and, more recently, 
entiy into the EC internal market. Ritson (1977) pointed out that preserving self-sufficiency 
in excess o f that which would emerge from free trade presumes that the farm sector would 
be slow to respond to a crisis, requiring the government to take pre-emptive action. 
However, as underlined by Ritson, increasing the long-term production o f food is likely to 
be a costly method of securing food supplies. Consequently, the argument as a basis for 
support of agricultural R&D, as means to underpinning this goal, could be considered as part 
o f a costly solution and so questionable.
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1.2.2.3 The Taxpayer Benefits from Agricultural R&D
Another more specific argument arises from the long-term trends of agricultural prices and 
the effect o f technology on various groups. Cochrane’s ‘treadmill effect’ (1957) involves a 
phenomenon specific to the interaction between agriculture and technology. Innovative 
farmers adopt a particular technology before their fellow farmers, increasing supply at 
reduced cost and thus gaining higher profits. However, the consequent increase in supply 
reduces market prices. Consequently, if non-adopters fail to take up the technology, then 
their profits will be reduced. The implication of this would be that the late-innovating 
farmers have to acquire the technology to retain previous profit levels. Accordingly, it 
seems the main beneficiary of agricultural research is the consumer, who experiences lower 
prices. The inference o f Cochrane’s work is that it is not practical nor effective to extract 
payments from such a wide and diverse group as the ‘consumer’ and, therefore, the funding 
o f underlying agricultural R&D should be financed by taxpayers.
However, a more equitable means of funding this research would seem to be to impose a 
levy on a specific commodity. This appears to be a fairer system as only the consumer of 
that commodity would pay for the levy through higher prices. In the UK, the Meat Research 
Institute was founded by the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) in the early 1960s. 
Financing for research was provided half through Government funding and half through 
levies imposed on animals sold at slaughter and handled through the Meat and Livestock 
Commission. However, after 1971, the contribution from industiy began to decline as 
profits fell, because of increased European competition, and as such levy funding was 
eventually abandoned in 1980 (Henderson, 1981). This illustrates some problems with 
levies, namely their enforcement and the reliance on stable economic conditions. More 
successful schemes have emerged from France and New Zealand. In France, at present, a 
‘quasi-tax’ on agricultural products is collected, which, along with a flat-rate farm tax, funds 
the majority of agricultural R&D. However, it is generally maintained that the specific 
institutional and marketing structures involved in French farming have allowed this system 
to develop and its adoption in other economies is severely limited (Routerier, 1998). In 
addition, analysis concerned with the spread o f benefits of agricultural R&D (Freebairn et 
a l,  1982; Dryburgh and Doyle, 1995) have found that, dependant on the market structure of 
the industry, the benefits may not be fairly distributed. This latter study found that the main 
beneficiaries o f UK dairy research was the processing sector, with the farmer and consumer 
actually suffering losses in welfare.
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Furthermore, there is an inherent fallacy underlying Cochrane’s analysis, namely it only 
applies in a country without price-supports. As such it is applicable to the ‘laissez-faire’ 
period o f UK agriculture in the early part o f this century, but less obviously valid after the 
Second World War, during which internal prices have been inflated above world levels, 
making the argument spurious to UK agriculture today. On the contrary, Harvey (1991) has 
argued that technology which increases supply under a regime of price support, such as the 
CAP, is detrimental to both the consumer and the farmer. Specifically, he notes that 
increases in supply without a subsequent increase in demand will create surpluses, which 
either have to be stored or dumped cheaply outside the EU, so depressing world prices. He 
offers three policy options in this case. Firstly, support prices can be reduced, in which case 
domestic consumers will gain from R&D. However, the damage this would cause to farm 
incomes has prevented the EU from implementing such a policy. Secondly, restricting 
supplies using quotas will transfer the benefits o f technical change to the owners o f quotas, 
i.e. farmers. Thirdly, and more radically, he proposes stopping publicly-funded agricultural 
R&D with the aim of reducing surpluses.
What emerges, therefore, is an argument against output-enhancing R&D. That the taxpayer 
should be the sole means o f support for this R&D is questionable. This is because a 
situation of inflated prices and subsidised production, under the Common Agricultural 
Policy, has proved costly to the taxpayer. Conversely, because o f this, areas o f agricultural 
R&D which reduce output, such as animal welfare and environmental improvement, can be 
justified as meriting Government support.
I.2.2.4. Summary
Reasoning based on policy needs seems to offer several apparently valid reasons for public 
support o f agricultural R&D. However, the justifications are not unqualified. In particular, 
agricultural policies since the Second World War, with their reliance on encouraging output, 
have led to numerous distortions and negative effects on both the industry and the public at 
large. But while this may have removed some or much of the justification for public 
funding of output-enhancing research, there still appears to be some justification for public 
support o f non-output enhancing agricultural R&D, such as animal welfare and 
environmental protection.
Overall, the inference o f this analysis is that the question o f research funding cannot be 
considered in such simplistic terms as whether or not to support the agricultural research 
system, but instead must be assessed in terms o f the correct allocation of resources to the
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different areas o f R&D, In other words, some public funding for agricultural R&D is both 
justified and necessary. The key issue is where these public funds should most 
appropriately be channelled. Thus, various activities exist where the public sector should be 
paramount, or in which the private sector has neither the right nor the ability to fund. In 
order to establish this requires a deeper understanding o f the research process within 
agricultural R&D. This is the concern o f the next section.
1,3. The Process of Agricultural R&D
The traditional view of the research process is usually considered in terms o f a continuum. 
Thus, basic research is followed by applied and, finally, development work which leads to 
the introduction of a technology and in turn this affects economic productivity. A 
description o f these stages could be as outlined in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2. Research and Development Process by Type and Purpose
Research Type Definition
Basic The acquisition o f new knowledge with no particular application 
in mind
Applied-Strategic Research into a subject area which has not yet advanced to a stage 
at which an application that can be clearly specified
Applied-Specific Research specifically directed to producing an exploitable 
outcome
Development Using new or existing knowledge to create new products or 
processes
Whilst it offers an overview of the research process. Table 1.2 ignores the transfer of 
technology which is essential to successful adoption. Alston et al. (1995) state that not all 
research is for the benefit o f farmers, but other user-groups, such as policy-makers and 
scientists who gain from the increases in knowledge. Consequently, they point to the 
continuum which begins with veiy basic research in scientific disciplines, e.g. mathematics 
and genetics, and runs through to veiy applied and adaptive research with farm-level and 
policy-level applications (Huffman and Evenson, 1993). Consequently, when considering 
agricultural R&D, the process o f research becomes more complex. This can be illustrated in 
Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.2. A Model o f the Research Process with Agricultural Science
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animal welfare.
Applied
Specific
Development
User Groups
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Accordingly, ‘pure’ knowledge is predominantly created through basic and applied strategic 
R&D. At the basic end, research can be divided into both the natural and other ‘pure’ 
sciences. Both these areas consist o f work which is not directly related to agriculture, but 
could be considered as an essential background from which scientists can develop solutions 
to agricultural problems. This becomes more relevant when considering applied strategic 
work, which consists of scientific work which has an agricultural bias. Nevertheless, this 
work is at such a fundamental level that it could easily be applied to other areas. For 
instance work in the fields of cell reproduction and nutrition could be used as a basis for 
work in both human and livestock fields.
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The real distinction emerges when considering applied specific research which is solely 
directed at agricultural problems. Critically, the direction and outcome o f this work is far 
more foreseeable in comparison to the previous types. Hence, this type o f research can have 
general goals and can be directed towards a specific sector, e.g. crops and livestock. In 
addition, as its outcome can be generally determined, it can be divided into both productivity 
and non-productivity enhancing areas. Accordingly, non-productivity research in public 
good areas, such as animal welfare and rural diversification, calls for specific studies in 
relation to certain categories o f animal or types o f area. Furthermore, from this work actual 
solutions can be achieved through development work. This would include the introduction 
or adaptation o f technology or processes to achieve specific goals or, in terms o f the social 
sciences, the use of on-farm consultancies to improve productivity or exploit specific 
diversification opportunities. An important aspect o f this development process is the role of 
advice between the end-user and the producer of technology, which can help the adaptation 
o f the final product towards the specific needs o f an individual or group.
However, a caveat to the above delineation o f research is the interaction which exists 
between types. A number o f writers have emphasised that the research process is 
characterised by a complex series o f indefinable linkages (Thornley and Doyle, 1984; 
Rosenberg, 1990; Pavitt, 1991). Consequently, it has to be emphasised that basic, applied 
and development work are not distinct categories o f the research process, but intrinsically 
connected. This seems to complicate the traditional view that the public sector should be 
responsible for the majority o f basic research, whereas more applied and development work 
is the concern o f the commercial sector. Therefore, in terms o f the balance between basic 
and non-basic science, whilst knowledge is created through basic research, it can also be 
gained from applied and development activities, which may be o f benefit to future 
investigations in basic fields. More critically, an emphasis on applied science will actually 
create more technology for the advance o f agricultural policy goals. Thus, active 
participation by the public sector in these fields must surely be welfare increasing and the 
balance between these types of R&D should be reconsidered. This is further emphasised by 
Rosenberg (1990), who contended that private firms conduct basic research to understand 
new developments in science and to integrate them into their work. There can therefore be 
no clear division between public basic research and commercially orientated applied R&D 
and, to a degree, some overlap should occur.
Furthermore, research and development can be separated by activity to identify its level of 
appropriability and, hence, the role the public sector should play within agricultural R&D
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funding. Typically a separation is made between biological, mechanical, and chemical 
technologies, as well as managerial, e.g. agronomic, research (Ruttan, 1982, Pinstrup- 
Anderson, 1982; Thirtle and Echeverria, 1994). The last o f these studies found that 
differences occur depending on both the type and area o f research conducted. Their ideas 
may be summarised by the schematic diagram presented in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3. Research Process by Type and Area of Technology
Area/Type Basic Applied
Strategic
Applied Specific Development
Work
Managerial Public -
Biological
Chemical
Mechanical Private
Source: Thirtle and Echeverria (1994)
According to Thirtle and Echeverria (1994), basic research concerned with managerial 
improvements carries the greatest justification for public support. This is because it is 
essentially involved in the creation o f pure knowledge, which is difficult to protect, as 
opposed to development, or ‘adaptive’, work in mechanical fields, which is patentable and, 
therefore should be the concern of the private sector. Their study went further to suggest 
that UK agricultural R&D policy has largely ignored this rationale, quoting the case of 
MAFF allocating around 11% of its R&D budget towards ‘tractors and self-propelled 
vehicles’ in 1984.
However, this seems to ignore the interactions outlined above in terms o f the different types 
o f research. Consequently, it seems that the above scheme offers a somewhat simplistic 
view of public agricultural R&D funding. Rather areas of technology can be divided further 
into discrete blocks in terms o f livestock, crop and other agricultural areas. Thus, Figure 1.4 
presents this more specific view o f a publicly-funded agricultural research system in 
diagrammatic form.
The justification for public R&D is assumed to be an improvement in the productivity of 
agriculture, unless it is stated otherwise. Thus, whilst Figure 1.4 seems to follow Thirtle and 
Echeverria (1994) to some degree, in terms of support for basic research, there are specific 
areas which require support further up the spectrum and which are concerned with the 
public good. Accordingly, whilst the majority of work at the applied and development end 
is considered to be the concern of the private sector, it seems that some areas of R&D still 
carry a strong justification into both development and advisory fields.
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Figure 1.4 Justification o f  Publicly-Funded Agricultural Research System, by type and area
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Specifically looking at the areas themselves, it seems that managerial work has the strongest 
justification. Again, this is because the creation o f  pure knowledge is difficult to protect. 
However, the above schema is somewhat m isleading as managerial research into agriculture 
is, by definition, applied in nature. Consequently, the fundamental work, in areas such as 
m athematics, geography and psychology, will be conducted and, predominantly funded, 
from other sources and will ‘filter’ into fields such as agricultural economics and rural 
tourism management. Similarly, moving up the research spectrum into development and 
extension work it seems, from the arguments outlined above, that public support is only 
justified in offering solutions in respect o f  non-productivity goals. Thus, public-good 
research and advice in both livestock and crop areas are justified, along with support for 
diversification activities. This should merit increased justification, considering recent 
agricultural policy changes which aim to reduce farm income support for solely output- 
increasing activities.
In term s o f biological areas, a strong argument for public support em erges for work into 
converting crops into bio-fuels. One o f  the more salient arguments outlined previously 
justified public agricultural R&D as a means o f supporting infant industries. Therefore,
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agriculture as a provider of raw materials for other industries would not only be covered by 
this argument, but support may help to reverse the downward trend in economic growth 
within the UK agricultural industry. Consequently, work aimed at applied-specific goals is 
justified, but the case weakens at the development stage, as the private sector should be 
attracted to take up and develop this technology further.
The areas which are usually considered to be less appropriate for public funding by most 
writers in this area, namely chemical and mechanical, on closer examination are given a 
measure o f justification in Figure 1.4. However, again this is only in public-good fields. 
Accordingly, chemical research, whilst central to agricultural productivity for the majority 
of this century, is decreasing in importance as it has become replaced by biologically based 
compounds. Thus, the only work in specific applied fields that deserves support is that 
concerned with providing environmentaily-friendly alternatives for crop usage. This too, 
like bio-fuels, should become appropriable at the development stage and encourage 
commercial adoption. As such, public support for work at the development end of 
environmental chemical areas is only marginally justified.
Mechanical R&D for productivity-enhancement at the basic and applied strategic end, in 
crops and livestock seems justified as a basis for development into other areas, but given the 
opportunities for appropriation, should only be publicly supported to a degree. However, it 
seems that work in the field o f animal welfare, which includes behavioural studies at the 
basic end and its consequent application in respect of storage, transportation and feeding 
equipment, offers a strong degree o f justification for government support. Similarly, the 
dissemination o f this information is also critical, which, along with legislation against 
animal abuse, should encourage effective adoption o f improved animal welfare methods.
1.3.1. Summary
Analysing the specifics o f the agricultural research system offers a more complex picture of 
which areas should and should not continue to be publicly funded. This study has found 
valid arguments for the government support of certain areas o f R&D up to the development 
and extension stage where it is predominantly pursued for the enhancement of the public 
good. Consequently, it seems that there is no blanket formula for deciding which areas of 
agricultural R&D to fund and justifications for public involvement have to be considered on 
a case-by-case basis, as science policy dictates. The stark division between basic and
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applied R&D, which has occurred since the early 1970s, and the privatisation of the 
advisory service therefore emerge as rather simplistic policy solutions to the problem of 
justifying the continued funding of agricultural R&D.
1.4. Conclusion
Various arguments encompass the support o f agricultural R&D by the public sector. These 
have generally emerged in response to specific policy problems or from abstract theory. 
This gives an overall impression that justifications for public support remain static. 
However, there has been a very real change both in the goals o f agricultural policy and the 
agricultural research system itself, so that a more dynamic approach to assessing 
justifications for public funding is needed. Specifically, concentrating on the research 
process itself has been shown to give a more complex understanding o f the justification for 
public support, as opposed to the standard arguments usually applied to agricultural R&D. 
These findings have implications for the funding of public agricultural R&D and, as such, 
are dealt with under various headings outlined below.
1.4.1. The Role o f Basic Research in the Public Sector
That the public sector should fund basic research seems irrefutable. Indeed what emerges 
from analysis o f the research process is that basic research within agriculture is virtually 
non-existent, as this is predominantly an applied science. The conduct o f public research as 
a means to expanding the frontiers of science therefore cannot fail to be justified. 
Considering this as an indirect means to agricultural growth, the public sector is paramount, 
simply because the private sector will not fund this.
Real agricultural R&D begins with applied strategic research and this can be the domain of 
the public or private sectors. That industry will become involved in this area revolves 
around the concept o f appropriability. Thus, the chances o f a foreseeable gain dictate 
whether the private sector will become involved in a certain field. Demsetz’s (1969) 
contention that appropriability is merely a question o f applying legal mechanisms bears 
consideration in this context. Whilst, the passing o f appropriate patent mechanisms may 
make areas profitable, it does not necessarily mean that the private sector will invest into 
these areas. This is especially so in areas which require large investment.
Consequently, the public support o f applied strategic R&D can be seen as a means to 
reducing the disincentives for the private sector to invest in areas, especially where the 
social returns are high. However, pure knowledge is useless to the majority o f companies
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operating in the commercial sector, as they have neither the time nor resources to decipher 
their importance in order to develop agi'icultural technology from them. Hence, there has to 
be a degree of work concerned with embodying knowledge into some specific technology. 
Thus, some investment in applied-specific work has to be conducted to promote this and to 
encourage adoption o f such technologies. Thus, the removal o f whole areas o f the 
agricultural research service from the public domain is debatable and it seems that a more 
cohesive strategy for the removal o f research funds should accommodate the continued 
public funding o f basic, applied and development work, along with the appropriate 
dissemination.
1.4.2. Public Intervention and Output-Enhancing R&D
A growing concern with the public good argument for the state funding o f R&D has raised 
issues over the direction o f agricultural research. Until the 1980s the prime concern of the 
agricultural research system had been to achieve output growth. However, since that time 
there has been an observable switch towards supporting R&D connected with the 
environment, animal welfare and rural society. This relatively recent emphasis is quite 
remarkable, considering that the basis for public sector support, i.e. market failure, must 
surely be centred on these public good goals. That the bulk o f post-1945 agricultural policy 
has offered lavish supports for output increases and, that agricultural R&D has been the 
means by which this has been achieved, must surely raise questions retrospectively over the 
public support offered for the ARS in the last 50 years.
A caveat to the above discussion is that, whilst Government support o f science is now 
defined in terms o f its ability to both increase the quality o f life and create wealth, the 
division between these objectives is hard to define. For instance, producing a genetic 
marker will create wealth for the country, improve the quality o f the animal’s life by 
reducing stress and improve the consumers’ life by enhancing the quality of meat they 
consume. Consequently, most public research institutes would claim that their research 
encompasses both dimensions. Therefore, it would seem that the achievement o f both goals 
should be justified in the future.
1.4.3. The Role of Extension within the Public Sector
Until recently, the extension service was an intrinsic part o f the post-1945 agricultural 
research system. The decision by Government to release output-increasing advice into the 
commercial sector raised a question over the balance and direction o f public support. As
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outlined in Figure 1.2, it seems that advice is an essential part o f the continuum by which 
R&D is adopted successfully. Thus, the feedback o f information could arguably be included 
as part of the development process itself. However, the promotion o f public-good advice is 
in line with the above reasoning, which questions the justification for public sector 
involvement on theoretical grounds in relation to output-enhancing areas. Accordingly, the 
removal o f non-public good functions from the public advisory service seems to carry strong 
justification.
In summary, this chapter has presented an extensive overview of the arguments that have 
been used to support the public funding o f agricultural R&D. However, when considered in 
the context of agricultural research, development and advice some o f these arguments 
become spurious. Thus, this chapter has provided a conceptual framework for evaluating 
the justification for public sector agricultural R&D, outlining areas that merit continued 
support and those which do not. It automatically raises the question of whether the 
Government has adopted these principles when allocating funding to the public agricultural 
research service. Consequently, the next chapter provides an overview of the major 
developments, which have occurred in the UK ARS, as a way of answering this question.
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CHAPTER 2
THE INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF PUBLIC 
AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
2.0. The Institutional Development of the UK Agricultural Research Service
Throughout this century the organisation and administration of science has undergone 
radical changes in terms o f both its structure and purpose. The Agricultural Research 
Service (ARS) has altered as a result o f both the shift in the priorities of the science system 
and a shift in agricultural policy towards environmental and social goals. However, the 
history o f the agricultural research service reveals a number of issues which, in varying 
magnitude, have coerced the ARS into its present structure. These forces have emerged 
from a variety o f technological, social, political and economic circumstances and one o f the 
unanswered questions is whether these changes have materially improved or worsened the 
efficiency and performance o f agricultural research. To answer this question the history of 
the ARS needs to be interpreted and analysed as a series o f issues. Previous histories on the 
development of the Agricultural Research Service have recognised a number of 
chronological phases (Ellis, 1991; Thirtle, Palladino and Piesse, 1997). However, they have 
not directly related the phases to changes in Government research philosophy and 
involvement in science. This is arguably crucial to understanding the question o f whether 
continued public funding for agricultural research is justified.
Four issues need to be addressed. First, how far has agricultural research policy operated 
within the framework of agricultural policy? Second, how has the influence of Government 
in agricultural research varied over time in terms of both its direction and level o f funding? 
Thirdly, how have the UK agricultural research establishments adapted to the changes in 
Government involvement and to the Government’s perception o f publicly-funded science? 
Finally, how has the involvement of the private sector in agricultural R&D changed over 
time and what consequences has this had for the science base in the UK? In this chapter, an 
attempt is made to review these four issues in the context o f the historical development of 
the ARS.
2.1. Research and Agricultural Policy
Publicly-funded agricultural research and development (R&D) began during the final phase 
of ‘laissez-faire’ in British agriculture, evolving as a minor component of rural 
development policy. It therefore seems that at its inception there was no strong relationship 
between R&D and agricultural policy. That the Government saw both facets as separate 
entities during this period is indicated after the repeal o f the first interventionist 
Agricultural Act 1920, which led to the release o f money for the funding o f agricultural 
research (Ernie, 1961).
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However, the subsequent history o f agricultural R&D in the UK is arguably characterised by 
tensions between science priorities and Government philosophy. Nevertheless, Government 
statements throughout the century have been conducted in the belief that there is an 
underlying symbiosis between policy making and research. For this reason the historical 
development of agricultural policy in the UK can be seen as an evolving package of 
measures aimed at achieving various objectives. The interactions between agricultural 
policy and research policy are outlined in more detail below.
2.1.1. Agricultural Policy and Productivity-Enhancing Research
Throughout the 1930s a sporadic collection o f measures constituted an agricultural policy, 
the main thrust of which was the protection o f home markets against foreign competition 
(Tracy, 1989). A systematic policy for agriculture was only established after the Second 
World War. The Agriculture Act (1947) emerged from the very real threat o f world food 
shortages and a concern over the growing war-time balance o f payments deficit. Achieving 
stability of food supplies through efficiency o f production was the main mechanism used to 
offset these effects. In many respects these policy objectives were consistent with those of 
publicly-funded agricultural research which, since its inception, had aimed at raising output 
either through improving the quality o f inputs or increasing disease resistance (Riley, 1981; 
King, 1981).
This expansionist policy continued until production had caught up with demand in staple 
products when, after 1953, the Government began to pursue a policy of selective growth 
which guaranteed prices on a set o f commodities. A number o f wider policy measures also 
supported this stance and continued to develop into the 1960s. The most prolific of these 
policies was the National Plan (DBA, 1965) which had the general aim of increasing the 
UK’s competitiveness on international markets. However, the most significant effect on UK 
agriculture since 1947 was entry into the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) o f the 
European Union. The system of price intervention gave generous subsidies on most 
commodities, as well as protection from non-European trade. Agricultural output flourished 
under this system and in many ways deviated from the UK’s plan for selective output, as 
protection was offered for all commodities. However, the success o f the CAP raised 
questions over the viability of over-producing stocks of food. Reforms had therefore to be 
instituted within the CAP to curb outputs. The MacSharry plan in 1992 aimed at reducing 
expenditures on price support, encouraging rural and social development and protecting the 
environment. Whilst not changing the objectives of the CAP, broad social objectives were 
emphasised through a system of direct payments, instead of the previous system of
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commodity price supports. This time controls were intended to restrain production and 
allow for more environmentally friendly practices.
Closer analysis of Government spending shows increasing productivity as intrinsic within 
R&D priorities. Around half o f the MAFF research budget for 1996/7 was directed towards 
improving the economic performance o f agriculture (MAFF, 1996). Similarly, the Scottish 
Office Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD) contributes 60% of 
its resources towards underpinning advances in the competitiveness and efficiency o f the 
agricultural and food industries (Scottish Office, 1994). Recent Government policy seeks to 
'‘'‘underpin the industry’s competitiveness and market responsiveness where there is wealth 
creating potential and where there are opportunities fo r  increased UK sourcing and scope 
fo r  expansion into new markets” (MAFF, 1996, pp. 96). This is evidenced by around £50 
million expended towards both crop and livestock science in 1996/7 by MAFF with the 
intention o f improving economic performance.
2.1.2. Agriculture and the Wider Public Good
The growing public unease towards intensive farming, coupled with Government concerns 
over the administration o f the CAP, led to a refocusing o f agricultural policy during the mid- 
1980s. Within the UK the Agricultural Act (1986) introduced a number of Government 
sponsored schemes, most notably the establishment of Environmentally Sensitive Areas 
(ESA) and the Farm Woodland Scheme (FWS). These programmes supported the idea that, 
if farmers were to undertake more environmentally friendly practices on the farm, the costs 
should be subsidised by the Government. Similarly the European Union, through the CAP, 
directed increasing funds away from output-enhancing programmes, as reflected most 
notably in the controversial ‘set-aside’ scheme under which farmers were given payments 
for taking agricultural land out o f production.
Around the same time as these changes to agricultural policy occurred there were shifts in 
research priorities. The Research Councils organised their responsibilities to include 
environmental issues. The ARC, whilst concentrating on creating a competitive agriculture, 
stated an intention to give greater regard to the environmental consequences of agricultural 
and horticultural practice (AFRC, 1986). MAFF statements also began to show a shift 
towards emphasising environmental protection. Predominantly, agricultural programmes 
revealed an increasing concern with the over-use and safety of agro-chemicals (Cabinet 
Office, 1989). Crop research towards protecting and enhancing the environment attracted 
around £30 million o f R&D spending in 1996/7 (MAFF, 1996; Scottish Office, 1994).
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In addition, in the 1990s there have been increasing public outcries over the treatment and 
transportation o f farm animals. This has led to legislation both at national and European 
levels directed towards the humane treatment o f animals. This is reflected by a rise in R&D 
spending on animal welfare, most of which is concerned with the development and 
enforcement o f statutoiy and other controls on the treatment o f animals. This involves both 
behavioural research and its application to engineering in producing better environments and 
handling methods for livestock. Again, in 1996/7 MAFF and SOAEFD animal welfare work 
accounted for 20% of the ‘public-good’ component o f the R&D programme {ibid.).
2.1.3. Agriculture and Rural Development Policy
Agricultural research first began after growing social concerns over rural standards o f living 
led to the 1909 Rural Development Act. However, in the 1930s the emphasis shifted 
towards market protection rather than rural development. Rural living standards improved 
drastically after the Second World War and support for farming communities generally 
emerged from guaranteed prices and, later, incomes policies. As a consequence rural 
aspects of agricultural policy during this period received less attention and did not achieve 
any momentum again until the mid-1980s. Shifts away from output-enhancing goals led to 
support policies directed at non-farm activities. Whilst there were shifts from emphasising 
productivity in the 1970s with the Mansholt Plan, which directed small amounts of money 
towards various rural objectives, little was conducted in this area by the EU until the 1988 
reforms of structural funds (European Social Fund, the Regional Development Fund and the 
Guidance Section o f the price guarantee scheme). More specific measures were aimed at 
speeding up the adjustment o f agricultural structures, with a particular view to reform the 
CAP (Tracy, 1989). Consequently, funds have been directed towards improvements on the 
farm and on social assistance to farmers.
Rural development R&D forms an integral part o f a policy for enhancing the countryside. 
The most prominent area of research funding is concerned with underpinning the 
Countryside Stewardship Schemes and the establishment o f Environmentally Sensitive 
Areas. This is concerned with research on the interaction between agriculture and the 
environment, and includes policy research over the operation of these schemes. Generally, 
the remaining areas o f rural development work are related to methods o f protecting natural 
resources and animal environments.
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2.1.4. Summary
W hilst the relationship between R&D and Government seemed ad-hoc before the Second 
World War, the development o f  a policy for advancing productivity after 1947 was 
supported by the agricultural research service (ARS). For the bulk o f  its post-war history 
the ARS has concentrated on expanding output and increasing efficiency. These two facets 
were therefore combined to some degree and, during this period, supplied a cohesive policy 
for increasing productivity in UK agriculture.
Similarly, changes to agricultural research in the early 1980s towards environmental 
concerns pre-empted agricultural policy in this area. Shifts in public attitudes have led to 
policy changes which seek alternatives to increasing productivity. Research work 
concentrating on the public good was, until recently, only minimal. However, at present 
MAFF and SOAEFD contribute around half o f  their research budgets towards these aims, 
with a commitment to increase funding in the future (M AFF, 1996). The divide between 
research is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. Research Expenditures o f MAFF and SOAEFD by area, 1996
□  Im p ro v in g  E co n o m ic  
P erform an ce
■  E n v iron m en ta l R & D
□  A n im a l W elfare
□  R ural D e v e lo p m e n t
F o o d  R & D
Overall, whilst improving economic performance amounted to £54.3 million in 1996, other 
'public good' areas garnered around £59.4 million. However, this does not include £21 
million allocated towards food research which is principally statutory work on food safety 
alongside some money towards improving the economic performance o f  the industry.
Nevertheless, whilst the overall thrust o f  research has been in line with Government policy, 
it seems that autonomy in research management has lead to a bias in direction away from
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Governmental aims. Accordingly, whilst the ARS sought productivity gains, it did not 
follow the shifts in Government emphasis, namely towards commodities which offered 
higher returns. This is exemplified in the case o f food research which was established and 
conducted under no direct policy and as such the work into food quality and storage can be 
seen as an anomaly in the policy context. Consequently, a major issue in the development 
o f the agricultural research service is its relationship with Government. More specifically, 
the amount of involvement the Government has desired in the management of public 
agricultural research. This is the concern of the next section.
2.2. Level o f Government Involvement in Agricultural Research and Development
The research institutions formed at the beginning of the century were only part funded by 
the state. Various public bodies were involved in the administration o f grants from their 
own budgets, predominantly the Departments of Agriculture and the Development 
Commission, in order to establish and fund research into commodities determined by 
producer and grower organisations. At its inception, therefore, lines o f decision making 
overlapped between these public and private bodies. Nevertheless, Government influence 
on research programmes at this stage was minimal and, on the whole, scientists were given 
the freedom to pursue their own investigations. Only in times of crisis did the Government 
become involved with research. For instance, a severe outbreak o f foot and mouth disease 
during 1922-23 threatened the UK cattle population and led to the setting up of an animal 
disease station at Compton (Henderson, 1981).
Since the Second World War, research funding has predominately been channelled through 
three main bodies, namely i) the agricultural research council (ARC), ii) government bodies, 
such as MAFF and the Scottish Office, and iii) the universities. However, growing 
pressures, predominantly rising costs of research and development, led to changes in the 
organisation and management o f the research system. As such various phases can be 
identified in the development of Government involvement with the agricultural research 
service (ARS). A distinct period emerges up to 1972 during which the ARS experienced 
fluctuating levels of autonomy in research management, A number o f economic and 
political factors emerged in the 1960s which led to the introduction o f national goals within 
the overall framework o f science planning. This culminated in a phase between 1972 and 
the early 1990s o f strict accountability for the publicly-funded applied and development 
work of the research bodies. The final phase from 1993 onwards resulted from a re-
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organisation o f the research system, which severely reduced the amount of steerage 
available to policy makers.
2.2.1. The Extent of Autonomy
The Agricultural Research Council (ARC) was established in 1931 chiefly to provide advice 
and co-ordinate research amongst the Departments o f Agriculture and the Development 
Commission. However, the decisions on the work to be conducted remained with the 
funding bodies. That the ARC was to be managed on an autonomous basis had been 
determined by a Committee established in 1918 concerned with Government administration. 
The structure o f the only research body in existence at the time, the Department of Scientific 
and Industrial Research (DSIR), was reviewed in light o f a decision to establish a medical 
research council. The DSIR enjoyed a large degree of autonomy and was advised by a Privy 
Council consisting o f scientists, who directed and allocated resources for research 
programmes. In supporting this structure for future research bodies, the Committee 
advocated a belief in the ‘independence of science’:
"It is important, also, to observe that, although the Minister in 
charge o f  an administrative Department is answerable to 
Parliament fo r  the work o f  the Committee [the then Medical
Research Committee] we have o f  set purpose, and fo r  two clear
reasons, classified the Committee as a service o f  general 
character and not as a body engaged upon research fo r  the 
immediate purpose o f  a single administrative Department”
(Quoted in Henderson, 1981, pp. 22)
This approach was commonly referred to as the ‘Haldane Principle’ after the head of the 
committee, Viscount Haldane. Consequently, the Agricultural Research Council was to be 
managed on the same lines as the DSIR, with advisory bodies consisting o f representatives 
of scientific repute deciding on research priorities. There were therefore only tenuous links 
between the Agricultural Research Council and Government bodies at its inception.
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The implications of the Haldane principle were only fully realised after the Second World 
War, when research funds were growing substantially and the ARC was granted the right to 
establish its own institutions. Concerns were voiced, usually from the ARC, regarding an 
overlap o f interest between its own institutes and those sponsored by the Ministry of 
Agriculture. The Agricultural Research Act (1956) was passed after much debate over these 
concerns. Under this legislation the institutes previously controlled by the Ministry of 
Agriculture were transferred to the ARC’s financial and administrative responsibility. 
Hence the direct influence of Government was removed and shifted to an advisory capacity 
within the Privy Council for Agricultural Research.
Throughout this time the Higher Education Institutions (HEI) remained relatively free from 
Government intervention. University research was usually basic in nature and a 
complement to an institution’s educational activities. It was therefore considered to be 
administratively impossible to control and direct research programmes. Similarly, the 
National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS), established in 1947 for the transfer of 
research results into practice, operated between the farmer and the research institute. 
Consequently, it relied on the advice from staff working with farmers to provide direction in 
research programmes. Accordingly, this system seemed self-governing and it could be 
ascertained that Government influence was only slight during this period.
2.2.2. Emphasising the National Need
After the Second World War the sophistication of research increased and led to a greater 
investment in advanced and expensive equipment. Throughout the post-war years as 
research funds grew. Government science policy showed a growing concern over obtaining 
value for money on its investment. This influence first emerged on the advisory committees 
of research bodies. Whilst previously populated by public scientists, Agricultural 
Departments became increasingly represented on these committees.
However, whilst the autonomy of the Research Councils was not affected, fears were 
expressed over the lack o f co-ordination in research effort and there were calls for ‘‘a 
rational system o f  apportioning resources between the research agencies under the Haldane 
System ” (Trend, 1963, para. 52). This search for producing a system which would increase 
the national benefit culminated in the Science and Technology Act (1965). The Act sought 
to modify the organisation o f the Research Councils without affecting the independence of 
scientists and shifted funding decisions away from the Treasury towards the Department of 
Education. This body was chosen because its functions were not particularly relevant to the
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fields o f the Research Councils and therefore helped to achieve the aim o f preserving the 
Haldane principle to some extent (Henderson, 1981). Consequently, its name was changed 
to become the Department o f Education and Science (DES).
Pressures for national relevance led the Research Councils to begin assessing their own 
research programmes and set criteria that would allow for the possible success and scientific 
importance o f their work. The ARC stressed the usefulness o f the research it was 
undertaking and, in turn, founded a working party to consider its future programmes in 
agricultural research and established three criteria for assessing its research projects. These 
were i) the future importance to agriculture o f the chosen objective, ii) the prospects for 
success, and iii) the scientific importance o f the work (Henderson, 1981, pp. 92). However, 
a later programme which aimed to achieve some systematic planning within programmes 
stated that little was known about the full extent o f research projects conducted within each 
institute before the 1970s (Ulbricht, 1977). That the ARC could confidently assess all its 
research against these criteria has therefore to be questioned. Similarly the ARC had not felt 
the need to establish such a working party before this period, which perhaps indicates that 
questions of national relevance were being asked for the first time within the ARC.
2.2.3. The Rise in Accountability
Several different factors emerged within the UK Government during the 1960s that 
culminated with the imposition of an accountability mechanism on the science system. 
Kogan and Henkel (1983) have traced the rise of administrative prudence in Government. 
This is evidenced by the establishment o f public expenditure surveys in the early 1960s 
which grew in complexity over the decade and began to consider how much the UK could 
afford to spend on an area or whether it could be more profitably invested elsewhere.
The early 1970s saw the culmination o f these trends with the pursuance by the Heath 
Government towards gaining certainty in decision making. Ministers were called upon to 
review the functions of their departments in order to clearly define the levels of 
responsibility and accountability. Within this remit the Government adopted a report 
prepared by Lord Rothschild concerned with the management o f Government R&D, 
subsequently referred to as the Rothschild Report.
In an attempt to maximise the efficiency in allocation of public R&D funding, the Haldane 
principle would be replaced with a ‘Customer/Contractor’ mechanism. Specifically, this 
relied on there being an explicit divide between basic research, defined by Rothschild as 
"the discovery o f  rational correlations and principles” (Rothschild, 1971, para. 7), and
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applied research which had a practical application as its objective (ibid., para. 6). The 
direction of applied research, Rothschild contended, should not be deeided by scientists, but 
by the body paying for that research. This body was referred to as the ‘Customer’. The 
Customer would decide on the research needed and then choose a ‘Contractor’. The 
consequence o f the Government’s adoption o f the Rothschild Report was a shift in funding 
from the DES to MAFF. Initially, Rothschild had foreseen MAFF to be in control o f 77.5% 
o f the funds for agricultural research (ibid., pp. 21). However, Table 2.1 shows this target 
was never achieved and that the MAFF share was never really better than 50% even at the 
height o f its implementation.
Table 2.1. Division o f MAFF/DES Research Expenditure in Current Prices, £ million and
1976 1980 1982 1990/1
MAFF 19.1 30.4 44.3 45.1
DES 15.1 29.5 41.9 88.4
M AFF Share o f  Budget 56% 51% 51% 54%
Source: ARC (Various Years)
The principal effect o f these changes was the development of a highly complex 
administrative structure within the agricultural research system. This structure, that was 
intended to create better value for money, led to feelings within the scientific community 
that it was removing resources, which could have been better employed in research (Kogan 
and Henkel, 1983). Furthermore, Ruttan (1982) criticised the fact that, although the 
administration o f research programmes was improved, it did little to refine the management 
o f research. Fears were also expressed over the loss o f flexibility experienced by the 
Research Councils in allocating some of their resources to commissioned work (DCS, 
1979).
2.2.4. Shifts in the Accountability Mechanism
The Thatcher administration effected fundamental changes to the research system from 1979 
onwards. More pressure was imposed on the Civil Service to create better operating 
efficiencies within the public sector. This emerged with the creation o f the Office o f 
Science and Technology (GST) in 1992. This new body undertook the administration o f the 
science grant from the DES. The Realising Our Potential policy document (OST, 1993) 
ushered in another change to the re-organisation for the science system. Whilst stating a 
commitment to strengthening the ‘Customer/Contractor’ principle for departmental applied 
and development work (ibid., para. 1.18), it also claimed to support autonomy for the
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running of Research Councils. The report cited the Haldane principle which it defined as 
"the day to day decisions on scientific merits o f  different strategies, programmes and 
projects” (ibid., para. 3.23), but highlighted the need for some mechanism to co-ordinate 
activities and working practices. This was to be achieved by the establishment of a Director 
General o f the Research Councils (DGRC), who would advise the OST on the distribution 
of funds between Research Councils. Similarly advice was provided to the OST from newly 
formed ‘Technology Foresight Groups’ (TFG) to help decide priorities on the future needs 
o f each industry.
These changes had followed a period of reduced funding for applied and development work 
with the aim of increasing industrial involvement. Consequently, the Customer/Contractor 
mechanism became undermined as steerage relied on setting goals for publicly-funded 
applied and development work. Accordingly, accountability shifted emphasis towards the 
research institutes themselves through a series of Government scrutiny reviews o f public 
research establishments. These began in 1994 aiming to establish whether duplication of 
research did occur in areas o f public research. These could then be identified as areas which 
should be privatised (RRI, 1994). Where privatisation was not feasible then the scrutiny 
would identify areas for rationalisation o f facilities and capabilities. It would also consider 
whether changes in current ownership and financing arrangements would lead to more 
effective operation and better value for money. Government scrutiny reviews would be 
undertaken every 4 years for research institutes. Consequently, it seems that the 
Government has removed itself directly from dictating publicly-funded research 
programmes within the research institutes. The onus o f national relevance o f results has 
therefore been placed back into the hands o f the scientists, with the role o f Government as 
an invisible hand threatening privatisation.
2.2.5. Summary
The relationship between the Government and the Agricultural Research Service has 
changed radically over this century. The Haldane Principle instituted the philosophy within 
UK research that the scientists were the best qualified to decide on the direction and 
allocation o f funds for research programmes. Whilst this seemed appropriate before the 
research system grew, increasing levels o f expenditure and pressing demands for nationally 
relevant outcomes within Government gave rise to an accountability mechanism known as 
the ‘Customer/Contractor’ principle. The Agricultural Research Council saw half of its 
funds re-allocated to MAFF for applied project work. However, after subsequent cuts in 
these areas during the 1980s steerage returned towards concentrating on the relevance and
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quality o f the institutions themselves and autonomy has returned to a lesser extent within the 
agricultural research service.
The level o f Government involvement has had an influence on the size and activities o f the 
Agricultural Research Service. To understand this further, the bodies which operate within 
the ARS require further examination. This is to establish the extent to which these changes 
have affected the producers of agricultural R&D. This is discussed in the next section.
2.3. The Evolution of Agricultural Research and Advisoiy Bodies
The UK agricultural research service (ARS) is comprised o f a complex number of bodies. 
By far the largest conductor of research is the Agricultural Research Council (ARC)', which 
governs institutions in England and Wales, as well as recommending funding arrangements 
to the Scottish Office for their equivalents, the Scottish Agricultural Research Institutions 
(SARI, now SABRI^). The Department o f Agriculture in Northern Ireland (DANI) also 
conducts research in its own institutes and at the Queen’s University, Belfast. The 
agriculture departments within universities and the agricultural colleges within the UK also 
undertake research usually o f a fundamental nature. The transfer o f results was achieved 
through the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) in England and Wales 
until 1996, at which time it became a private agency. A much reduced advisory function is 
now provided by the Farming and Rural Conservation Agency (FRCA). The Scottish 
Agricultural College (SAC) offers both publicly-funded advice to farmers in Scotland and 
undertakes research into agricultural problems.
At various stages of its development the ARS has changed in size. For the majority of its 
history there has been a sustained growth in expenditure, for which the Agricultural 
Research Council (ARC) has been the main beneficiary. However, radical changes emerged 
in the 1980s which affected both parts of the research-advice continuum and severely 
reduced its presence within the agricultural industry. As such, the following analyses can 
be divided into three stages, namely, i) the establishment o f research bodies, ii) the 
expansion of these bodies, and iii) the decline o f agricultural research.
‘ Changes have been imposed on the name throughout this history. It became the Agricultural and Food 
Research Council (AFRC) in 1982 and the Biotechnology and Biological Science Research Council (BBSRC) in 
1994. However for clarity the first names allocated to establishments will be maintained.
 ^Scottish Agricultural and Biological Research Institutes.
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2.3.1. The Establishment of Research Bodies
State-funded agricultural research emerged indirectly with the dispensing o f sporadic grants 
to Higher Education Institutions (HEI) in the 1890s. Direct funding o f agricultural research 
did not begin until after 1909. Reflecting the growth o f Liberalism in early-twentieth 
century British politics, the Development and Road Improvement Funds Act was passed in 
1909. It intended to improve the living standards of the countryside predominately by a 
programme of afforestation and road building (Russel, 1966). Consequently, expanding the 
resources for the proper scientific development of agriculture and fisheries was only a small 
facet o f this policy. Funding was administered by the Department o f Agriculture and 
Fisheries (DAF) in England and Wales on the advice o f the Development Commission, 
which had been established with the concern of promoting the social and economic 
development o f rural England. In Scotland, grants for research were allocated from its own 
Department o f Agriculture. The Commission upheld the belief that specialisation was a 
necessity for the advance o f knowledge and allocated funds to institutions focused on 
certain areas of research throughout the field o f agriculture. Consequently, this Act began 
the systematic establishment of state-funded agricultural research institutions throughout the 
UK.
Public funding involved the awarding o f a lump-sum grant 'whenever Government saw fit' 
from a development fund towards the establishment of a research station (Ernie, 1961). The 
producers' organisations and the County Councils were expected to highlight the need for 
research in their own specific field and would usually have to offer around half of the 
running costs. This would be matched by money from the Departments of Agriculture. 
Whilst the Development Commission would administer grants, the Agriculture Departments 
would be responsible for the work of these institutes. In total around 32 agricultural and 
horticultural research establishments emerged to form the public agricultural research 
service between 1909 and 1931. O f these, 16 were concerned with all aspects o f plant and 
crop science, 12 with animal disease, nutrition and breeding and the remaining four with 
agricultural engineering, economics and work into food storage quality (Henderson, 1981).
The development o f such a large organisation, with its mixture of funding sources and 
management in the hands o f individual scientific institutes, led to risks o f an overlap of 
effort. There was, therefore, a need for the systematic organisation o f each research 
discipline within agriculture. Accordingly, the Agricultural Research Council (ARC) was 
established in 1931 to provide criticism and advice to the Agricultural Departments and the
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Development Commission. To oversee the management and funding o f the ARC the Privy 
Council for the Organisation o f Agricultural Research was also established at this time.
2.3.2. The Expansion of Agricultural R&D
The Second World W ar and its effect on food supplies changed the way in which 
Government perceived agriculture. Research began to be seen as a means to underpinning 
productivity increases and, along with the agricultural industry itself, experienced a 
sustained period o f increased public investment. The expansionary period began in the 
early 1950s and ended in the early 1980s, with the ushering in o f  the Thatcher 
Administration and subsequent pressures on public sector financing. Figure 2.2 shows the 
growth in real terms o f the major bodies conducting research during this period. Total 
funds grew by an average o f 7% per annum from 1952/3 to 1983/4. The major recipient o f  
these funds was the ARC. W hilst average growth rates in the Scottish Office Agriculture, 
Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD) and M inistry o f  Agriculture, Fisheries 
and Food (M AFF) research expenditure were 9% per annum, during this period the ARC 
experienced an average increase in funding o f  15% per annum. The research expenditures 
o f the Department o f  Agriculture for Northern Ireland (DANI) and the University Grants 
Committee (UGC) remained relatively constant.
Figure 2.2. Total Public Expenditures on UK Agricultural R&D from 1952/3 to 1984/5, in 
real terms, £ million in 1970 prices^
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Public expenditures were deflated by the RPI index.
48
After the 1956 Agricultural Research Act the ARC was charged with the management o f the 
whole organisation for agricultural, horticultural and food research in England and Wales. 
Accordingly, it secured financial responsibility from MAFF for 14 research institutes. 
Similarly after the Second World W ar the ARC began to establish 8 o f  its own institutes in 
areas which it believed merited further investigations.
The a r c ’s approach to organisation seems to outline an ambition to assume responsibility 
for the whole area o f agricultural research and as a consequence it developed into a ‘many 
tentacled structure’. The establishm ent o f  Research Units, usually situated within 
Universities and concentrated on unspecified basic research, seems to have been the A R C ’s 
contribution to the advancement o f knowledge. Consequently, in light o f  the relatively low 
capital costs o f  establishing Units, it is questionable whether there was a justification for 
establishing further research institutes. In 19 8 1 it was estimated that around 60 to 80% o f 
an institute’s expenditure was on staff costs (Henderson, I9 8 I, pp. I I I ) .  The Research 
Units therefore offered relative flexibility and reduced capital costs. Figure 2.3 shows the 
distribution o f  funds between the MAFF institutes, the ARC institutes and the Research 
Units.
W hilst during this period 22 Units were established, their proportion o f  the budget was 
minimal, due largely to low capital costs. However, at the end o f  the 1970s with the 
increase in commissioned programmes from MAFF, there was a decline in importance o f 
the Units and many were absorbed into the research institutions themselves.
Figure 2.3. Allocation o f AFRC Research Expenditures from 1965/6 to 1984/5, in real 
terms, £ million in 1970 prices
□  AFRC U n its
■  M AFF Institu tes
□  AFRC Institu tes
C: ”
Source: AFRC (Various Years)
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2.3.3. The Growth in Food Research
Although the M inistry o f A griculture’s in-house activities began in 1940 with the Pest 
Infestation Laboratory, the safety o f  food produced and imported was believed to be the 
remit o f  the Department o f  Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR), which was 
responsible for the food laboratories during this period. The em phasis o f  these institutes 
was on food safety and the analysis o f  toxic residues in food. It would therefore be true to 
say that very little research was conducted on food improvement. Research in this area was 
usually as a spin-off from agricultural problems, such as the quality o f  meat, which would 
be part o f  a w ider programme concerned with beef, sheep and pig meat production.
W ork directly concerned with the quality o f  food emerged from the ARC in the early 1960s 
with the establishm ent o f two institutes, the M eat Research Institute (M RI) and Food 
Research Institute (FRI). The former was concerned with the effects o f  storage on the 
quality o f meat carcasses and was part funded by levies from the M eat and Livestock 
Commission. However, the majority o f publicly-funded work was channelled into the FRI 
and its predecessors, the Low Temperature Research Station and the Ditton Laboratory. 
Tasks prioritised for this institute related to food in general other than red meat and 
concentrated more on storage than the quality o f food produced. Figure 2.4 shows the 
allocation o f  expenditure on food research in proportion to agriculture.
Figure 2.4. AFRC Expenditure on Food in relation to Agricultural R&D, in real terms, 
£ million in 1970 prices_____
□  F ood  
■  Agriculture
I  S
Ov 00 00 00 00
g . O ' O ' ^
Source: AFRC (Various Years)
Figure 2.4 highlights the A R C ’s antipathy towards food research throughout most o f its 
earlier period. Instead the majority o f agricultural research institutes concentrated on 
products up to the farm gate and were constrained by capital costs to continue on this path.
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Equally, food science was for much o f this earlier period not considered a scientific subject 
in the same sense as work on genetics or soil chemistry and, therefore, suffered from a lack 
o f top scientists in the field. It was also felt that the private sector should play a bigger role 
in funding both the MRI and FRI (Henderson, 1981). However, little interest was voiced 
from industry and the burden o f support remained with the public sector. In the early 1980s, 
after criticism from a Select Committee lamenting the lack o f food research, the title and 
remit o f the ARC was changed to incorporate food (Agriculture Committee, 1983). Whilst 
no new institutes were formed the level o f its expenditure grew in proportion to its other 
disciplines and in 1993/4 food research had a share of total expenditure of around 20% 
(AFRC, 1994).
2.3.4. The Changing Nature o f Advisory Bodies
Public advice to farmers first emerged from the HEI sector at the turn o f the century. 
However, it did not occur on a systematic scale until the Second World War with the advent 
of the County Agricultural Organisers. The setting up of a national advisory service 
reflected the growing awareness during the Second World War o f the significance of 
technical advances in improving agricultural productivity. The National Agricultural 
Advisory Service (NAAS) was established in 1947. Within its advisory capacity the NAAS 
conducted development work in order to provide technical advice to farmers and to relate 
research findings to specific regional problems. In undertaking R&D, the NAAS was 
concerned with the various processes between the scientific and technical aspects of 
production. This work was conducted on experimental husbandry farms and science 
stations and concentrated in the main areas of interest to the improvement o f farming. These 
farms were dedicated to applied work on insect pests, soil fertility and animal nutrition 
(Watson, 1946).
The work o f the NAAS continued unchanged throughout the 1960s. Figure 2.5 shows that 
NAAS expenditure throughout this period hovered around £1-2 million in real terms until 
the early 1970s. The re-organisation o f the NAAS into the Agricultural Development and 
Advisory Service (ADAS) in 1971 saw larger amounts o f money being directed into it. 
Specifically, the formation o f ADAS reflected growing demands from the farming industry 
for a body involved in overall farm management.
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Figure 2.5. Advisory Expenditures for England and Wales, in real terms, £ million in 1970 
prices___________________________________________________________________________
^  sO 00 O  
^  ^  'O  'O
Source: HM Treasury (Various Years)
ADAS was an amalgamation o f  the NAAS extension service along with three other 
Government bodies involved with agricultural problems, namely i) the Agricultural Land 
Service, advising on land use and structural changes, ii) the Field Drainage and Water 
Supply Service, involved in land improvement work, and iii) the V eterinary Investigation 
Service, providing diagnostic services to local veterinarians. This re-organisation was a 
determined effort to reduce Government involvement in agriculture and increase self- 
reliance by industry (Emry-Jones, 1970).
Figure 2.5 shows the increasing annual expenditures directed towards ADAS in support o f 
its duties. From 1970/1 until 1984/5 real annual expenditures increased by an average o f 
9.9% per annum, compared to an average annual increase o f  only 2.7% in the preceding 
period o f  1952/3 to 1969/70. Therefore, in light o f  the earlier statem ent that Government 
should reduce involvement and increase self-reliance on the industry, this staggering rise in 
ADAS expenditure is surprising. If anything the amalgamation o f  research services and this 
continued growth in public funds shows an increased involvement by the public sector with 
the farming industry.
2.3.5. Agricultural R&D in Scotland and Northern Ireland
Constitutional arrangements within the UK led to differences in the organisation o f 
Agricultural Research facilities both in Scotland and Northern Ireland. W hereas England 
and Wales have undergone the severest changes in management and adm inistration, the rest 
o f  the UK has remained relatively unaffected. The organisation that emerged for research in
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Scotland now consists o f  5 Scottish Agricultural Research Institutes (SARI). The ARC has 
retained a purely advisory role to the Scottish Office Agriculture, Environment and 
Fisheries Department (SOAEFD), which is in charge o f adm inistering grants between 
institutes. SOAEFD also distribute grants to the Scottish Agricultural College (SAC), 
which undertakes the advisory and development work for the farming industry in Scotland. 
The Universities conducting agricultural research, predominantly Aberdeen, Edinburgh and 
Glasgow, are the only institutions not funded by SOAEFD, but instead by the University 
Grants Commission (UGC). Figure 2.6 shows the advisory and research expenditures o f 
SOAEFD.
Figure 2.6. Agricultural and Advisory Expenditures for Scotland, in real terms, £ million in 
1970 prices___________________
■  A d v is o r y  
□  R esearch
Source: SOAEFD (Various Years)
Funding has grown relatively steadily throughout the period from 1952/3 to 1984/5. The 
average increase has been 9% per annum. Disaggregating amongst the various bodies, the 
SARI’s have enjoyed a steady growth until the mid-1980s, when current expenditure 
reached a peak o f around £22 million. In contrast, capital expenditure, in line with the re­
building programmes recommended by the ARC, continued to increase at a steady rate for 
much longer. Advisory expenditures, along with development spending, at SAC also 
increased steadily upwards during this period.
Within Northern Ireland, the Department o f Agriculture for Northern Ireland (DANI) is 
responsible for all research, education and extension. In-house research and education is 
conducted at the Queen's University, Belfast and at 8 research divisions around the country. 
The research is directed by 6 sector Committees which review the needs o f  the agricultural
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and food industry'*. The comparatively small size o f the region allows for better co­
ordination and closer links between the Committee members (consisting o f  scientists and 
representatives o f  the industry) and the farmers themselves than could be achieved in 
England and Wales. Data on DANI expenditure is hard to quantify. However, Thirtle, 
Piesse and Smith (1997) have estimated agricultural R&D expenditure in Northern Ireland 
to be around £9 million per year, but little can be drawn from these assumptions about 
funding.
2.3.6. The Decline of Agricultural R&D
The increasing demands from the Thatcher Administration to achieve efficiencies within the 
Civil Service and the belief in reducing the burden o f state funding initiated major changes 
to the agricultural research system. In 1984/5 cuts appeared in the Government funding o f 
science. The agricultural research budget suffered reductions o f  £10 million in 1986/7 and 
o f  £20 million in 1987/8, predominantly in applied and development work. The changes in 
research expenditure can be seen in Figure 2.7.
Figure 2.7. Total Public Expenditures on UK Agricultural R&D from 1984/5 to 1994/5, in 
real terms, £ million in 1970 prices.
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Figure 2.7. shows a slight dip in research expenditures, predominantly experienced by the 
AFRC. However, funds after 1989/90 returned to previous levels, with an emphasis on 
basic science (Thirtle, Piesse and Smith, 1997). Along with these funding pressures the 
AFRC had initiated a restructuring o f  its research stations which began in the early 1980s. 
As a consequence research was consolidated into 8 institutions, each concerned with a
 ^ T h e  S e c to r  C o m m itte e s  are c o n cern ed  w ith ; ru m in an ts, n o n -ru m in a n ts , h orticu ltu re , e n v iro n m en t, f ish er ie s , and
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distinct area o f agriculture and food research. This naturally led to the loss o f areas of 
expertise with consequent reductions in staff numbers.
The desire within Government to improve accountability and efficiency was further 
enhanced with the establishment o f ‘next steps’ agencies in 1988. This would mean that 
certain aspects o f the Civil Service could be hived off as agencies, which would provide 
specific services to the Government or other customers. Thus, from this period onwards 
the creation o f agencies or non-departmental public bodies would be as a means for the 
Government to release functions which, until that time, enjoyed direct public support. 
Those functions which would remain in the public sector would have to prove they were 
both necessary and best carried out under Government control. Consequently a series of 
reviews were initiated, referred to as ‘Prior Options’, which would investigate public 
establishments in terms o f their suitability for remaining in the public sector.
Only two years later ADAS was re-organised into two separate agencies. One agency 
would cover statutory work, whilst the second would be concerned with research and 
advisory activities. This re-organisation was stated to be a means to facilitate privatisation 
of certain functions within ADAS (NAO, 1990). Accordingly, after an extensive review it 
was eventually decided that its consultancy and research activities were to be privatised. 
MAFF stated the desire to have a ‘clean break’ in respect of all non-statutory work to the 
private sector, with an assurance that services provided to the Government could still be 
delivered effectively. The work which would not be transferred to the private sector, 
predominantly in environmental and animal welfare areas, was placed with a new agency, 
the Farming and Rural Conservation Agency (FRCA), which was established on 1st April 
1997.
‘Realising our Potential’ (OST, 1993) substantially altered the purpose and mission of the 
ARC. Along with its own institutes it had now to encompass the biological work of the 
Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC) and was charged with developing links 
with biologically based industries. As such the Council was renamed the Biotechnology 
and Biological Science Research Council (BBSRC) and adopted four centers from SERC 
concerned with the molecular and biochemical sciences. Similarly the mission of the 
BBSRC was widened to encompass the aim of understanding and exploiting biological 
systems for its potential users which were now listed as; ‘'the agricultural bio-processing, 
chemical, food, health care, pharmaceutical and other bio-technological related industries ' 
(BBSRC, 1995).
forestry.
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Consequently, the search for a wider market to justify public expenditure saw a shift away 
from solely agricultural related themes. The research institutes themselves concentrated 
more on expanding their basic research facilities in order to exploit opportunities in other 
areas. For instance, the Roslin Institute’s most successful product of recent years has been 
an anti-trypsin drug which is used in the treatment of spina-bifida. Similarly, most of the 
institutes have developed commercial arms which are concerned with exploiting their own 
research. The Babraham Institute (BI) conducts basic biological research which can be 
applied to non-agricultural related fields. Indeed, in 1997/8, the BI claimed to have only 
one project, concerned with animal welfare, which had any direct link with agriculture (BI, 
1997). There are, therefore, some indications that agricultural science has become less well 
represented within research institutes, now seeking new markets for exploitation.
2.3.7. Summary
The ARC has evolved into the main instigator of agricultural R&D in the public sector. 
Whilst starting life as only an advisory body to the Agricultural Departments, it has 
undergone the most radical changes to its role and purpose throughout this century. Post­
war increases in funds led to its expansion into most fields relevant to agriculture by either 
the establishment of institutes or funding fundamental work in research units. However, 
cuts in expenditure led to a re-organisation into 8 institutes and the widening o f its remit 
towards biological and biotechnological research indicates the decline of overall resources 
towards agricultural research.
Advisory services emerged within the educational sector and developed into a national 
service in the early post-war expansionist period. Nevertheless, funds were not heavily 
directed into this area until it was formed into ADAS. During the 1970s and 1980s 
increasing expenditure was directed towards ADAS despite, after 1987, charging for non- 
statutory research and advice. Reflecting the decline in public agricultural research, ADAS 
was privatised in 1997 and now only conducts statutory functions in its new form, the 
Farming and Rural Conservation Agency (FRCA).
Consequently, the most recent influence on the bodies involved within the ARS has been 
the demand placed by post-1979 Government administrations on reducing levels o f public 
support for areas o f the Civil Service. By far the most radical changes have occurred since 
this period and, consequently, the final section o f this history is devoted to analysing the 
effect of these policies.
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2.4. The Influence of the Private Sector
The public and private sectors remained relatively independent entities until the late 1970s. 
However, from 1979 onwards, there has been a commitment to reducing the burden of 
public funding by releasing public assets into the private sector. A number o f Government 
consultancy documents emerged in the early 1980s which gave an indication that industry 
ought to take a more participatory role in the conduct of public research. This, the 
government advocated, would allow for a more efficient use o f resources and also increase 
the exploitability of public sector research (ABRC/UGC, 1982; ABRC/ACARD, 1983).
These policy aims grew in importance after radical cuts in funding were imposed on the 
agricultural research system during the mid-1980s and reflected the increasing influence of 
the private sector on both the operation and funding of agricultural research. These key 
policy developments can be classified as i) the removal o f public support for near-market 
research, ii) privatisation o f public bodies, and iii) the promotion o f commercial 
involvement in the public sector.
2.4.1. Declining Public Support for Near-Market Research
The policy of withdrawing support for so called near-market research began in the latter part 
of the 1980s. Cuts in public expenditure were desired by the Government, which began to 
encourage industry to take a bigger role in the funding and priority setting of agriculture and 
food R&D. As part of this process an internal civil service document was produced, 
referred to as the ‘Barnes Review’, which explicitly desired the transfer to industry or 
termination of near-market research, which was defined as work which was of direct 
relevance to industry, in the public sector (Read, 1989).
An intrinsic part of this policy should have been the consultation mechanisms involved. 
However, in identifying programmes to be cut there were no formal consultations outside 
Government during the course of the Barnes Review (Read, 1989). Similarly, another 
criticism was the short time span in which this was conducted (Read et a l, 1988). This 
suggests that certain research areas were earmarked within the Ministry for cuts in 
expenditure. Thus, the consultations might be interpreted as a ‘warning’ for the research 
programmes that it no longer desired to fund.
Table 2.2 shows the full extent o f applied and development work conducted in the 
immediate period before the implementation o f the near-market policy. From this evidence 
MAFF-funded research seem to be the most susceptible to cuts in expenditure. If  the
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categories of specific applied and development work were deemed near-market, then around 
60% of the MAFF grant would be vulnerable. The ARC, with no research in either of 
categories areas seemed less likely to suffer reductions. Consequently, over the period 
between 1982/3 and 1989/90 MAFF research budgets fell by an average o f 5.3 % per 
annum, whereas the ARC for the same period saw a nominal annual increase o f 0.1%. 
However, the severest cuts in the ARC budget came in 1985/6 when grants fell from the 
previous year’s funding by 7.7% in real terms (Cabinet Office, 1991). This implied that 
near-market cuts impinged on certain areas o f applied strategic work as well.
Basic Applied Strategic Applied Specific Development
MAFF 3.8 32.2 36.4 27.6
ARC 58.3 41.7 nil nil
Source: Cabinet Office (1986)
Parallel to these changes in public support for R&D, levy boards were established or re­
organised following the Agriculture Act (1993), with the overall aim by Government of 
encouraging levy funds to substitute for reductions in public R&D expenditure (Thirtle, 
Piesse and Smith, 1997). As such, the boards were to concentrate on near-market research, 
conducting strategic work o f benefit to the sectors involved, the majority of which would be 
aimed at underpinning the effectiveness and competitiveness o f the industry. However, it is 
evident that the levy boards with a total research spend of around £14 million in 1993/4 
(ibid.), had not the ability or will to make up the cuts of around £30 million made in public 
R&D support in the mid-1980s (Read, 1989).
2.4.2. Privatisation of Public Bodies
Throughout the Thatcher Government there was a concerted push for departments to 
identify areas which could be transferred to industry. The National Seed Development 
Organisation (NSDO) was a Government owned body designed to multiply and sell seed 
varieties. The highly competitive industry within which the NSDO operated made it a 
candidate for transfer into the private sector. However, it relied predominantly on the 
varieties produced by the Plant Breeding Institute (PBI). These two bodies were sold as a 
package to Unilever in 1987, leaving the biotechnology aspect with the newly formed 
Institute o f Plant Science Research (IPSR) in Norwich.
Changes in the extension system began with the ‘Report o f  a Study o f  AD AS' (Bell, 1984). 
In deciding the future shape o f the agricultural advisory service the author recommended a
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market-led approach to the provision o f advice. In 1987 this eventually led to charges for 
consultation and for some of its research. However, public good research and extension, 
which the report defined as promoting environmental and animal welfare practices for 
farmers, were to remain publicly funded and provided without charge. Financial targets 
were set by MAFF and consequently ADAS research establishments were also expected to 
carry out non-statutory work on a commission basis.
Table 2.3 shows the effect of these changes on applied crop improvement research. Thus, 
whilst commodity groups increased spending by £4.7 million from 1985/6 to 1991/2, there 
was still a shortfall in total funds for R&D in this area o f £10.2 million in real terms. Pray 
(1996) also claimed that similar cuts were experienced in the applied animal sciences, while 
commodity groups for this sector only provided £2 million pounds for research in 1991/2.
Table 2.3. ADAS funding o f Field Crop Improvement R&D, in real terms, £ million in 1996 
prices
MAFF Commodity Groups Total
1985/6 27.0 2.3 29.3
1991/2 12.0 7.0 19.0
Level o f  Change, £ million (-15.0) .M .7 ) (-10.3)
Source: Pray (1996)
2.4.3. Commercial Involvement in Public Research Institutes
Indirect contracts from industry have been undertaken with the public sector throughout the 
history o f the agricultural research service. However, these remained minimal until 
Government policies emerged favouring increased private sector involvement. Webster 
(1988) traced the idea o f a ‘market for science’, namely a view that science could be 
developed and exploited in order to contribute to economic growth, to the Rothschild Report 
of the early 1970s. However, this was only applied internally within the public sector. In 
the 1980s radical changes emerged when the Thatcher administration fostered the 
philosophy of an ‘enterprise culture’. The public sector was to suffer reductions in 
expenditure in a bid by Government to create a more competitive atmosphere comparable to 
industiy. Coupled with these reductions were the establishment o f various schemes that 
supported increased co-operation between both public and commercial sectors.
Due to the needs for secrecy, data on the level o f linkage have never been declared. The 
ARC, whilst providing information on its commitment to collaborative programmes, has not 
disclosed levels o f funding from industrial partners. However, the level of spending on
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collaborative programmes was around £12.3 million in 1993/4. This compares with an 
overall budget o f £156.2 million in the same year (AFRC, 1994). Whilst the ARC did 
derive another £12 million o f income from contract research (ibid., 1994), it only reflects a 
small proportion o f research income emerging from external funding.
2.4.4. Summary
The concerted effort for private involvement by the Government since 1979 has seen a 
radical change in the direction and purpose o f the Agricultural Research Service. Recent 
Government policy has operated under the belief that the way to create a more efficient 
public sector producing research relevant to industry’s needs is to involve the private sector 
more. One consequence has been to reduce the public funding to agricultural research 
institutes. This has led to a major restructuring of both institutes and programmes. 
However, in terms of increasing private sector funding for R&D conducted in the public 
sector, the results have been quite small, with most agricultural research institutes still 
heavily dependent on public funding.
2.5. Conclusion
Whilst the agricultural research service has changed radically over the century, for the bulk 
of its existence it has remained relatively unfettered by Government influence. Under the 
philosophy of an autonomous management structure the ARS has grown considerably, 
emerging from a facet of rural development policy to becoming the basis for all non-medical 
bio-technological and biological investigations within the UK. This review has sought to 
describe these changes and why they have occurred. However, with its development a 
number o f issues have appeared which raise questions about the role and effectiveness o f the 
agricultural research seiwice throughout its existence.
The whole debate over policy and research interaction raises questions as to the ability of 
Government to dictate R&D programmes. The agricultural research system has experienced 
differing levels o f autonomy and accountability from time to time. However, the rises in 
accountability in the 1970s were the result o f internal pressures within the Civil Service, 
predominantly the push towards certainty in decision making and the rising costs of 
research. This indicates some degree o f dissatisfaction with Government control as opposed 
to the management o f an autonomous research council. The return to a modified system of 
autonomy under the policies outlined in 'Realising Our Potential ' seems to have been an 
acknowledgement by Government that its involvement can only be limited and that 
scientists are the best groups to decide on issues o f national relevance.
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In conjunction, the large growth of the ARC could also be accredited with the emergence of 
accountability systems. Under the system of autonomy the ARC enjoyed its longest period 
o f sustained growth and expansion. However, the ARC could also be accused o f spreading 
its resources too thinly to cover all fields, which in agricultural research involves a wide set 
o f disciplines. It may therefore be guilty o f believing that funds would rise continuously to 
cover all scientific areas it deemed would fit the mantle o f ‘agricultural R&D’. Thus, it 
could be contended that growth o f the agricultural research service may have emerged due to 
this pursuit of expansionism and that the consequent reductions and re-focusing towards the 
chemical and bio-technological industries were aimed at improving returns on these 
resources.
A related issue is the push for industrial involvement during the latter part of the ARS’s 
history. The switch was part of a general policy for removal o f public assets. However, 
what does emerge is the distinct absence o f the private sector. Whilst providing for some of 
the funds removed, indications are that both the levy boards and the commercial sector have 
not matched the cuts in public research expenditure. The near-market cuts o f the late 1980s 
of around £30 million have only been replaced by around £14 million from the levy boards 
(Pray, 1996). Similarly, Thirtle, Piesse and Smith (1997) found an overall reduction of 
commercial research by five percent since the initiation of the research cuts. Therefore, 
with the cuts in public expenditure, overall research spending in UK agricultural research 
has been reduced in recent years.
Another issue emerges over the role o f the NAAS and the ARC. At the inception o f the 
advisory service its work was considered independent of the ARC’s, which was seen as 
being concerned with more fundamental research. It was considered that the NAAS with 
stronger links to the farming industry would be better equipped to direct this research. 
However, it was made clear at its inception that the work o f the advisory service was only 
secondary to that of the ARC (Henderson, 1981). That this decree emerged from a body 
consisting o f ARC members questions whether this was a rational decision or merely a case 
o f empire-building within the public sector. During the 1950s the ARC successfully pushed 
for control of the MAFF-sponsored research institutes, which suggests overtones of the 
latter.
Agricultural R&D has, until recently, been predominantly concerned with increasing 
physical productivity. The general consensus has been that this has been successfully 
achieved, with average growth in agricultural productivity at around 1.9% per annum 
(Thirtle and Bottomley, 1992). This has been coupled with an agricultural policy, the main
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thrust o f which has been to increase output since the Second World War, Policy 
mechanisms have tended to take the form of subsides to encourage productivity. This too 
has been a success, creating an over supply o f most commodities and self-sufficiency for the 
majority o f foodstuffs within the Common Agricultural Policy (Tracy, 1989). Thirtle and 
Bottomley (1992) have shown a significant increase in annual average percentage growth of 
the agriculture sector between 1972 and 1985, with a trebling in growth rates compared to 
those prior to UK entry into the Common Agricultural Policy. That this has had a great 
effect on productivity questions the strength o f the relationship between research and 
agricultural policy. Research work conducted before 1972 could only garner a rate of 
around 1% per annum. The tremendous growth reported after 1972 therefore has to be 
related to the increased commodity supports which were offered by the CAP. This must cast 
doubt on just how much of the observed productivity growth o f the agricultural sector can 
be attributed to research induced technological changes. Instead it may indicate that farming 
had the capacity to increase outputs to some extent, through managerial improvements, 
regardless o f technological innovation.
However, the majority of economists are agreed that research spending is a major causal 
factor in productivity increases (Norton and Davis, 1981; Echeverria, 1990). If this is the 
case, then questions arise over the laxity o f an agricultural policy which supports output 
gains, for while subsidies can direct output, research strongly dictates the extent o f increases 
in output. Hence the push for output growth in the 1960s and 1970s led to subsequent 
problems o f over-capacity in farming and o f environmental damage, which are now key 
issues in formulating EU agricultural policies. There has, therefore, been some misdirection 
in supporting both agricultural R&D and agricultural subsidies. Similarly, now that 
environmental aims are gaining increasing attention in the formulation o f agricultural policy 
it is very much less clear that agricultural R&D has adapted to the new economic context 
facing industry. As such, the idea that through the greater involvement of industry 
agricultural R&D would more closely reflect the needs o f industry is open to debate.
What emerges from the analysis is a dislocation between Government and science. External 
forces have proved to be insufficient in affecting research aims and similarly the 
autonomous development o f the ARC has proved more powerful in creating change. The 
changes to the research system can be generalised under three headings, namely i) an 
increasing emphasis on accountability, ii) changes in the level and allocation of funding, and 
iii) changes in the way results are disseminated. The Government’s pursuit o f value for 
money and relevance in research has initiated these changes. It therefore follows that the
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next question to be asked is how effective have these changes been in terms o f the 
agricultural research service. This issue is addressed in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3
IN SEARCH OF A MORE EFFECTIVE MODEL 
FOR THE PUBLIC FUNDING OF AGRICULTURAL 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
3.0. Ill Search of a More Effective Model for the Public Funding of Agricultural R&D
The historical changes outlined in the previous chapter need to be understood in terms of 
their underlying effectiveness. Therefore, in this chapter an attempt has been made to 
assess the literature which has developed on the management, funding and transmission of 
an agricultural research system (ARS) and, more generally, the science system itself.
Government distinctions of research effectiveness seem vague before the 1980s.
Classifications o f public R&D before this time tended to revolve around the type of
research conducted rather than its effectiveness, for example work was either allocated into 
crops or livestock Indeed, before 1956 there is little evidence that the Government 
differentiated between the type of R&D that it was funding. Money was administered in 
the form of a block grant and the research bodies allocated their resources between 
disciplines and foci as they deemed most effective. Similarly, during this time, no attempt
was made to monitor the effectiveness o f resource use. After the passing o f the
Agricultural Research Act (1956) a clear distinction was made for the first time between 
Agricultural Research Council (ARC) funding, which was for the conduct of basic and 
applied work, and the National Agricultural Advisory Service (NAAS) funding, which was 
for development and extension work (Thirtle, Piesse and Smith, 1997). In 1972, a further 
partition of funding took place, when the Rothschild Report was taken up by Government 
and funds were crudely divided between basic and applied research. The former were 
viewed by Rothschild as 'research with no specific goal', whilst the latter were stated to be 
for 'research with a practical application in mind'. Nevertheless, only in the mid-1980s 
did Government begin to classify the primary purpose of the research it was funding. This 
is presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1. Classification o f Research by Primary Purpose_____________________________
Primary Purpose_______________ Definition_________________________________________
Advancement o f Science All basic and applied R&D which advances human
knowledge
Support for Policy Research to meet Government’s own needs for
knowledge
Support for Procurement Research where the Government is main supplier of
Decisions goods or services
Improvement of Technology Applied R&D to fund the advance of technology of the
UK economy
Support for Statutory Duties Applied R&D which assists Departments to carry out
statutory responsibilities 
Other Science and Technology Applied R&D which cannot be classified under the
Expenditure___________________ other headings, e.g. support for developing countries
Source; Cabinet Office (1985)
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This compartmentalisation o f R&D helped to give more direction to the allocation of funds 
and could be seen as a concerted attempt at improving the effectiveness o f research 
resource use. In the 1990s the onus for selecting research topics fell on the research 
institutes, who were required to undertake projects which attained the broad objectives of 
‘wealth creation ’ and ‘improving the quality o f  life ’ (OST, 1993).
What emerges, therefore, is an increasingly sophisticated measure of how resources should 
be allocated internally to achieve external goals. In something as long-term as R&D, where 
both internal and external environments can change radically, assessing the effectiveness of 
resource allocation is at best highly complex and at worst impossible. However, the 
historical analysis of the previous chapter indicates how the UK Government has striven to 
improve the relevance and exploitability o f the science that it is funding. Overall what has 
emerged is an increasingly sophisticated market system for research and advice. The three 
main shifts have been i) changes in the management of the agricultural research service, ii) 
changes in the allocation and level of funding, and iii) changes in the way that the results of 
research are disseminated. Nevertheless, these changes to the agricultural research system 
have not solely been a UK phenomena. During the 1980s most developed countries 
experienced shifts away from public support for R&D towards an emphasis on a more 
market orientated system. Accordingly, analysing other national agricultural industries 
offers some indication of whether changes in research management have had any significant 
effect. However, before this is done, the bulk o f literature which has emerged concerned 
with how to effectively manage an agricultural research system needs to be reviewed. Thus, 
once an indication o f an effective model is developed it can be tested against actual changes 
in agricultural productivity in a number of countries in order to establish its validity. This is 
the concern of the next section.
3.1. In Search of an Effective Model for Public Agricultural R&D
Given the changes in the agricultural research system (ARS), it now has to be established 
whether there is any evidence that effectiveness of R&D has been improved. This requires 
an investigation of the factors which are of importance in increasing the efficiency and 
relevance o f the science system. Therefore, this section aims to review the literature which 
has emerged on the changes in the management, funding and transmission of agricultural 
R&D. Whilst interactions exist, these three areas will be analysed separately in order to 
clarify the issues involved.
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3.1.1. The Management o f Agricultural R&D
The majority o f philosophies on the scientific process predominantly consist of two 
opposing modes o f management, namely the ‘internalist’ and the ‘externalist’ models. 
Consequently, the principal arguments o f this section centre around the question o f whether 
science is more effective when priorities are set within the research institute compared to 
Government peer review.
The ‘internalist’ model of science relies on the belief that the scientific community is self­
regulating and has its own value system, which administers rewards and punishments. Kuhn 
(1970) likens creative discovery to the process o f selection in plant and animal species. 
Scientists filter basic ideas through their own value systems and assess them against what is 
already known in order to propose projects which they believe to be of scientific merit. 
Priority setting, therefore, needs no intervention from Government and the idealised 
internalist model relies on both bodies being autonomous entities. Occasionally these would 
be brought into a relationship, but are essentially capable o f existing independently without 
any significant effect on each other. Within this internalist environment, agricultural 
scientists can pursue their own investigations, which, through their contribution to 
increasing knowledge, may ultimately be o f benefit to the agricultural industry. Advocates 
of this system have pointed to the fact that it allows for serendipity, i.e. the chance discovery 
of a phenomenon that can be investigated further. A system whereby those closest to the 
research are responsible for its funding allows for an appropriate allocation of money 
towards a project’s development into an exploitable outcome.
When the autonomous system operated in the UK agricultural research service, it attracted 
several criticisms. Firstly, whilst it provided the best environment for scientists to produce 
creative research, it was perceived as unresponsive to the needs o f the farmer and the 
agricultural industries, as scientists tended to devote too much time to basic research 
(Ulbricht, 1977). There was also the problem of excessive duplication o f research. Whilst it 
has been argued that duplication is another method of solving problems (Thornley and 
Doyle, 1984), there is a point where excessive duplication affects the productivity of 
resources allocated to agriculture.
These criticisms led to the promotion o f the ‘externalist’ model. This rejected the idea that 
science could only be understood by its own internal dynamic and asserted that bodies 
outside science were just as, if  not more, qualified to evaluate and direct research
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programmes. In adopting a system of accountability the Government aimed to address the 
problems of duplication and unresponsiveness by making it more transparent. However, 
implementation o f an externalist system usually calls for an explicit divide between basic 
and applied research under the belief that applied research should be steered towards 
Government aims. Rosenberg (1990) has questioned this view, quoting numerous examples 
o f applied research that have led to addressing basic problems, e.g. the birth o f radio 
astronomy evolved from investigating how to remove static from telephone calls. Hence a 
criticism of the externalist approach, with its emphasis on accountability, is that it ignores 
the basic-applied dichotomy. Kogan and Henkel (1983) and Spedding (1984) have stated 
the impracticability of imposing such a system on the natural and biological sciences, as 
agricultural research depends on the complex interaction between natural and biological 
functions.
The externalist approach also relies on the belief that sponsors removed from science can 
formulate problems and then contract them out to scientists to solve them. It assumes that 
science is at a stage where one or a number o f disciplines can be applied to a specific 
problem. This is usually conducted through some system of peer review. However, many 
research fields o f importance are at a pre-paradigm stage, where there are no agreements on 
the most relevant disciplines and no clear academic networks for the solution o f these 
problems. It is therefore questionable whether a problem can be stated and then solved by 
external bodies. Specifying objectives also raises the real danger that there are the means 
and knowledge for solving the problems (Thornley and Doyle, 1984). Moreover, Philip 
(1978) has questioned the viability o f Government peer review, when the main problem with 
directing research strategies is the long gestation period involved. Research programmes 
usually last longer than a Government itself and as such national needs are generally set 
within a short-term framework. This tends to hinder the advice given by the peer review 
boards themselves. Spedding (1984) has also questioned whether the UK has a long-term 
agricultural policy which, he suggested, was an essential input for the effective planning of 
agricultural R&D. Despite these criticisms, in a study of alternative mechanisms, Anderson 
and Moxliam (1992) concluded that decisions on funding basic science have not, and 
probably never will have, any acceptable alternative to peer review. As discovery cannot be 
contrived, strategic planning calls for a greater coherence and focus on the lines o f scientific 
inquiry supported (Anderson, 1994). This, therefore, calls for a greater depth of disciplines 
represented on peer review panels and more two-way communication with scientists 
conducting the research. Thornley and Doyle (1984) have pointed out that a more effective 
use o f public money is likely to be achieved by improving the efficiency by which the
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results o f R&D in agriculture are evaluated, rather than by sifting the initial proposals for 
R&D. The costs o f a peer review system can be substantial both in terms o f money and time 
for users and providers of research. However, the benefits incurred in terms of the 
effectiveness of R&D, i.e. increased applicability and relevance to agriculture, make peer 
review a necessity in obtaining improved research outputs.
An effective research system, therefore, needs to respect the fact that steerage is only limited 
and over-emphasis on specific research goals could be detrimental to the production of 
R&D. The research system therefore needs to be flexible enough to allow for serendipity, 
but also transparent enough to allow some steerage.
3.1.2, The Funding of Agricultural R&D
The issue of expenditure on agricultural R&D tends to revolve around the type of funding 
practiced. Frequently, this reflects the type o f management philosophy undertaken in the 
science system. Thus, project funding is usually characterised where steerage is a large part 
o f the system. Similarly, research institutes which enjoy autonomy in decision making are 
usually funded institutionally. The British system of autonomy was supported by 
institutional funding for many years until contracts for research were developed in the early 
1970s. As such project funding has grown in influence to facilitate accountability in 
research funding. Bredahl et al. (1980) have stated that the goal o f a research management 
system is the production of a socially desired mix of research output at the minimum social 
cost. They concluded that institutional funding has a lower cost, whereas contract funding 
enables the socially desirable mix to be more directly obtained.
The main criticism of institutional funding o f research is that it is limited in its capacity to 
reallocate scientific effort and financial resources from traditional areas of concern or staff 
capacity to other areas (Bredahl et al., 1980), With project funding, fears were expressed 
over the loss o f flexibility experienced by the Research Councils in allocating some of its 
resources to commissioned work. This was especially true o f the ARC, which had by the 
late 1970s 50% of its funding from contract work and 80% of its staff engaged partly or 
wholly on commissions (DCS, 1979). It was, therefore, considered unwise to increase the 
proportion o f commissions for fear of its effect on the autonomous research conducted 
within the institutes. Thornley and Doyle (1984) have also pointed out that, where a large 
proportion of funds are tied to specific projects, this did not allow much room to redirect 
research rapidly in response to new and unexpected breakthroughs. The costs o f an 
accountable system of research management are not inconsiderable, as it affects the
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productivity of the research scientist and the research administrator. The research scientist 
loses time in completing research proposals and, similarly, the research administrator spends 
time processing applications. A senior researcher, who has only time for formulating grant 
proposals and managing a laboratory, does not represent the best use o f a creative scientist’s 
time (Bonnen, 1987).
However, the funding argument cannot be put into ‘either-or’ terms, i.e. if  one is good then 
the other has to be bad for science. This obscures the real funding problem and the best 
method is a mix o f both funding types for different forms of research (Bonnen, 1987; 
Bredahl et. a l, 1980). In their analysis of effectiveness in molecular biology institutes, 
Herbetz and Muller-Hill (1996) concluded that the quality of the research was no different 
in institutionally supported establishments than in those which were project funded. It 
seems, therefore, it is how these funds are employed and managed within institutions that 
affects the behaviour o f the researcher. Effective research should allow for both creativity 
and exploitability. Institutional funding favours creativity and frees money for more 
research projects, thus increasing the chances of producing more successful innovations. 
Project funding is costly and affects research productivity, but it arguably stimulates 
creativity through the entrepreneurial skills involved in obtaining contracts. It may also 
reduce the costs of exploitability, as the system has become more receptive to the perceived 
outcomes o f that research.
Accordingly, it is hard to draw any conclusions as to which type of funding allows for more 
effective research. At present the most manageable system seems to be a mix between 
project funded research for applied activities along with institutional funds for basic 
research. However, this does not answer the point raised earlier on the need for integration 
between basic, strategic and applied work in the natural sciences. The two forms of funding 
systems have to be more flexible in their awareness of this interaction in order to assess any 
possible avenues for future funding.
Along with questions o f the type o f funding for a research institute, there are arguments 
concerned with the relative mix of sources for funding. A wholly publicly-funded research 
system relies on the relative continuity of funds to allow long-term decision making in 
certain areas, as well as the free release of accessible information for the future development 
of research. The history of science is littered with discoveries made on the basis o f publicly- 
available knowledge. Private funding, with its need for secrecy and copyright, will affect 
how these outcomes are realised. There is, therefore, a problem with the probity of publicly-
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funded research being infiltrated and exploited for private gain. Read et a l  (1988) quote a 
case of the Plant Breeding Institute (PBI), which, when it was in the public sector, refused 
germ-plasm to a sponsor because it considered it improper that the sponsor should have sole 
access. Accordingly, the productivity o f research is disrupted through restricting the flow of 
information. Private funding is more precarious, because it is profit-led. In public-private 
ventures performance measures are imposed on the public system for achieving short-term 
goals, with the threat o f removal o f funds if these outcomes are not met. This uncertainty 
cannot fail to have a negative effect on the productivity o f the researcher involved.
There is also the danger o f a research institute tailoring its priorities towards explicitly 
commercial outcomes in order to provide a more attractive investment for firms (Read et a l, 
1988). This was reinforced by Lindner (1993) in a review of Australian agricultural 
research policy, which was considered as emphasising public funding for these ‘usable 
technology’ fields and was criticised for ‘crowding out’ private research, i.e. offering 
technology at no or subsidised cost. A contrasting view was voiced by Pineiro (1986), who 
argued that the public sector would become more efficient, accountable and offer increased 
value for money if it responded to particular requests from commercial companies. Whilst 
there are very real dangers in promoting such a policy, it does tend to reinforce a view that 
the public sector removed from the market-place is inefficient (Carney, 1998). 
Consequently, it seems that some interaction with the private sector must be beneficial for 
both sectors. Accordingly, an effective system of research funding may benefit from close 
liaison between scientists from both sectors. Privately-funded research is becoming a 
necessity with decreasing budgets and so, in order to maintain effectiveness, an independent 
monitoring system is needed to insure against any negative effects occurring. Furthermore, 
limits to the level and areas o f involvement should be imposed on the private sector.
3.1.3. The Transmission of Agricultural R&D
The argument for free advice stems from the origins o f agricultural extension, as the spread 
o f knowledge, being a public good. If the dissemination o f public research can be efficiently 
achieved, then the research will be at its most effective. Publicly available information 
involves the freedom to publish in scientific and technical journals. This ensures that firms 
are made aware o f current research techniques and, therefore, creates a basis for 
encouraging competition. Similarly, a free advisory service for farmers, solving on-farm 
problems through research and personal visits, helps to provide a stable and competitive 
economic environment for the agricultural and food industries.
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against the nature of public intervention which aims to improve the welfare of society. 
However, general opinion about charging for agricultural advice, and its subsequent 
privatisation, is agreed on the fact that it allows for better targeting. A farmer cannot only 
choose between advisory bodies, but also will tend to be more responsive to advice that 
he/she has to pay for. Read et al. (1988) have voiced concerns that the charging o f advice 
leads to an increased bias toward larger farms, which ultimately opposes competition from 
the small-scale farmer. However, Dancey (1993) has pointed out that advice should be seen 
as an on-farm investment which would offer higher profits. The smaller farmer should 
therefore allocate his/her budget accordingly to allow for the payment o f advice.
However, a problem occurs within a public organisation that has to begin charging for 
advice. The advisoiy service has to be set performance targets. One consequence of this is 
illustrated by the Australian extension service’s drive for charging. It began to re-allocate 
resources towards activities with the potential for generating revenue, rather than to those 
that were not undertaken in the private sector (Lindner, 1993). Therefore, there was some 
social cost as advice offered was only concentrated on economic benefits and ignored such 
things as environmental extension, which offered little immediate reward to the farmer. 
This has been recognised by the UK Government, which still offers free public-good 
information in certain areas o f farming, after the privatisation o f its advisory service. 
However, Roling (1986) has criticised this as superficial when imposed on an extension 
service. The tendency is for areas o f public good funding not to be based on results but on 
mistaken beliefs about what it should and can do.
From market research of farmers, the NAO (1991) concluded that the transitions to an 
organisation driven by market forces has led ADAS to be rated more highly than when it 
provided advice free of charge. Dancey (1993) reiterated this by pointing out an OECD 
study of other countries’ experiences of market transition. On the whole there was an 
opinion that advisory resources that were run on a commercial basis were more efficient and 
effective, offering an enhanced degree o f specialisation.
3.1.4. Summary
The goal o f re-organising the research system is to realise highly creative science with the 
maximum potential relevance for industry and society. Clearly, a creative environment for 
research can be achieved through autonomy which allows scientists the resources to pursue 
their own investigations. However, this may not result in R&D which is relevant to the 
needs of the agricultural industry. It may also be welfare diminishing, as public money
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without any Government control could be tied to areas which are no longer profitable or 
socially beneficial.
Stability o f funding offers an environment for long-term decision making. Decreasing funds 
will ultimately have implications for the effectiveness of the research conducted and how it 
should be developed in the future. Research teams also contribute to effectiveness and the 
multi-disciplinary expertise o f staff at institutes needs to be maintained. The main 
consequence of losing some disciplines may slow down or reduce the spread of benefits of a 
technological innovation. Therefore, research grants may be altered to be capital intensive, 
so as to maintain staff and facilities, at the cost o f current funds for the actual conduct of 
research. The mode of transference o f information seems to favour the privatisation of 
dissemination methods, as farmers seem to value the advice more if  they have to pay for it.
Considering the UK agricultural research service, it seems that some of these factors have 
been embraced throughout its history. However, there is a psychological effect in that if  
Government funding feels that useful research is being done then this may have an 
enhancing effect on performance. Consequently, whilst the above analysis gives an 
indication o f improved effectiveness, it now needs to be assessed whether this is proven by 
actual practice. For this to be achieved, actual research management changes have to be 
considered. This is the concern o f the next section.
3.2. Productivity Trends and Agricultural R&D: Evidence from Other Countries
Amongst the developed countries, who all have encountered changes in the management and 
funding o f their agricultural research and advisory services which correlate to some degree 
with UK experience, are the United States, the Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia. 
Accordingly, it is interesting to consider the trends in agricultural productivity and research 
funding encountered in these countries.
Using data series provided by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAQ), some 
indication can be drawn of each o f the above country’s productivity trends. Changes in 
agricultural productivity since 1971 are mapped in Figure 3.1, which show Laspeyres 
derived productivity indices for four countries, where ‘N Z’ denotes New Zealand, ‘US’ the 
United States, ‘NL’ the Netherlands, and ‘ AUS’ Australia.
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Figure 3.1. Indices of Agricultural Productivity for Four OECD Countries, 1971-1995,
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Source: FAQ (Various Years)
Overall, the trends in productivity show variable patterns. Throughout the period the 
Netherlands has enjoyed the highest level o f growth. Productivity was rising at a steady rate 
until the early 1980s, when a decline became evident. From the mid-1980s onwards 
productivity has stabilised, all be it at lower levels. In contrast, in Australia and the US 
productivity growth has been uneven and seems to hover around 1971 levels throughout the 
period. The most dramatic decrease has been in the case o f New Zealand agriculture which 
fell 20 points at its most extreme during the late 1980s.
These patterns are clearer when delineated into periods. Table 3.2 shows the average annual 
growth rates for the four countries over the periods 1971-1981, 1981-1995 and 1971-1995.
Table 3.2. Average Annual Growth Rates in Agricultural Productivity for the Four
Annual Growth Rates
1971-1981 1981-1995 1971-1995
Australia 0.52 0.63 0.57
Netherlands 2.36 -0.06 0.70
New Zealand 0.11 -0.49 -0.34
United States -0.26 0.40 0.19
Source: FAO (Various Years)
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3.2.1. Reductions in the Levels of Funding
Table 3.3 shows the annual average growth rates for agricultural research expenditures for 
the four countries studied in comparison with the OECD average.
Table 3.3. Average Annual Growth Rates in Public Research Expenditures for the Four
Annual Growth Rates
1971-1981 1981-1993 1971-1993
Australia 2.1 0.3 1.2
Netherlands 4.2 0.9 1.6
New Zealand 2.2 -2.2 0.2
United States 2.4 2.3 2.1
Other OECD (22) 2.7 1.8 2.2
Source: Alston, Pardey and Smith (1998)
Overall, during the period 1971 to 1993 all four countries have experienced growth rates in 
expenditure below the OECD average. This change is more extreme when delineated by 
time period. Thus, whilst the four have growth rates around the OECD average before the 
1980s, this was drastically reduced in three o f the countries studied after this date. The most 
extreme cuts in expenditure during this period were experienced by New Zealand, with a 
reduction o f 2.2% per annum in real expenditure. Whilst expenditure increased in the later 
period in Australia and the Netherlands, it was below 1% per year and was dramatically 
depressed when compared with the rises in the 1970s. Only the United States enjoyed 
relative stability of funding throughout this period, but this too was below the OECD 
average.
O f course, changes in research funding do not impact immediately, as the full of effect of 
research is only felt over a period o f time. However, there are trends which may reflect 
differences in research expenditures. Considering the productivity growth rates in Table
3.3, some similarities are revealed when dissaggregated into the two periods. Very 
obviously, the New Zealand growth rates have decreased from a positive rate of 0.1% per 
annum during 1971-1981 to -0.5%  per annum in the latter period. Similarly, the 
Netherlands’ productivity trend has reversed even more dramatically from the early period 
o f strong positive growth to negative rates for the 1980s and 1990s. This correlates to some 
degree with falls in research expenditure in these two countries. In contrast, although 
Australia suffered cuts in expenditure, it still maintained a nominal positive growth in 
research spending and enjoyed an increase in productivity growth for the latter period. 
Finally, in the case of the United States, which was the only country to maintain research 
funds at over 2% per annum throughout the whole period, productivity growth, according to
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Table 3.3, increased from negative rates in the 1970s to a positive figure o f 0.4% per annum 
in the 1990s.
Despite the fact that there are difficulties in deriving a causative link between changes in 
research expenditure and productivity, for instance an overriding effect o f productivity will 
be changes in agricultural policy o f a particular country, there does appear to be some 
circumstantial evidence of a relationship. Reductions in expenditure appear to be associated 
with downward shifts in productivity, while maintaining a stable level of funding is 
associated with some level o f growth. However, changes in agricultural productivity may be 
the result of a more complex set o f shifts in the management, funding and transmission of 
research. Consequently, the countries in question have to be analysed with specific 
reference to their agricultural research systems in order to understand this relationship with 
productivity change.
3.2.2. United States of America
Huffman and Evenson (1993) have constructed a more sophisticated total factor productivity 
index (TFT) than those presented in Table 3.2 over the period 1889 to 1990. Consequently, 
with a longer series o f data and more accurate methods, they have calculated a much higher 
average growth since the Second World War of around 2.9 percent per annum. 
Accordingly, they provide a consistent series by which shifts in the research system can be 
measured.
These changes can be classified into three phases, namely i) 1887-1945, a period of rising 
public expenditures administered institutionally, ii) 1946-1974, a period o f stable 
expenditures during which project funding became dominant, and hi) 1975-1990, a period of 
continued growth in the share o f research supported by project grants as opposed to 
institutional funds. Within this last period private sector expenditure varied between 47% 
and 53% of total agricultural research funds (Alston, Pardey and Smith, 1998). However, it 
seems that in the United States the private sector has always played a relatively larger part in 
total agricultural research expenditure.
Table 3.4. Total Factor Productivity for US Agriculture, percentage growth per annum,
1887-1990 ________________________________________________________________
1887-1945__________1946-1974__________ 1975-1990
Annual Average
Percentage Growth_______________IT_________________T6_________________2A________
Source; Huffman and Evenson (1993)
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Overall, US productivity has grown throughout the whole period o f the research system’s 
existence. This growth rate began to increase more rapidly after the Second World War 
with stable research expenditures and increased project funding. However, a greater 
increase is observed in later periods when, with the private sector relatively stable, public 
research was funded through project grants.
3.2.3. New Zealand
In New Zealand the public sector has always had a higher level o f research investment than 
industry. In 1981 expenditure by commercial firms was estimated at around 7% of total 
research funds, but this has increased to around 25% of total research funds in 1993 (Alston, 
Pardey and Smith, 1998). Research in New Zealand, since the early 1970s, has been project 
funded and after 1984 the Government began a five-year ‘forward look’ statement of 
science. Whilst funds have always been relatively low for R&D, after 1984 New Zealand 
severely reduced public expenditure (Radford, 1996). This was to enable a policy o f 
increasing reliance on levy boards for funding R&D and employed a ‘piggy-back’ approach 
to technology adoption from other national research systems.
Table 3.5. Total Factor Productivity for New Zealand Agriculture, percentage growth per
annum, 1953-1995_________________________________________________________________
1953-1983_________ 1984-1995__________1953-95
Annual Average
Percentage Growth_________________ FT________________-0.9_______________ TO_______
Source; FAO (Various Years)
As shown in Table 3.5, New Zealand productivity growth rates before 1984 were 
comparable with those in both the UK and the US at around 1.7%. However, a significant 
change occurred after this period when average annual rates became negative. Whilst this 
could be the result o f the drastic removal of public sector funding, it has to be considered in 
conjunction with a reduction o f price support mechanisms which occurred at the same time. 
There were, therefore, changes during this period to output prices in relation to input prices, 
which would impinge on any measure o f productivity change. Accordingly, the idea that 
reduced funding for research causes decreases in productivity has to be approached with 
caution when considering New Zealand agriculture.
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3.2,4, Australia
For Australia the productivity index for the period 1953 to 1995 is presented in Table 3.6. 
The earlier period reflects a situation where public expenditure dominated and grew 
annually. This period also showed an annual average rate o f productivity growth 
comparable to other developed countries.
Table 3.6. Total Factor Productivity for Australian Agriculture, percentage growth per
annum, 1953-1995__________________________________________________________________
1953-1980_________1981-1995__________ 1953-95
Annual Average
Percentage Growth_________________ L6_______________ ft6________________ L2________
Source: FAO (Various Years)
Funds began to decline in real terms during the later period and increased priority was given 
to applied over basic research. Similarly, Australia, like New Zealand, has a small private 
agricultural research base, which grew during the 1980s and accounted for 30% o f total 
funding in 1993 (Alston, Pardey and Smith, 1998). In addition to this, levy boards have 
always played a part in funding research in Australia. From 1953-1994 contributions from 
commodity groups have been in the area of 20% of total research funds (Mullen et a l, 
1994). Consequently, the period after 1981 is one o f declining Government control and 
increasing industrial influence (Hussey, 1996). However, while this period has been 
associated with positive productivity growth rates, there has been a decrease of around 1% 
per annum in rates o f growth since 1980.
3.2.5. Netherlands
The Dutch agricultural research system experienced high rates o f expenditure in the 1960s 
and the establishment of a large number of research institutes. In 1972 the National Council 
for Agricultural Research (NRLO) was established which instituted a five-year forward look 
of agriculture. In 1980 the funding for research was decreased and the number of research 
institutes declined from 22 to 12. In 1986 the most radical decision o f the Government was 
to privatise public agricultural research. The institutions involved had, therefore, to develop 
stronger market orientation (Roseboom and Ruttan, 1997). The trend in the rates of 
productivity growth are presented in Table 3.7.
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Table 3.7. Total Factor Productivity for Netherlands Agriculture, percentage growth per
annum, 1953-1995_________________________________________________________________
195S-1971 1972-1986 1987-1995 1953-95
Annual Average Percentage
Growth__________________________ Z6____________L3___________-04 __________ 1.5
Source: FAO (Various Years)
What emerges is that the implementation o f the NRLO planning structure and the forward 
look was associated with a decline in average growth rates. Coupled with the severe 
reductions in funding from 1980 onward, there was a decrease in the rate o f productivity 
growth for agriculture of around 1.2%. After the decentralisation and privatisation of R&D 
the rate actually became negative. Consequently, from the point o f view of the Dutch 
agricultural research system all the changes, i.e. declining funds, privatisation and peer 
review, appear to have had negative effects on the productivity o f the industry itself.
3.2.6. Summary
Comparisons of trends in research expenditure and productivity do show some level of 
association. Generally, in countries where research spending has been reduced a 
corresponding fall in productivity has been noted. Similarly in the US, which has 
stabilised funds to some degree, there has been continued expansion o f growth. However, 
this statement has to be approached with caution. Whilst it would seem that the movement 
towards greater reliance on private funding for agricultural R&D has had a negative effect 
on agriculture, R&D spending is only one of a number o f factors impinging on productivity 
growth. For instance, only the UK has suffered drastic changes to its advisory system and 
the modes o f transference throughout this period. For the bulk o f other countries, the 
mechanisms for R&D transmissions have been relatively unaffected. More critically, the 
changes occurred during a period of recession in agriculture, so downward rates of 
productivity growth could just as well be caused by reductions in demand and investment. 
As most productivity rates have shown a decline during the 1980s, these could reflect the 
effect o f economic recession. It, therefore, seems that deriving unequivocal relationships 
between research and productivity is difficult.
3.3. Conclusion
The theoretical literature concerning agricultural research management seems to favour 
some degree of input from the commercial sector, both in terms of research and extension 
services. Nevertheless, actual evidence from other countries’ experience seems to reveal
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the negative consequences of adopting increased reliance on private sector funding. 
Consequently, it seems there are various problems with deriving such a simplistic link 
between expenditure on R&D and agricultural productivity, and this relationship needs to 
be explored more deeply. A prime area o f investigation should be whether R&D 
expenditure has such a strong effect on productivity. This is an intrinsic question, as the 
majority o f studies which have supported increased public funding o f agricultural R&D 
have been based on measuring a high return to R&D. Accordingly, various questions 
emerge which can be framed as hypotheses and tested in the following chapters.
Firstly, in relation to the alleged high returns to public R&D, one question is the extent to 
which R&D affects agricultural productivity and this may be stated as the first hypothesis:
H}.‘ Rates o f  return to public funds are high and expenditure should be increased.
Secondly, considering recent Government policy, with its emphasis on basic research at the 
expense o f applied research and development work, an evaluation is required o f whether the 
returns to publicly-funded R&D have been reduced by the removal of near-market funds. 
Thus a further hypothesis would be that:
H 2 : Public funding o f  applied research and development work is intrinsic to
improving productivity.
Thirdly, in relation to the changes in the management and funding o f agricultural R&D in 
the UK, one question which hangs over the history of the agricultural research system is 
whether increased accountability has improved the efficiency o f publicly-funded R&D. 
This may be expressed as a third testable hypothesis, namely:
H 3 : Public agricultural R&D has benefited from  increased Government influence
over its management and funding.
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A fourth area, which has, until recently, been discounted by work on public R&D returns, 
has been the influence of the private sector. It seems essential to fully account for the effect 
o f private sector involvement when evaluating the correct level of return to public sector 
R&D. Consequently, a fourth issue to be tested may be expressed as the following 
hypothesis:
H p The commercial sector has a stronger influence on productivity than the
public sector.
However, since the mid-1980s agricultural R&D has acquired another role in relation to 
public-good R&D, such as the environment. This type of non-productive R&D may be 
beneficial, but is mostly non-quantifiable and indirect. As it is growing in importance 
within Government research agendas, there is a need to discover whether any relationship 
can be found within R&D spending and improving the quality o f life. This leads to a fifth 
hypothesis:
H p The trend towards lower agricultural productivity growth is a reflection o f  an
increasing proportion o f  research funding being directed to improving 
the ‘quality o f  life ' rather than 'wealth creation'.
The next two chapters seek to test these hypotheses. Thus, Chapter 4 examines the whole 
concept o f R&D and productivity in order to gain a clearer understanding o f whether 
previous arguments on research funding hold. In particular an attempt is made to estimate 
statistically the contribution of R&D expenditure in the UK to agricultural productivity 
growth rates. In doing this the impact o f the changes to the balance o f research funding in 
respect o f type and source of funding is explored. In Chapter 5, the idea o f the 
‘effectiveness’ o f research investment is explored further in terms o f economic, social and 
scientific goals.
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CHAPTER 4
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC AND 
PRIVATE RESEARCH INVESTMENT ON 
AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
4,0. Measuring the Impact of Public and Private Research Investment on Agricultural 
Productivity Growth
The problem of directly relating agricultural R&D activity to productivity growth rates has 
been highlighted in the previous chapter. However, the bulk o f studies dedicated to 
assessing effectiveness o f agricultural resource use have relied on a belief that expenditures 
on R&D positively affect productivity growth. Consequently, whilst these studies are 
popular, they suffer a degree o f criticism over their use and application (see for example 
Harvey, 1988; Pardey and Craig, 1989; Huffman and Evenson, 1993). Thus, as studies have 
developed, a variety of techniques have been used to improve the measurement of returns to 
agricultural R&D.
Accordingly, the aim o f this chapter is to question the underlying basis for assessing R&D 
spending against productivity growth and, similarly to analyse the various methods used, in 
order to establish whether they are appropriate to tackling this problem. Specifically, it 
seeks to test two of the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter. Predominantly, it aims 
to establish whether, in view of near-market cuts, public applied R&D has been intrinsic to 
improving agricultural productivity. Similarly, with regard to the recent desire by 
Government to increase the involvement of the private sector within agricultural R&D, it 
also aims to test the hypothesis o f whether the commercial sector has a stronger influence on 
productivity than the public sector.
4.1. The Concept o f Total Factor Productivity
Under the assumption of constant returns to scale, a doubling o f inputs should double the 
level of output. However, what is usually observed is that the growth in output exceeds the 
growth in inputs. This phenomenon is usually attributed to increases in total factor 
productivity (TFP) which, most economists argue, is caused by disembodied technical 
progress (OECD, 1992). Technical knowledge is integrated into inputs, which helps to 
improve the efficiency o f resource use, as typified by a more disease-resistant seed variety 
or a more fuel efficient tractor. Consequently, the majority o f studies into agricultural TFP 
growth have sought to measure the magnitude o f its relationship with public R&D (see 
Norton and Davies, 1981; Echeverria, 1990).
However, there are a number o f other issues which could equally be related to changes in 
TFP. Firstly, these studies ignore the fact that the assumption o f constant returns to scale is 
inappropriate. Over time as firms grow, they begin to acquire knowledge and expertise and
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so increase productivity. This phenomenon has been observed in UK agriculture, as 
structural changes, which occurred in the 1950s and 1960s, led to increases in the average 
size of farms (Grigg, 1989). Similarly, there are other factors which may cause TFP growth. 
These are i) apparent errors in the measurement o f output and inputs, ii) improvements in 
the quality o f capital, land and labour, and iii) imperfect competition.
The majority o f studies on TFP within the UK, whilst highlighting some of these problems, 
have not fully addressed them. Similarly, these studies have usually attributed the majority 
o f TFP growth solely to research expenditure without testing whether there is any causal 
link between them. Therefore, there is a need to consider how TFP indices are constructed 
and to establish whether there is any valid relationship between R&D and productivity 
growth, before measuring the impact o f R&D expenditure on productivity.
A measure o f UK total agricultural productivity was first constructed before the Second 
World War by Beilby (1938). However, in the post-war period total factor productivity 
indices have been constructed by numerous authors over various time periods in respect of 
the UK. MAFF (1961 and 1969) constructed an aggregate productivity index which 
cumulatively covered the periods 1949 to 1967. Productivity was measured by “the ratio o f  
output to all inputs other than entrepreneurial labour and interest on tenant's capital" 
(MAFF, 1961, pg., ii). By using a method which compared changes in pairs o f years, the 
effects o f economies o f scale and price distortions were eliminated. The average rate o f 
growth was found to be 1.7 per cent per annum over the period 1949/50 to 1966/67.
More recently, Whittaker (1983), Godden (1985) and Doyle and Ridout (1985) have gone 
some way to constructing a more accurate measurement of agricultural productivity changes 
by including factors such as land, labour, rents and quality adjustments. In the last of these 
studies, outputs and inputs were deflated by an index o f ‘agricultural output prices’ and ‘an 
agriculture means of production index’ respectively. Using a Laspeyres index this yielded 
an average annual rate o f growth o f 1.8% for the period 1951 to 1981.
Rayner et a l  (1986) used the more complex Tornqvist index, which compares factor shares 
in output/input ratios between two successive years. In applying this method an average rate 
of growth o f around 1% per annum was found for the period 1956/7 to 1976/7. Thirtle and 
Bottomley (1992) adopted a similar procedure and sought to clarify some of the 
measurement errors involved in the interpretation o f UK agricultural accounts. These found 
an annual average rate of growth o f 1.9% was found for the period 1967 and 1990.
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Consequently, it seems the majority o f studies have adopted different conventions in respect 
of measurement and calculation. There are, therefore, a number of issues which need to be 
addressed in deriving an index of total factor productivity. These can be classified into three 
decisions, namely i) data measurement errors, ii) correct adjustments for changes in the 
quality o f inputs, and iii) the choice o f indexing procedure.
4.1.1, Data Measurement Errors
The collection o f aggregate data presents many hazards. This is exacerbated when trying to 
derive a consistent series over a long period. Government statistics change throughout time 
both by definition and by measurement, as statistical and recording methods advance. This 
problem cannot be eradicated, but a number o f sources are available which record 
agricultural statistics. For the whole period after the Second World War the agriculture 
departments have published information in the ‘Agriculture in the UK ’ series. Similarly, the 
‘Annual Abstract o f Statistics’ (CSO) contains published aggregate agricultural accounts 
throughout the period and explains definitional changes as they occur.
However, because a certain level of information was not published, predominantly before 
the mid-1960s, various series do not reflect their true levels. For instance, in recording 
labour productivity the accounts do not include ‘farmers, partners and directors’ until 1978. 
However, more critically, the accounts do not publish intermediate feeds and seeds until 
1964/5. Therefore, final output cannot be derived properly. Using Gross Output for 
consistency would inflate output statistics relative to their true level. Another problem 
arises with the time periods for the agricultural accounts. Until 1978 these were recorded in 
crop years (June/May). However, they are presented in calendar years in subsequent 
periods. Whilst these errors cannot be eradicated, some allowance can be made for changes 
in the composition o f inputs over time. These and other problems were accordingly 
considered and the approach employed outlined below.
4.1.2, Quality Adjustments
A possible source o f productivity growth could be an improvement in the quality o f inputs 
used. For instance, the constituents o f fertiliser in 1946 would be less effective than 
fertiliser applied today. Thus, improvements in machinery, land, labour and capital could 
have some effect on productivity growth. These would emerge through more efficient 
capital investment, a better skilled workforce, or private and public investment in research.
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Quality adjustment and its effect on productivity growth has been the concern of a large 
number o f studies in agriculture. Rayner and Lingard (1971) adjusted for quality 
improvements in the prices and quantities of fertiliser used in British agriculture. More 
recently, Fernandez-Cornejo and Jans (1995) used hedonic pricing methods to adjust for 
quality o f pesticide usage on four major US crops. These studies both indicated a rapid 
increase in the quality of agro-chemicals used within farming since the Second World War. 
However, when adjusting for land quality, Thirtle and Bottomley (1992) found only a 
nominal increase in productivity growth for the period 1967 to 1990. As regards the 
question of the quality of capital investment, this has been contentiously applied to TFP 
indices. Godden (1985) derived a TFP index for agriculture which gave a growth rate of 
1.5%, but which was reduced to 1.3% after adjusting for the quality o f capital investment. 
Similarly, Fousekis (1997) accounted for the role o f public infrastructure in Greek farming 
through land improvement and public storage facilities. This study found that the non­
inclusion o f these external effects would lead to biased estimates o f productivity growth.
However, the problem with adjusting for quality is that no coherent estimates, which reflect 
true quality change, exist on an aggregate level. Thus, the use o f quality adjustments may 
lead to further distortions o f actual TFP growth. Consequently, as the estimation of accurate 
series o f quality series are beyond the scope o f this study, the decision was taken not to 
modify the input series for quality changes, especially as finding proxies to measure quality 
proved difficult.
4.1.3. Choice of Indexing Procedure
When measuring the changes in Total Factor Productivity over time, most studies adopt 
some form of indexing procedure. However, there is much debate over the most appropriate 
procedure to use. Christensen (1975) classified two main types of indexing procedure used 
in production analysis, namely i) the Laspeyres index and ii) the Tornqvist index. In 
addition, with the advent o f newer methods for productivity analysis, recent studies have 
also adopted the Malmquist indexing procedure (Fare et a l, 1997; Hadley et a l, 2000).
Previously, most economists have favoured the Laspeyres index, these are either quantity or 
price indices, which measure changes against a single base year. A Laspeyres quantity 
index can be presented as (Christensen, 1975):
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^/ %0 = /Y,Pio^io (1)
where {xj/xq) is the relative change in output (input) between the periods ti and ti, and the 
sum of output (input) prices (p) times output (input) quantities (%) in a particular year (/) is 
measured over the cumulative value o f output (input) in a base year (0). This procedure has 
interpretive qualities, as its reliance on a base year allows for measuring changes in the 
value o f total inputs resulting from pure quantity changes (Christensen, 1975). However, 
there are problems in its derivation. On a purely practical level the extent o f change is 
related to the choice o f base year. Consequently, it could be open to criticisms o f bias 
arising from the choice o f base year. The Tornqvist index overcomes this problem to some 
degree as it relies on a system of both factor shares and on smoothing a previous year’s 
prices and quantities, rather than relying on a base period. The Tornqvist index is thus 
written as;
log(;ci/x„) = 2;w,(x,|/x,o)
where (xj/xo) is the relative change in output (input) between two time periods, and ^  . is the 
weight allocated to each factor of production (i). The Tornqvist index relies on factor shares 
and on smoothing a previous year’s prices and quantities, rather than relying on a single 
base period as with the Laspeyres index. Christensen (1975) has pointed out that the 
Tornqvist index reflects a situation whereby, as the price o f an input increases, the producer 
decreases its use to keep its marginal productivity proportional to the new price. Hence, the 
prices from both periods are included in the Tornqvist index to represent their marginal 
productivities. Similarly, the Tornqvist index relies on the previous year’s prices and 
quantities, whereas the Laspeyres index, with its reliance on a base year, can overstate the 
effects o f changes over time. This is critical when attempting to derive an index from 1948 
to 1996. On a conceptual level, Alston, Norton and Pardey (1995) found that the Tornqvist 
index represented price weights most specific to that economic activity. Thus, they 
favoured the Tornqvist over the Laspeyres when there was “reason to think that producers 
are reacting to local prices but cannot do so instantaneously ’ ‘ (ibid., pp. 128).
The Malmquist index is the most complex of the three procedures, but tends to avoid some
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of the restrictions o f the Tornqvist and Laspeyres measures outlined above. Thus, when 
coupled with the newer techniques o f Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and Stochastic 
Production Frontiers (SPF), it provides a more dynamic picture o f productivity change. 
Malmquist TFP measures can be decomposed to show changes due to technical efficiency 
change, i.e. the change in a particular farm becoming more efficient and moving closer to 
the production frontier, or technical change, i.e. an actual shift in the production frontier 
itself. It does so by calculating the ratio o f the distances o f each data point relative to a 
common technology. Equation (3) defines an output orientated TFP change index (which 
considers a given input vector (x) and the maximal proportional expansion of an output 
vector (y)^) from period (s) to period (t) (Coelli et a l, 1998):
d'oiy,.x,) d ^ ( y „ x j
--------------------X ----------------------
1 / 2
(3)
where
Mo is the output-orientated Malmquist TFP index,
( y , , X, ) is the distance from period t observation to the period s common technology, 
^ ‘o (P t, X J  ( y ^, X,, ) is technical efficiency change, and
d!,(y,,x,)
1 / 2
is technical change
The most attractive property of the Malmquist index for this study is that, unlike the 
Tornqvist procedure, only quantity data are required to derive the index (ibid., pp. 221). 
Consequently, this would obviate the problem of UK entry into the Common Agricultural 
Policy in 1973 and high price supports, which would increase growth rates considerably 
using the Tornqvist procedure. However, the main drawback o f the Malmquist is that it 
requires extensive data. Thus, the majority of studies using Malmquist indexing procedures 
have only examined specific commodities over a short period o f time, where data are 
available (see for example Battese and Coelli, 1992; Piesse and Thirtle, 1997; Hadley et a l, 
2000).
For longer time periods studies into TFP have favoured either the Laspeyres or the Tornqvist 
approach, with the bulk o f recent work dedicated to the latter procedure. However, the
' An input orientated procedure would consider the minimal proportional contraction o f the input vector, given 
an output vector.
majority o f earlier studies have used the Laspeyres index to measure TFP growth. 
Consequently both indices should be used in order to measure the level o f variance between 
the two.
4.1.4. UK Agricultural Total Factor Productivity
In order to construct a total factor productivity index a number o f sources were used. 
Predominantly, data were assembled from the aggregate agricultural accounts published 
yearly in the Annual Abstracts o f Statistics o f the Central Statistical Office (CSO). This was 
to ensure consistency in measurement. However, because o f limits to the amount o f data 
recorded, the ‘Agriculture in the UK’ series published by MAFF, which in earlier editions 
included Agricultural Census information, was used for gathering information about 
employment statistics.
Final output was derived by removing intermediate seed and feed from gross output. 
However, before 1964 the amount o f intermediates are not stated within the agricultural 
accounts. This is because during the 1960s an increasing amount of farm specialisation 
occurred and hence the amount of produce traded between farms became significant. 
Consequently, as approximately 3% of gross output was accounted for by intermediates in 
1964, this figure was trended back to 0 in 1948. After 1978 Government began to publish 
most data in calendar, as opposed to crop, years. In order to maintain consistency, after 
allocating stocks in the appropriate year, the crop year convention was continued forward, 
using adjustments for both the output and input series, as advised in MAFF (1990, pp. 19).
Inputs consisted o f all intermediate inputs, namely fertiliser, imported livestock, seed and 
feeding stuffs, along with the costs o f hired labour, rents, depreciation on buildings and 
machinery as well as running costs. Within agriculture the flow o f capital stock is produced 
both on and off the farm. On-farm capital assets, as recorded in the agricultural accounts, 
are predominantly farm machinery and buildings. In addition, a 3% charge on capital stock 
to represent the flow of off-farm capital services was included in the input series. This is 
consistent with USDA recommendations and favoured by Thirtle and Bottomley (1992). 
However, a possible error occurs in respect o f buildings depreciation and farm maintenance, 
which was not included in the accounts before the mid-1960s, and therefore have had to be 
imputed through rent and interest values.
The Laspeyres index was derived following Doyle and Ridout (1985), whereby the ratio of
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outputs to inputs in any particular year was compared to the ratio o f a base year. Final 
output was deflated by the ‘Agricultural All Output Index’ and the inputs by an aggregate of 
fertiliser, agricultural feed and machinery prices. Consequently, all prices were based on the 
mid-year 1970, obviating some of the bias caused by measuring changes over such a large 
period. Using this index gave an annual average growth rate of 1.9% from 1948 to 1996.
The Tornqvist index operates under a system of factor shares. As a result, the inputs and 
outputs series had to be disaggregated. Outputs were derived under the four headings given 
by the aggregate accounts, namely i) farm crops, ii) horticultural crops, iii) livestock, and iv) 
livestock products, which consisted o f wool, milk and eggs. For the input series eight 
headings were used, namely all four major intermediate inputs of feeding stuffs, fertiliser, 
seeds and imported livestock, as well as rent, labour (hired workers), miscellaneous 
expenditure, which includes pesticides after 1986, and an interest on capital stock series. A 
series for inputs and outputs were constructed using the formula recommended by Rayner et 
a l  (1986) and the TFP index derived from:
ln(.4„, t A ,) = Y,W„ ln(7,„, Q  ln(G„„ / G„) (4)
where
At is the level of TFP in year t,
Yji is the output of commodity) in year t,
Wy =  QVjf + /  2 is a moving average of two successive years, where Wjt is the value
share of the jth  product in total output,
Grt is the input of commodity r in year t, and
Cir =  (Q , + Q/+i) /  2 is a moving average o f two successive years, where is the value 
share of the rth product in total input.
Essentially, this method takes each series o f outputs (inputs) and weights their share against 
the sum of total output (input). This share, a moving average over the year in question and 
the year ahead, is then multiplied by the log o f the ratio o f a particular output (input) for the 
year in question and the year ahead. The total factor productivity index can then be derived 
by taking the sum of the logged output series minus the sum of the logged input series 
(Thirtle and Bottomley, 1992). The results were then exponentiated and chained, using 
1970 as the base year for chaining. Consequently, both the Tornqvist and the Laspeyres
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indices can be compared and are shown graphically in Figure 4,1.
Figure 4.1. Comparison Between Laspeyres and Tornqvist Indices for UK Total Factor 
Productivity, 1948 to 1996
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The first impression gained from Figure 4.1 is that the Laspeyres index seems to provide a 
more smoother interpretation o f the productivity series than the Tornqvist. This is 
especially prevalent in the second half of the series where the Tornqvist seems to exhibit 
more dramatic productivity growth. In particular, the Tornqvist picks up the drought years 
of 1975 and 1976. Finally, in the 1980s the Tornqvist rises substantially, if erratically, 
above the Laspeyres index. This comparison is clearer when Table 4.1 is considered. 
Annual average growth between the two indices for the entire period seems to be similar at 
around 1.9%. This compares with the majority of other UK studies, which tend to be just 
below 2%. However, comparing separate periods, in this case before and after entry into the 
Common Agricultural Policy, shows a large degree of variance.
Table 4.1. Annual Average Growth Rates Between Laspeyres and Tornqvist Indices, 
percent
Period Laspeyres Tornqvist
1948-1972 2.37 0.60
1973-1996 1.09 3.25
1948-1996 1.73 1.90
Whilst the Laspeyres has a high growth rate which then declines after 1972, the Tornqvist 
shows a very slight growth for the period 1948 to 1972 of 0.6%, which then rises 
substantially to 3.3% per annum after entry into the CAP. In addition, the Tornqvist shows
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a higher overall rate o f growth at 1.9%, whereas the Laspeyres is lower at 1.7%. 
Consequently, it seems that for the entire period their behaviour is wholly distinct. This is 
an important point as it raises the issue o f which index depicts reality, Thirtle and 
Bottomley (1992), using the Tornqvist procedure, found a similarly high rate of growth after 
entry up until 1985. However, before entry, 1967-1972 they found a growth rate of 1.76%. 
To some degree this correlates with these findings, but it may be indicative o f the indexing 
procedure adopted.
4,1.5. Summary
The development o f a total factor productivity index is intrinsic to evaluating returns to 
agricultural R&D. Thus, by using the two most favoured methods for deriving total factor 
productivity and removing some of the reasons why there may be a residual, there still 
appears to be a growth in TFP. There are, therefore, other factors, discounting measurement 
errors, which have not been accounted for and which are responsible for this growth. The 
majority of work has centred on the assumption that R&D causes productivity growth, but 
very few have tested this hypothesis. Consequently, the next section explores the nature and 
validity o f this relationship.
4.2. Concepts in the Econometric Evaluation of Agricultural R&D
Evaluations of past research effectiveness have produced a vast body of literature which 
have employed various methods to answer the question o f whether agricultural R&D is an 
economically justified public investment. The attempts can be classified into three 
categories, namely i) the economic surplus approach, ii) the production function approach, 
and iii) the profit function approach.
The economic surplus approach involves the estimation o f the underlying consumer and 
producer surpluses generated by shifts in the agricultural supply function. These changes 
tend to result from research-induced unit cost reductions or productivity enhancements. 
Hence the gains from research represent the net change in total economic surplus, resulting 
from a gain in consumer surplus and the change in producer surplus. However, the shapes 
and shifts in supply and demand functions rely on different sets of assumptions. Estimates 
of the returns to research using the economic surplus approach are highly dependent on 
these alternative assumptions (Linder and Jarret, 1978; Wise, 1984).
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The second method is based on the estimation of a production function for agricultural 
output, in which research expenditures are included as one of several inputs. Within this 
approach two main methods have been adopted. The ‘integrated’ method is concerned with 
changes in the input-output combinations which results in large, unexplained residuals 
attributable to research innovation. The basis of this method was pioneered by Griliches 
(1964), who included expenditure on research and extension in a production function using 
average per farm data, in order to find the marginal product o f research expenditure. From 
this the social rate of return could be inferred. The problem with this approach is that 
research is not a direct input to the production process. Rather the results of research 
expenditure indirectly influence crop and livestock production through its incorporation in 
new technology.
Alternatively, the ‘two-stage decomposition’ procedure seeks to explain the changes in the 
rate o f total factor productivity (Knutson and Tweeton, 1979; Thirtle and Bottomley, 1988). 
Changes in TFP are regressed against variables such as R&D, as well as weather and farmer 
management skills. As research effects are not immediate, lags are set for the future when 
an innovation’s impact will peak and then decline as it is superseded by other innovations or 
is overcome by natural forces. The result will show the percentage change in TFP given a 
one percent change in expenditure on R&D. The sum o f the coefficients o f R&D 
expenditures can, therefore, be used to calculate the efficacy o f R&D expenditure over time. 
Harvey (1988) has criticised this method on a number o f grounds. Firstly, the method is 
highly sensitive to the length o f lag included. Similarly, most studies in the UK have not 
included the adoption process, which is critical to increasing productivity in agriculture, as 
without farmer uptake of new technology there will be no productivity growth.
A third method, which has gained popularity recently, is the ‘dual profit function’ approach 
(Bouchet et a l ,  1989; Khatri and Thirtle, 1996). Profit functions allow inputs to be fixed or 
variable and can incorporate exogenous conditioning factors such as R&D expenditures 
(Lau, 1976). Consequently, the model has a degree o f theoretical consistency and offers 
ease of modelling. However, a major restriction is the estimation of the time series data, as 
it seems unlikely that prices are an exogenous variable. Thus, the estimation o f objective 
functions using prices as independent variables will be biased. Secondly, the estimated 
functions rarely display the properties required by theory. Accordingly, the use o f the 
method cannot be justified by appeals to theoretical consistency, since most models are not 
theoretically consistent (Doyle et a l,  1994).
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Overall the measurement of research effects on productivity encapsulate various practical 
and conceptual difficulties and no method has successfully overcome these. The choice of a 
method will therefore involve weighing up the advantages and disadvantages o f the different 
methods. Whilst the profit function approach is conceptually attractive, it was felt that as 
the vast majority of studies in this area have adopted some form of the production function 
approach, this should be chosen in order to test the validity o f these studies. In addition, 
advances have been made in respect o f the various concerns voiced about previous 
production function studies in the UK and so these could be integrated into an improved 
method. Within this broad approach the two-stage decomposition process, which enables 
advice and private R&D to be disaggregated from public research and allows for an 
assessment o f their effect on productivity, was selected. This was important in a situation 
where the private seetor is being called upon to conduct more research, and the public 
advisory service is moving towards a market situation. Hence the pay-off to investment in 
both these areas would help to give indications o f the appropriateness of various strands of 
research policy, aimed at improving the efficacy o f R&D.
4.2.1. Previous Studies of Research and Agricultural Productivity
The majority of past studies have estimated a high rate of return on investments in 
agricultural research (Echeverria, 1990). Ruttan (1982) pointed out that investments in 
agricultural R&D are between three and five times higher than those on most alternative 
investments. These levels o f return have been used to argue for increasing levels of funding 
for research, since the returns far exceed the investment costs. Fox (1985) refers to this as 
the ‘under-investment’ hypothesis and goes on to state its importance in that, if ' ‘advocates 
o f  this view can persuade legislators o f  the veracity o f  their contention, then a re­
arrangement and/or increase in public expenditures could result” (ibid., pp. 806). He goes 
on to say that if this hypothesis were wrong, then this re-allocation o f resources would be 
welfare diminishing. Table 4.2 outlines the studies that have been conducted within the UK 
and their estimates o f the rates o f return on agricultural R&D.
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Table 4.2. Previous UK Studies into Returns to Agricultural R&D
Author Period Rate o f  Return
Doyle and Ridout (1985) 1966-1980 10-30% (Decreasing over time)
Wise (1986) 1986 8-15%
Harvey (1988) 1988 -38% to 12%
Russell and Thirtle (1988) 1976-1985 327:1 (Rape Seed)
Thirtle and Bottomley (1988) 1950-1981 70%
Khatri and Thirtle (1996) 1953-1990 18%
Thirtle and Townsend (1997) 1973-1989 44%
Source: After Echeverria (1990)
With a few exceptions the estimated returns to research have been relatively high and 
therefore calls for more investment to realise the social optimum have been common. 
However, there is little agreement on the correct method o f measuring returns to agricultural 
research (Huffman and Evenson, 1993). The studies themselves show vast differences in 
actual returns. As such, Harvey (1988) has questioned the validity of such an exercise 
because of the non-uniformity o f research results. Doyle and Ridout (1985) showed that 
returns were decreasing over time, which could correlate with the reduction of research 
funds during that period. They concluded, however, that reduced rates of return could either 
be due to diminishing returns as investment increases, an inappropriate allocation of 
resources or a decrease in the efficiency by which scientific knowledge was employed in 
technology. Since the mid-1980s various efforts have been made to find the true level of 
returns to agriculture. It seems there are four major factors that have not been addressed in 
studies before this period. These are:
1) The effect o f  international spill-overs (Huffman and Evenson, 1993). Knowledge is not 
boundary specific. Consequently, discoveries funded from other countries may be embodied 
into UK research. With the increasing globalisation of chemical and pharmaceutical firms, 
the expenditures o f foreign Governments and private firms have to be taken into account 
when assessing returns to a national system. In a study by Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle 
(1998), which incorporated the effect o f international patents, the coefficient measuring the 
impact o f UK public R&D on productivity was reduced from 0.26 to 0.06.
2) The excess burden o f  taxation. Fox (1985) first highlighted the fact that the collection 
and redistribution o f taxes for public spending incurs a cost in itself and rates of return 
should be adjusted accordingly. Using a previous study on agricultural research, 
incorporating the excess burden reduced returns from 37% to 26%. Whilst Dalrymple 
(1990) found this concept to be theoretically sound, the ability to derive an appropriate 
measure of excess burden was questioned and he asserted that Fox’s calculations may have
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over-stated the reduction.
3) Private R&D investments. Echeverria (1990) in a review of returns to research 
highlighted the fact that the majority of studies ignored the effect of the private sector on 
increasing productivity. This is mainly due to difficulties in obtaining data and measuring 
the true level of information flows between the public and private sectors.
4) Conceptual and theoretical difficulties. There has been a growing body of literature 
which questions the effect o f R&D on productivity growth. The OECD (1992) could find 
no empirical relationship between research and economic growth. More specifically, 
Hal lam (1990) found rates o f return were highly dependent on both the length and shape of 
the lag. He compared the rates o f return between the standard inverted ‘U ’ shaped Almon 
lag with endpoint restrictions used in most previous studies, with variations in restrictions 
and shape. Whilst the unrestricted and polynomial lags yielded a coefficient o f 0.35, the 
standard restricted model had one of 0.52.
These critiques have gone some way to undermine the ‘under-investment hypothesis’ and 
support Harvey’s (1988) contention that the application o f econometric methods to 
agricultural research are highly spurious and, in a policy-making context, quite dangerous. 
What emerges therefore is that studies on the true rate o f return o f agricultural research, 
whilst popular, are somewhat debatable in terms o f policy-making. Notwithstanding this, an 
attempt to measure the impact o f past research on agricultural productivity will be made, 
with a view to assessing whether research policy changes have affected the productivity 
enhancing effects o f R&D.
4.2.2. Measuring Agricultural Productivity Change
The bulk of studies on research and productivity have derived some form of relationship 
similar to that depicted in equation (5) (Thirtle and Bottomley, 1988):
i? = 2  + p  (5)
/■ = o
where
P  is the rate o f change in total factor productivity between year t and year t+1,
R  is the sum of public expenditures on research, lagged by n years,
S  is the public expenditure on advisory activities,
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E  is an index of the managerial ability of farmers,
IF is a weather index that explains a proportion o f the variations in P, and 
p  is the error term.
Consequently, a series for each o f these variables has been derived and assessed for their 
effect on productivity. The research data were obtained from various sources. Firstly, the 
University Grants Commission (UGC) records the allocation o f block grants which are 
devoted to research on agriculture and veterinary subjects within Higher Education 
Institutions. This is provided for England, Wales and Scotland. However, data from 
Northern Ireland were not available. Similarly, the Government spends money on in-house 
research. Data are available from the supply estimates published by the HM Treasury and 
available in yearly statements from HMSO command papers. Scottish data on the 
development work o f the Scottish Agricultural College are declared in the ‘Agriculture in 
Scotland’ series of SOAEFD, which also provides information for the research institutes in 
Scotland. However, Northern Irish data are not available and estimates of research 
expenditures were taken from Thirtle, Piesse and Smith (1997). The major conductor of 
agricultural R&D in England and Wales is the Biotechnology and Biological Science 
Research Council, which from 1965 onwards has published annual statements of 
expenditure. Before this period, figures had to be obtained from the Government supply 
estimates of HM Treasury.
These supply estimates were also the source of advisory data for England and Wales, which 
include both current and capital expenditures. However, the reliability of this data has to be 
questioned as the activities o f ADAS in respeet o f research and advice are not well 
delineated. For Scotland, the advisory work o f the SAC is published in the ‘Agriculture in 
Scotland’ series.
For the education series, an index was derived o f the number o f diplomas and degrees 
obtained in agriculture as a percentage of the agricultural population. This series has many 
faults, as it assumes that all agriculture students enter farming after qualifying, though in 
reality they tend to enter other related industries (Burrell et al., 1990). However, it remains 
as the standard proxy for growing entrepreneurial ability within the farming community.
Fluctuations in humidity and precipitation will have a direct effect on the yield o f farm 
crops, as well as the quality o f grassland for grazing livestock and the level o f feeding stuffs
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requirements. MAFF (1961) were the first to adjust net income to ‘normal’ weather 
conditions. However, in theory, fluctuations in terms o f drought and heavy precipitation, in 
a relatively stable climate such as the UK, should cancel out over time. In practice an index, 
which gives a coefficient for the effect o f weather over the period of study (Doyle and 
Ridout, 1985; Thirtle and Bottomley, 1988; Huffman and Evenson, 1993), is usually 
included. The derivation of a weather index is varied. Doyle and Ridout (1985) took a ratio 
o f forecasted crop outputs against actual crop outputs. A similar method was used for 
international comparisons by Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle (1998). However, there are 
limitations to data availability and, because o f this, most studies have used a ‘de Martonne 
aridity’ index (Oury, 1965; Thirtle and Bottomley, 1988; Hallam, 1990), which is a ratio of 
precipitation and temperature. Whilst not ideal, as it gives no indication o f the full effect of 
various conditions on each commodity, it does account for some of the weather changes 
responsible for productivity changes.
4.2.2.1. Choice of Deflator
The problem with the production function method is that the series has to be deflated for 
price fluctuations. In addition, an index of the price of scientific resources does not exist. 
Davis (1981) suggests using an index o f professors’ salaries, but, whilst academic wages are 
published by the UGC, they do not provide a consistent series for the period 1948 to 1996. 
Consequently, whilst not ideal, the choice o f an agricultural input deflator was chosen. This 
was mainly because it ensures consistency o f treatment with the private sector research 
series (see below). The other possible deflator was the retail price index, but this was 
considered to only reflect consumer preferences. The agricultural deflator was preferred as 
it follows, to some degree, the price preferences o f farmers for agricultural inputs, which 
embody technological advances.
4.2.2.2. The Stationarity Problem
Before using time series data within an estimation procedure the series must be first tested 
for statistical validity. Stationarity is a fundamental assumption o f time series. If data are 
stationary then their statistical properties remain constant over time. However, what has 
usually been observed is that over time the series tends to drift away from the mean, usually 
referred to as random walk. If  this occurs then the data are said to be non-stationary and, if 
used in a regression, will lead to spurious results.
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When testing for stationarity a unit-root test is performed. When the series are non- 
stationary this infers that the root o f a series is unity {p = 0.9-1.1) and follows a random 
walk with drift (J3 = 0). Dickey and Fuller derived the distribution for the estimator, when p  
=1, and generated critical values o f F-test statistics for the random walk hypothesis (Pyndick 
and Rubinfeld, 1998). The process o f finding an unit root involves first running an 
unrestricted regression and then a restricted regression. The standard F ratio is then 
calculated to test whether the restrictions (/? = 0, =1) hold and the resulting F-statistic is
measured against the F-test tables generated by Dickey and Fuller. However, Mackinnon 
derived estimates from a wider set of observations and these are the ones used to test for unit 
roots here.
The most popular methods for measuring unit-roots are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) or Phillips-Perron methods. The ADF and Phillips-Perron tests involve integrating 
lags to the variable on the right hand side o f the equation to correct for serial correlation. 
However, the Phillips-Perron test is favoured as it recommends the length o f lag required, 
using the Newey-West procedure (Lilian et ah, 1995). When a series is stationary it is 
denoted 1(0), however if the data are non-stationary then it has to be differenced, denoted 
I(x), where x is the level o f differencing required. The results derived from this procedure 
for the current data are presented in Table 4,3.
Table 4.3. Test for Unit Roots Using the Phillips-Perron Method
Series, 1 9 4 8 -1 9 9 6
Tornqvist TFP Index 1(1)
Laspeyres TFP Index 1(1)
Public R&D Expenditure 1(1)
Advisory Expenditure 1(1)
Education Index 1(1)
Weather Index 1(0)
The results show that all the series, apart from weather, were found to be non-stationary. 
Thus the application o f ordinary least squares would be inappropriate. Running the Phillips- 
Perron test a second time, at the first difference level, rejects the hypothesis o f a unit root for 
all variables. Consequently these series have to be first differenced, before they can be used 
within a regression.
4.2.2.3. Causality and Productivity
Establishing whether a relationship between research and TFP exists is usually facilitated by 
a Granger causality test. Essentially, the Granger test works on the idea that if  X causes Y,
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then changes in X should precede changes in Y. In order to establish unidirectional Granger 
causality two conditions need to be met. Firstly, X should help to predict Y, and secondly, 
Y should not help to predict X. If Y were to also predict X then bi-directional Granger 
causality would exist.
Using research data and a TFP index for the period 1967 to 1987, Hallam (1990) could find 
no causality between research expenditure and TFP. However, the functional form was 
restricted because o f a shortage o f degrees o f freedom and so a shortened lag had to be used. 
Pardey and Craig (1989) found that causality could run in the opposite direction. However, 
recent studies, using a Tornqvist index over a longer period, have found that research 
expenditure causes, in the Granger sense, TFP (Khatri and Thirtle, 1996; Thirtle and 
Townsend, 1997). Consequently, using the research data, a Granger test was undertaken. 
The Laspeyres and Tornqvist indiees were regressed against public research and advisory 
expenditure. All series were logged and deflated at 1970 prices.
The Granger test allowed lags to be imposed to measure effectively the effect of research 
expenditures on the TFP index. While this is usually considered a weakness o f using the 
Granger test, as it has a high sensitivity to the length of lag used (Gujarti, 1995), a method 
exists to determine the length of the appropriate lag. Regressing research expenditure 
against productivity with a lag will have an effect on the Schwartz criterion. Essentially the 
Schwartz criterion is a method of measuring goodness o f fit which corrects for the loss of 
degrees of freedom that results when additional lags are added to the model. It is the most 
accurate method of determining lag length as it penalises the addition o f right-hand side 
variables (Pyndyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). The lag structure can be determined by increasing 
the number of lags until the Schwartz criterion reaches a minimum value. Consequently, the 
Laspeyres (TFP(L)) series was found to have a lag length of 10 years, whereas the Tornqvist 
(TFP(T)) had a length of 11 years, when measured against the public research series. The 
results for the Granger causality test are presented in Table 4.4.
Table 4.4. Granger Causality Test Between Public R&D and Productivity
Null Hypothesis: F-Statistic: Reject Null Hypothesis
Research does not Granger Cause TFP(L) 2.54 Yes
TFP(L) does not Granger Cause Research 0.57 No
Research does not Granger Cause TFP(T) 0.83 No
TFP(T) does not Granger Cause Research 1.83 No
Critical F Values at < 0.05 Laspeyres 2.45, Tornqvist 2.54
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If the F-statistic provided by the Granger causality test is higher than its eritical value, then 
the null hypothesis, i.e. that R&D does not cause TFP change, has to be rejected. Thus, it 
would provide evidence that R&D causes TFP change. For the above pairs of series, both 
the null hypotheses concerning the Tornqvist TFP series cannot be rejected. Consequently, 
this indicates that whilst research does not cause TFP, TFP also does not cause research 
expenditure. However, the same procedure when applied to the Laspeyres TFP index 
rejected the null hypothesis that research does not cause TFP growth, but did not reject the 
null hypothesis that that TFP does not cause R&D growth. Consequently, as Granger 
Causality tests only supported the hypothesis that research causes TFP when the Laspeyres 
index is used, further analysis was confined to the Laspeyres index.
4.2,3. Agricultural R&D in the Private Sector
Until recently, a major cause o f productivity growth, that has been overlooked by studies 
into public R&D, is the influence o f the private sector on research spending. Within the UK 
Doyle and Ridout (1985) doubled public research expenditures to account for private 
research, so in this study the effects o f public and private expenditures could not be 
disaggregated. Thirtle and Bottomley (1988), through lack of any published data, had to 
ignore private R&D and suggested applying Evenson's (1967) estimate o f dividing the 
public rate of return by 1.22 to take into account private R&D spending. However, a major 
advance occurred with Khatri and Thirtle (1996), who included US chemical and 
pharmaceutical patents to derive an index which took account o f spill-overs from private 
research. This was developed further by Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle (1998), who included 
European data on patents. However, a list o f patents has a major disadvantage, as a patent 
series is no indication of the level of research expenditure required to obtain the patent. 
Similarly, the patent o f a private company may have emerged from publicly-funded basic 
research. It therefore seems inadequate to use such a series for a comparison o f the 
effectiveness o f research investment by the public and private sectors. Consequently, for the 
period 1948-1996 a series o f private research expenditure on agricultural R&D has had to be 
constructed for this analysis.
Measuring the level o f private sector expenditures on research is a difficult task because, 
unlike the USA, firms are not obliged to publish expenditures on research and development 
within their statements o f accounts. Lord and Rogers (1969) tried to obviate this by 
conducting, what seems to be, the first survey on the commercial agricultural industry’s 
research activity. Information was gathered from larger firms and then re-weighted to cover 
the UK industry. Table 4.5 shows that expenditures rose, in cash terms, from £5.5 million in
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1955/6 to £10 million in 1995/6. Beck (1987) could only offer a rough figure of ‘around 
£100 to £200 million’ for 1984/5. This seems consistent with a study by Thirtle, Piesse and 
Smith (1997). This latter study presented an earlier projection o f £301 million for 
agriculture research spend in 1988/9, which was later found to have declined to £286 million 
before inflation in the period 1993/4.
Table 4.5. Previous Estimates on Private Sector Agricultural Research, £ million at nominal
prices______________________________________________________________________________
1955/6^ 1965/6^ 1983/4* 1987/8** 1993/4**
£M___________________^ _________IRO_________ 100-200_________ 301.0_______ 286.0
# Ashton and Lord (1969); * Beck (1987); **Thirtle, Piesse and Smith (1997)
Consequently, for this analysis there is a need to update these figures. This suggested that 
one method for assessing private expenditures would be to use surveys. This has the 
advantage of offering actual data from companies involved in research and by-passes the 
problem of conjecture in evaluating spending levels. Against this, one problem to be faced 
is that no published figures are available for the number of firms involved in the agricultural 
industries. To counteract this, the reported proportion o f turnover spent on research in the 
firms sampled was applied to the published data on sectoral gross output to give an estimate 
o f the overall level o f private industrial agricultural research activity. The construction of 
the questionnaire, the sampling technique and the results obtained are explained in the 
subsequent sections.
4.2.3.1. Methodology
The survey population consisted of companies in the UK involved in the manufacture of 
inputs into the farming industry, who undertook research or development. The whole 
agricultural industry was divided into five sectors, and these are defined in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6. Agricultural Sectors Employed Within the Survey
Sector Definition
Agrochemicals crop chemicals, including fertilisers
Veterinary and Medicine animal pharmaceuticals and welfare
Plant and Crop seeds, horticulture, agronomy and farming systems
Animal Science breeding, nutrition, lactation and growth
Agri-Engineering farm vehicles, buildings and computer systems
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The survey was aimed at the Research and Technical Directors or their equivalent in 
business organisations. Names were gathered from lists o f members o f agricultural 
associations and trade directories.
4.2.3.2. Sampling Plan
The questionnaire was administered separately for two sizes o f firm, non-large and large 
firms. Non-large firms were surveyed by means o f a postal questionnaire, whereas large 
firms were approached by personal interview. It was assumed that, as the large firms have 
more influence on the UK agricultural industiy, they had to be questioned further on their 
R&D activity. However, due to the high costs o f a personal visit to a firm, it was felt that 
only companies with annual turnovers in excess o f £100 million from UK activities would 
be interviewed. Consequently, non-large firms were regarded as companies having a 
turnover of less than £100 million. The non-large firms were classified by the five sectors 
defined in Table 4.7 and chosen through random probability sampling, stratified by sector 
within the survey. Thus, these five sectors were treated as sub-sections from which a 
population was selected through normal probability sampling. This was in order to help 
ensure each sector was fairly represented within the sample.
Firms were first contacted in September 1996 by telephone to inquire whether they 
conducted R&D and, if  so, the questionnaire was mailed to them. O f the 717 firms 
contacted, 430 conducted research and development o f some kind and this formed the initial 
survey size. The incentive o f inclusion o f a prize draw was included to encourage early 
response, but follow-up reminders were sent to firms who had not replied by the closing 
date, which was extended to the 30 November 1996.
As most of the large firms had interests in more than one sector, 50 were targeted separately 
for personal interview. These were selected from company directories. Similarly, large 
firms, which were predominantly involved in the food industry but who were known to have 
interests in an area o f agricultural input, were also included in the survey o f 50 Targe’ 
companies. The companies were approached by a telephone inquiry, followed by a letter 
confirming the time and date for the interview. The questionnaire still formed the basis of 
the interviews, but it was intended to secure more detailed information in respect of 
questions on expenditures, priorities and linkage activities. Out o f the 50 companies 
approached, 15 agreed to disclose information, but only 13 could accommodate an 
interview. The remaining 2 were sent expanded questionnaires specific to their companies. 
The whole process o f collection o f both non-large and large firm data took from September
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1996 to February 1997. Table 4.7 shows the distribution by sectors in terms o f the sample 
and the response rates.
Table 4.7. Sample Stratification by Sector, numbers o f Firms and percent
Main Sector Activity Original 
Sample Size, 
Firms
Number 
Conducting 
R&D, Firms
Spread by 
Sectors
Number o f  
Response, 
Firms
Spread by 
Sectors
Agrochemicals 150 110 23.4 26 22.0
Veterinary and 
Medicine
155 91 19.4 27 22.9
Plant and Crop 160 121 25.7 29 24.6
Animal Science 161 93 19.8 20 17.0.
Agri-Engineering 141 55 11.7 16 13.6
Total 767 470 100 118 100.0
Table 4.8 shows the total numbers of firms in the original sample, both large and non-large. 
O f the 767 firms sampled, 470 (61% of the original sample) were found to conduct some 
form o f R&D after a telephone enquiry. These firms were either mailed or visited and this 
yielded a total response of 118 firms, a response rate of 15% from the original sample, or 
25% after the telephone inquiry. These response rates were higher than expected, but may 
have been the result of targeting specific persons within each company. The results of this 
survey are outlined below.
4,2.3.3. Private Research Expenditure
As firms were reluctant to provide detailed information on R&D expenditure, they were 
asked to give an indication o f their R&D spend as a percentage of turnover in terms o f one 
of 6 bands or ranges. These ranges were defined as 0%, 1-3%, 4-6%, 7-9%, 10-14% and 
over 14%. If a company had a research spend above 14%, then they were asked to specify a 
percentage. However, a problem arose with having to use these categories in that, if the 
centre o f each range were taken as indicative of the firm’s R&D spend, this might lead to 
biased over- or understated estimates. Accordingly, the upper, mid, and lower limits of each 
range were used to give an indication of possible R&D expenditures. The more detailed 
survey o f the larger firms allowed for clearer indications o f exact research spend and 
obviated this problem.
Accordingly, once the research expenditures were collected, their intensities could be 
calculated as a means o f comparison across sectors. Dividing the total level o f turnover for 
the sample in each sector by the total level o f research in that sector gave the research
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intensity. For the 118 firms responding, the estimated R&D expenditures and intensities, as 
measured by turnover, in 1996 are given by sector in Table 4.8.
Table 4.8. Estimated Level of R&D Expenditure and Intensity by Agricultural Sector for 
Survey Respondents in 1996, £ million and percent
Lower
Limit
Mid-Point Upper
Limit
Standard
Deviation
Agrochemicals, £ million 88.9 93.2 100.8 6.0
R&D Intensity (%) 6.9 7.0 7.2 0.1
Veterinary and Medicine, £ million 16.2 20.3 27.2 5.6
R&D Intensity (%) 9.5 9.6 9.9 0.1
Plant and Crops, £ million 33.9 40.0 49.6 7.9
R&D Intensity (%) 6.8 7.0 7.4 0.1
Animal Science, £ million 15.5 20.1 27.6 6.1
R&D Intensity (%) 2.0 2.3 3.1 0.2
Agri-Engineering, £ million 14.4 15.8 18.2 1.9
R&D Intensity (%) 2.1 2.2 2.4 0.1
Total Expenditure, £ million 168.9 189.4 223.4 27.5
R&D Intensity (%) 5.0 5.1 5.5 0.1
Whilst there was a provision in the survey that the company should only declare their 
amount o f expenditure on UK based activities, it has to be conceded that the above figures 
may be overestimated due to the amount of embodied knowledge within multi-national 
companies. Thus, larger companies which have research interests in other countries may 
embody this knowledge through internal knowledge transference in scientific staff.
Overall the standard deviation between high, mid and low research estimates hovers around 
£2 to 8 million. Thus, agri-engineering seems to have the smallest deviation o f 1.9 million, 
whereas the estimates for plant and crops has the largest deviation o f £7.9 million. 
Nevertheless, the research intensities only deviate by around 0.1%, which seems nominal. 
The total research intensity o f the agricultural input industries can be estimated at around 5 
to 6% of turnover. The OECD ranks intensities as indicative o f an industry’s technological 
standing. According to their definitions, the agricultural sector would rank as below the UK 
average for a high-tech industry at 8.49% (OECD, 1994b). However, the agricultural 
industry involves a diversity of scientific disciplines and deriving a total research intensity 
for the industry seems spurious.
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The lowest figures are for agri-engineering and animal science, which each have an intensity 
o f around 2%. Thirtle, Piesse and Smith (1997) concluded that bad economic conditions 
would mean that the research spend would be lower than 5% for tractor manufacturers and 
this is near the estimate by Ruttan (1982) o f 3% for the farm machinery industry. Similarly, 
the animal science sector has only a low research intensity. Within commercial feed and 
breeding activities, appropriability is generally low, and so there is less o f an incentive to 
invest in R&D.
However, the figures of £169, £189 and £223 million are clearly under-estimates, not only 
because the 470 firms contacted probably do not represent the totality o f those involved in 
agricultural R&D, but also because only 15% of those contacted actually provided usable 
information. These responses were therefore re-weighted against the Census o f Production 
(CSO, 1998) to reflect each sector’s contribution to the turnover of the agricultural industry 
(See Appendix 3). A more realistic picture of private sector research spend may therefore 
be reflected in Table 4.9.
Table 4.9. Potential Level of R&D Expenditure by the Agricultural Sector in 1996,
£ million_____________________________________________________________________
Sector Estimated Total R&D Totals from  Thirtle,
Expenditure for all firms Piesse and Smith
Lower Limit Mid-Point Upper Limit (Adjustedfor 1995/C)
Agrochemicals 122.3 136.8 150.0 161.7
Veterinary and Medicine 25.9 27.8 29.8 45.1
Plants & Crops 111.0 138.1 165.0 21.6
Animal Science 69.5 92.2 114.7 15.1
Agri-Engineering 36.7 42.0 47.4 64.7
Total 365.3 436.9 506.9 308.2
The results of the survey would indicate that total private sector expenditure in the UK on 
both in-house and externally sponsored research on agriculture in 1996 was at least £365 
million and could be as high as £507 million. In comparison, reported UK public sector 
agricultural R&D funding for 1995/6 was around £335 million. From these results it would 
appear that the ratio o f private to public sector spending within UK agricultural R&D is 
around 1.3:1 to 1.5:1.
The only other figures available on UK private expenditures are estimates by Thirtle, Piesse 
and Smith (1997), which are also presented in Table 4.10 for comparison. What emerges is
Adjusted for inflation for 1995/6 using the Retail Price Index.
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that the sample figures are around 19 to 64% higher than these previous figures. At the 
upper limits this a substantial discrepancy. However, a major reason for this could be 
differences in the definition o f the groups involved. For instance, the plant and crop figure 
of £111 to £165 million is around 5 to 7 times higher than the £22 million given by Thirtle, 
Piesse and Smith However, this latter figure only reflects the ‘Seed Industry’, whereas plant 
and crops, as defined here, covers seeds, horticulture, agronomy and farming systems and 
therefore should be higher.
The largest discrepancy emerges in the animal science sector. Animal science includes 
Thirtle, Piesse and Smith’s (1997) categories o f ‘breeding and feeding stuffs’, along with 
research into physiology and dairy production. This figure is increased by around 8 times at 
its upper limits when including these factors. A recent estimate by the Foresight Panel 
(OST, 1995b, pp. 14) has stated biomedical research into agriculture is around £0.2 billion. 
Whilst this figure also includes food and forestry it may indicate that the estimate for animal 
science actually under-represents the levels of spend by industry. The agrochemical sector 
is lower but may more truly reflect expenditure, as Thirtle, Piesse and Smith’s (1997) figure 
overstated investment in R&D in the UK. Thus, they contended that this may include 
multinational research and the actual figure may be less (ibid., pp. 51). Agri-engineering is 
much smaller than Thirtle, Piesse and Smith, who used a turnover o f £1.5 billion for tractor 
manufacturers and assumed research expenditure at 4%. However, from Table 4.9 it is 
evident that the research intensity o f agri-engineering is nearer half o f this. Similarly 
turnover, according to the Census of Production (CSO, 1998), declined to around £1.3 
billion for tractors and agricultural equipment in 1996. Nevertheless, this is an under­
estimate as no figures were available for agricultural buildings and computer applications, 
which are included in this category.
4.2.3.4. Deriving a Series for the Private Sector
The private sector produces inputs for improving on-farm productivity. However, it must be 
accepted that during certain periods of its history, the public sector also contributed to these 
inputs. Therefore, whilst not ideal, the levels of inputs from the aggregate agricultural 
accounts in the Annual Abstract o f Statistics (CSO) is central to providing a consistent 
series o f the value o f inputs used on UK farms. Analysing these tables offers a number of 
inputs into the farming system, namely i) feeding stuffs, ii) fertilisers, and iii) seeds. 
Machinery is also present in the form of depreciation, which can be seen as the flow of
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capital stock. However, this does not represent the size or shape o f the engineering and 
buildings sector and so was not considered any further in the analysis.
A large increase occurred in inputs after entry into the CAP. The dropping o f trade barriers 
and increases in subsidies encouraged both home production and imports o f feeds and 
fertilisers. Whilst this could be a hazard in deriving the series, it does partially allow 
international spill-overs to be incorporated into the private industiy index. Given this 
assumption, the level o f agricultural research over the period 1948 to 1996 was derived by 
using the data in Table 4.8 to indicate research intensity for a specific year, which is, in 
effect, the percentage o f turnover dedicated to research. These percentages are presented in 
Table 4.10.
Table 4.10. Expenditure on Private Sector R&D in the UK Agricultural Sector, £ million at
1955/6 1965/6 1984/5 1995/6
Value o f Inputs, £M 468.5 719.0 4350.7 4542.8
Private Research Spend, £M 5.5 10.0 100-200 365-507
R&D Spend, percent 1 . 2 1.4 2.3-4.6 8 . 0 - 1 1 . 2
Overall, it would appear that private research intensity has grown since 1948. Whilst only 
nominal at 1.2% in the early 1950s, it has increased to around 10% over the 50-year period. 
This trend seems to correlate with the idea o f ‘big science’ and the increasing cost and 
complexity involved in technological advances. Thus, private agricultural firms have moved 
into areas of biological and biotechnological fields since the early 1980s and this is reflected 
by increasing research intensities.
Whilst these estimates only represent single years, they could be used as the basis for 
deriving a series over the whole period o f investigation. Specifically, using a simple moving 
average to smooth rises and decreases in these percentages, a continuous series of private 
sector research intensity was determined. However, whilst the early and latter parts of the 
series can be clearly ascertained, due to the lack of alternatives there is an area of contention 
over the activity within the late-1970s and early 1980s. This is mainly due to Beck’s (1987) 
estimation of research spend as between ‘£100 and £200 million’. Consequently, two 
scenarios were assumed to accommodate these differences. Scenario one is based on Doyle 
and Ridout (1985), presuming that the indications are that private expenditures in the 1970s 
were roughly equal to public outlays. This correlates with evidence from the chemical 
industries, which saw an increase in concentration during the late 1960s and 1970s, with the
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rise of giants such as BP Nutrition and Shell (Dawson and Lingard, 1987). Halving their 
figure for total UK research expenditure and incorporating Beck’s upper limit o f £200 
million gives scenario one. In contrast, scenario two assumes Beck’s lower estimate o f £100 
million in 1984. Accordingly, by using the derived percentages against the value o f total 
agricultural inputs over the period 1948 to 1996 and then deflating by the agricultural input 
deflator gives Figure 4.2. This shows the derivation o f the two possible scenarios relating to 
the activity that may have occurred in the UK private sector.
Figure 4.2. Estimates o f Private Agricultural Research Expenditure between 1948 and 1996, 
£ million in 1970 prices__________________________________________________________
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Scenario one seems to provide a smoother series than scenario two. However, this is no 
indication that it is more valid. Indeed scenario two, where expenditure was assumed to be 
£100 million in 1984, may reflect the recessionary period of the early 1980s, when 
investment was reduced. Similarly, the rapid expansion of research expenditure after this 
period could reflect the substantial investments made into biotechnology by companies such 
as Unilever and ICI. In order to check causality, a Granger test was conducted on both 
scenarios. Following the process outlined earlier it was found that at 5% significance levels 
Granger causality was bi-directional against TFP in both scenarios. However, when tested 
for stationarity, scenario one was found to be co-integrated at the 5% level with the TFP 
index. On the other hand, scenario two failed to prove stationary or co-integrated with the 
TFP series and was accordingly excluded from further analysis.
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4.2.4. The Nature of Knowledge Creation and Productivity Growth
Goods and services that enter the economy and have an effect on productivity are the result 
o f many stages o f research and development. In terms of R&D some o f these processes may 
be linked to investment specifically in developing that invention, but others may have 
emerged from different disciplines. For instance, a new tractor may only be a slightly 
modified model o f a previous version. This eould be counted as work at the development 
end of the spectrum, but the new process needed to modify that tractor may have emerged 
from high investment in the basic side of research, e.g. in robotics or precision agriculture 
using satellite mapping. Hence tracing the course o f a technical innovation may be possible 
for individual studies, but is impossible at an aggregate level. Accordingly, research is 
usually viewed as being embodied in a ‘stock o f knowledge’ and any investment in research 
considered to add to the stock o f knowledge. This relationship is represented by equation 
(6).
K , = { \ - d ) Ÿ K , _ , + ! 3 R ,  (6)
i= \
Research expenditure (R) in period t creates ‘bits’ (P) o f knowledge (Doyle and Ridout, 
1985). These bits add to the stock o f knowledge from the previous period (Kf.^. The total 
stock of knowledge (K) accumulates over a time period of (n) years. The nature of research 
is to advance the frontiers of knowledge, hence old ideas are replaced by new ideas. This is 
indicated by the rate o f obsolescence (S).
However, the relationship between knowledge production and agricultural productivity is far 
more complex. Martin et al. (1996) highlight six benefits to economic growth from basic 
research, which include the training of staff and technological problem solving. Moreover, 
these benefits follow ill-defined channels to create productivity growth, in comparison to 
applied and development work which is more directly focused. It was, therefore, felt that 
research should be divided into ‘basic’ and ‘non-basic’.
The basic series consisted o f research expenditures from UGC grants for England, Wales 
and Scotland, as well as a proportion o f AFRC expenditure. However, the AFRC annual 
report publishes figures for its science budget, along with project funding from MAFF and 
other bodies only after 1973. If the science budget is considered as money for basic
110
research, and project funding is presumed to be for applied and development work as 
Rothschild intended, then this could indicate the levels o f expenditure for the two types of 
R&D. However, before this period little is known about the division between different types 
o f research. Consequently, an approximation based on the average percentage split between 
the basic and non-basic types o f research after 1973 was used. This showed a split o f 53:47 
between basic and non-basic fields respectively.
Furthermore, as basic research may be expected to have a different effect on productivity 
than applied or development work, basic research expenditures have to be handled 
differently. Basic research can be seen as the stock of knowledge from which firms and 
public researchers develop specific products and processes. In this case the traditional 
model, outlined in equation (6), seems very relevant to deriving the state o f basic research in 
any particular period.
Whilst the series begins in 1948, it was necessary to construct a stock o f knowledge before 
this period. As information on research expenditures is sporadic before this period it was 
assumed that expenditure grew exponentially from £0.39 million in 1931 (Henderson, 1981, 
pp. 21) up to £3.79 million in 1948. Whilst there was agricultural research before 1931, it 
was felt the establishment o f the Agricultural Research Council at this time imposed some 
formative process by which knowledge was pooled and directed towards problems in 
agriculture. Therefore, the whole o f its budget in this period was considered to be for basic 
research. The monetary value o f research has then to be converted into ‘bits’ of knowledge. 
In equation (6) this is the p parameter. Taking the number of papers published and setting 
them against the scientific funding provided gives an indication o f the cost o f creating basic 
knowledge. Thus, using 1993 data on the publications and science budget expenditure of 
the Institute of Grassland and Environmental Research (IGER), the Rowett Research 
Institute (RRI) and the Institute of Arable Crops Research (lACR), some indication of the 
value of creating one ‘bit’ of knowledge is obtained. These calculations are presented in 
Table 4.11.
Table 4.11. Estimation of ‘Beta Coefficient’, from publication and science budget data in
IGER RRI lACR
Publications 346 338 652
‘Bits’ o f Knowledge 692 676 1304
Science Budget, £M 9.20 5.95 13.80
‘Bits’ per £ million 75.2 113.5 94.5
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Consequently, assuming arbitrarily that one publication produced two ‘bits’ of knowledge, 
an average of 94.5 bits of knowledge were created per million pounds spent on agricultural 
R&D. This figure was used in the beta coefficient in equation (6). Similarly, (5) was taken 
to be 0.05 after Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle (1998). This is related to the fact that the 
average life of a patent is 17 years and is presumed to be indicative o f the life of a single 
knowledge ‘bit’. Consequently, the stock of knowledge created solely from basic research 
expenditure could be derived and is presented in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3. Estimated Stock of Knowledge Created Through Expenditure on Public Basic
R&D
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There are obvious restrictions to this method. Firstly, basic research in certain areas, for 
instance microbiology, makes knowledge obsolescent much faster than every 17 years. 
Similarly, choosing 1993 as a base year was purely due to data availability and is biased 
against the 1950s and 1960s, when funding was expanding, but data on publications were 
not available.
Applied and development expenditures had to be handled differently from basic research. 
Thus, non-basic research is seen as a more direct expenditure, and as in more traditional 
studies, a lag has to be imposed on its effect on productivity. For non-basic research, the in- 
house expenditures for England and Wales were used, along with SAC development 
expenditure and in-house work in Scotland. The Northern Ireland research provided by 
Thirtle, Piesse and Smith (1997) was incorporated, assuming that it was predominantly 
applied in nature.
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4.2.41. Choice of Lag
The effect o f research on productivity is not immediate. There is some length o f time before 
money spent on R&D leads to a product, which is adopted by industry, and consequently has 
an effect on productivity. Therefore, within the economic evaluation o f research, much 
debate has centred around the shape and length o f the lag which should be imposed. The 
bulk o f studies have tended to adopt an approach involving the ‘best fit’ of the data as an 
indicator o f the true lag length. Under this methodology studies have found an average 
length of lag of 10 to 20 years. Similarly, the majority of recent studies, which have used 
the sounder econometric method of minimising the ‘Schwartz’ criterion for establishing lag 
lengths, have found comparable ranges for assessing the full effect of research on the 
economy.
Nevertheless, whilst the Schwartz criterion determines the best length o f the lag, there is no 
theoretically justified method for deriving its shape. The majority have followed conceptual 
thought on technology adoption, which tends to assume an inverted ‘U ’ shape. Thus, there 
are early adopters to a technology which, over a number o f years, becomes the industry 
standard and then declines in use as it is replaced by newer technology. The majority of 
studies have adopted an Almon lag (Cline and Lu, 1976; Doyle and Ridout, 1985; Thirtle 
and Bottomley, 1988). However, various other shapes have been imposed on the research 
lag. A ‘trapezoidal’ shaped lag (where the effect is held constant for a number o f years 
during the mid-period) was used by Huffman and Evenson (1993), and in a recent study by 
Khatri and Thirtle (1996) a ‘gamma’ shaped lag was employed. This took the inverted ‘U ’ 
shape with a longer skew in the earlier years and had a sharper decline in its latter stages. 
Consequently, the shape o f the lag tends to have relied on the ‘best fit’ approach. However, 
this is open to the accusation o f distortion regarding the true effect of the behaviour of the 
data. Indeed, Hallam (1990) found that changing the restrictions on the shape o f a lag of the 
same length gave highly varied results.
4.2.5. Estimation of Returns to Agricultural R&D
The model used is a variation o f equation (5), whereby (R), the research function, is 
disaggregated by type and sector. However, because of the non-stationarity of the series 
found in section 4.2.2.2. the first difference was taken of all variables, except the weather 
series, which proved to be stationary:
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where
P  is rate of total factor productivity change in year t,
^  is a constant,
is the stock o f basic knowledge over the period 1,
is the sum of public applied and development expenditures, lagged up to m years, 
P^’' is the sum of private expenditures, lagged up to n years,
S is public expenditures on advisory expenditure,
E  is an index o f the managerial ability o f farmers,
^  is a weather index that explains a proportion of the variations in P, and 
ju is the error term.
Variants on the above equation were attempted. However, the number o f variables proved 
problematic and incurred some degree o f multicollinearity. In particular, the results from 
using the stock o f knowledge index proved highly volatile and insignificant using a variety 
o f lag structures. As a result, the stock of knowledge series was not considered further and 
the basic research expenditure series had to suffice.
In order to establish the true effect of each type of research, the equations consisted of 
adding and removing the private research expenditure series. Consequently, four equations 
were derived using the above procedure.
The first equation used total public research expenditures (P^*), namely the sum of basic 
plus the applied research and development expenditures, as its primary variable. As 
determining true lag length was difficult, the procedure adopted was to include only this 
variable. Different lags and shapes were then imposed on this equation. Adopting the best 
fit procedure and dropping the Schwartz criterion restrictions allowed lags of between 8 to 
26 years to be imposed onto the data. This gave a coefficient which varied from 0.16 to 0.17 
for total public research expenditures. However, minimising the Schwartz criterion gave a 
fit o f 8 years, using the standard polynomial lag with both ends restricted to zero. Whilst 
this is the usual procedure imposed as regards the research coefficient (Doyle and Ridout,
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1985; Schimmelpfennig and Thirtle, 1998), it was felt that the coefficient should be 
measured against changes in the order and restrictions o f the polynomial lag. Thus, 
changing the restrictions and order o f the lag imposed various constraints on the shape o f the 
lag. However, differences between restrictions and orders o f polynomial were minimal with 
a minimum sum for the public R&D coefficient o f 0.159 and a maximum of 0.174. 
Consequently, it seems that changes in the order and restrictions o f polynomial lags have 
had very little effect on the measured impact o f public R&D. Furthermore, this variance 
seems insignificant compared to the extreme changes found by Hallam (1990) o f around 
0.20 between restricted and non-restricted lags.
Therefore, retaining the standard specification o f the polynomial lag with length of 8 years, 
it proved difficult to fit the remaining variables. This was especially the case with advice 
which proved insignificant for most lag lengths. Consequently, the advisory series was 
added to the public R&D series (R^ *"^ ^^ ). This follows the majority of studies in this area 
which obey the continuum between R&D and advice. This new series was fitted firstly 
without private expenditure with a lag o f 16 years. This is illustrated in equation (8);
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Furthermore, the private research series was then integrated into the equation. Again there 
was some freedom available in the lag length, which resulted in a variance of between 0.07 
to 0.16 using the best fit methodology. Minimising the Schwartz criterion suggested a lag of 
7 years for private research using a second order polynomial with both ends restricted to 
zero. This specification is presented in equation (9):
16 7
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The same equations were then run with the separate log series for basic and applied R&D 
expenditure replacing the public R&D expenditure series. However, the basic series proved 
difficult to fit, giving highly insignificant results, and had to be dropped from the remaining 
equations. Similar problems oceurred with fitting the applied R&D series with the advisory 
series and, following equations (8) and (9) they were combined into one series (R''^" '^'’). 
Fitting this series found a lag of 11 years used for equation (10):
11
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With the introduction of the private series, the best lag length again was seven years. This 
gave equation (11);
A l n f ,  = . 4  +  £ a , A l n f , T “*  + + / ? , A l n £  +  ;03PF+  /; (11)
1=0 /=0
The results o f the fits for all four equations are presented in Table 4.12. The four equations 
(8) to (11) seem consistent with the majority o f previous assumptions about R&D and 
productivity. Thus, a relatively short lag would be expected for applied research and 
development work within the public sector, along with an even shorter lag for private sector 
research which is profit-orientated and mostly short-term. Similarly, the projected total 
public research coefficient, which includes basic as well as applied R&D, has a lag o f 16 
years which seems to agree with other studies. The majority o f work in this area employs 
lag lengths o f 15 years and upwards.
Table 4.12. Estimated Parameters (with t-statistic in brackets) for the Different Equations, 
with and without private sector expenditure
Variable Coefficient
Lag Eg. (8 ) Eq(9) Eq(lO) Eq(ll)
Constant A - 2.91 3.08 2 .7 6 3 .0 6
(1 2 .3 2 ) (1 2 .9 9 ) (1 0 .8 0 ) (1 2 .3 2 )
Weather W - 0 .0 0 4 0 .004 0.003 0.003
(2 .4 4 ) (2.44) (2 .3 4 ) (2 .6 9 )
Education E - 0.25 0.18 0.31 0 .18
(3 .8 2 ) (2 .4 9 ) (4.56) (2 .4 5 )
Total Public R&D and j^ pbadv 16 0 .07 0.05
Advice (4 .4 3 ) (2 .9 0 )
Public Applied R&D j^ apadv 11 0 .0 9 0 .06
and Advice (3 .9 7 ) (2 .6 1 )
Private R&D RP" 7 0.09
(2 .1 0 )
0.12
(3 .0 9 )
Adj. R^ 0 .96 0.97 0 .97 0.98
DW Statistic 2.13 2 .5 4 1.76 2 .28
Critical t values for 40 degrees o f  freedom, one-tailed test, are 90% = 1.30, 95% = 1.68
Critical values for Durbin-Watson (equation 9) (k=4, n=32 ) are Dl= 1 .18-0^=1.73 (D-W value tested is 1.46)
All variables are significant, and the overall fit for the equations is good, with the R  ^statistic 
indicating that around 97% of the productivity series is explained by these variables. 
Similarly, most o f the Durbin-Watson (DW) statistic lies within the recommended range 
indicating that there is no significant serial correlation. As regards the results themselves.
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the first point to note is that the effect of a one percent increase in total public R&D and 
advisory expenditure varies from 0.05 to 0.07, Significantly, the introduction of private 
research forces the coefficient for public R&D downward.
The effect of the private sector can also be seen in the second set of equations coneerning 
applied public R&D and advice. Whereas its coefficient is 0.09 without private expenditure, 
it is pushed down to 0.06 when this is introduced. However, publicly-funded applied R&D 
and advice is still higher than the series containing total public R&D expenditure. This 
seems reasonable as applied R&D is much closer to productivity growth than total public 
R&D which includes basic research expenditure, which may have a more abstract 
relationship with productivity.
Another point to note is that private research yields an apparent return from around 0.09 to 
0.12, making it higher than publicly-funded R&D and extension. This too seems reasonable 
as private R&D is motivated by profits and is closer to the market than public R&D 
expenditures. In addition, it seems that private research yields a higher return where applied 
research rather than basic research is assumed to be the key factor driving productivity 
growth. This seems correct, as public support of non-basic areas would reduce the effort for 
a private firm to develop an innovation into a commercially successful product.
The weather coefficient in all four equations is nominal and seems to correspond with the 
assumption that periods of dryness are cancelled by wet weather. However, the education 
coefficient is noteworthy as it varies between 0.18 to 0.25 and even at its lowest is far higher 
than the equivalent public research coefficients. In a sense, this should be expected, as 
farmer’s entrepreneurial ability directly manipulates agricultural productivity and its effect 
should be stronger. Following the line o f arguments from previous studies, this high rate of 
return would suggest that funds could profitably, from a social viewpoint, be shifted from 
research to educational grants in agriculture. However, the education series is an index and 
it has conceptual problems as a proxy for entrepreneurial behaviour. Similarly, it cannot be 
quantified in monetary terms.
The goodness o f fit between the estimated and actual series are shown graphically in Figure 
4.4. Specifically, two series are used. The first (series 1) is total public research and advice 
with private expenditure, as defined in equation (9). The seeond consists of total applied 
R&D and advisory expenditures (series 2), again with private expenditure, as expressed in 
equation (11).
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Figure 4.4. Index o f Actual and Fitted Series from Regression Results, 1970=100
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Both series mimic the observed trend in productivity quite well, except for a high error in 
the mid-1970 drought years, where the forecast is smoother than the actual trend in 
agricultural productivity.
4.2.6. Summary
There are various methods available for evaluating ex-post returns to agricultural R&D. O f 
these, the production function approach has proved the most popular. However, the bulk of 
these studies exhibit various conceptual and methodological problems. Chiefly, the 
establishment of causality, errors in the collection of data and the effect o f private sector 
research expenditures have not been adequately explored in these studies until recently. 
This study has attempted to unify and correct sources of recording error in the derivation of 
research and productivity series. It has also introduced a comparable series for private 
sector research expenditure. Applying this series alongside various measures of research 
activity in the public sector, it was found that rates of return for public R&D were driven 
downward. Thus, earlier studies which ignored commercial R&D activity, probably 
overstated the effect o f public investments on agricultural R&D. Overall this conclusion 
seems to question the reliability o f estimated returns to research as a basis for policy 
decision making. The implications o f these findings are explored further in the conclusion.
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4.3. Conclusion
Rosenberg (1994) likens the process of R&D to a black box, in which investment in research 
affects productivity growth in indirect ways. Consequently, evaluating the effect o f the 
public sector on agricultural productivity poses many hazards and problems. However, 
whilst this cannot be fully corrected, other methods can be used to obviate some of the 
major errors involved in its measurement.
This research has found public agricultural R&D and extension to have a causal effect on 
TFP. This may help to answer the first hypothesis that public agricultural R&D has been 
intrinsic to productivity growth. However, causality was only found when using a 
Laspeyres index, no causality was found when using the Tornqvist indexing procedure. 
Accordingly, there has to be some suspicion over the validity o f linking R&D with TFP 
growth in previous studies when the Tornqvist indexing procedure was used. Nevertheless, 
using the Laspeyres series found a positive coefficient, indicating that some return has been 
gained from expenditures on public agricultural R&D and extension when measured against 
productivity growth.
However, there seems to be a divergence between the type o f research conducted and its 
relationship with productivity growth. Thus, basic research affects productivity through 
indirect channels, which imposes constraints on its accurate measurement. Therefore, the 
consequent focus on using applied R&D as a measure of research effort, whilst practical, 
may lead to a distorted assessment o f how Government research affects TFP growth. When 
looking at the public sector it seems that applied R&D and extension has a larger impact on 
productivity growth than total R&D and extension. Therefore, whilst this may indicate that 
its removal through 'near-market' research was misdirected, there is a strong suspicion that 
these constraints have distorted the accurate measurement o f returns.
The results from the private sector may give support for another aspect of Government 
science policy. Specifically, the second hypothesis, introduced at the beginning of this 
chapter, may have been proved. When including both public and private series, the 
coefficients are almost doubled for private sector R&D than public sector R&D. Thus, it 
does seem that private R&D has a higher impact on productivity grovyth than the public 
sector. Consequently, the high returns to private research may justify the increased 
emphasis on private sector involvement within public sector R&D. However, this has 
ignored the process o f transference between the public and private sectors. Thus, the 
applied R&D conducted in the private sector for a relatively short period o f time may only 
have been possible due to long-term basic research conducted in the public sector.
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Consequently, returns to the private sector may be disproportionately high as this does not 
take into account its reliance on public sector invention.
Nevertheless, assessing the immediate effect o f public research expenditure is spurious 
within the context o f the debate over public funding. This is because the Government 
invests in research in order to receive some social pay-off in the future. Consequently, most 
studies evaluate this ‘social’ rate o f return to public investment. Accordingly, the next 
chapter explores the concept o f public agricultural R&D in terms o f this social return and so 
aims to evaluate its effectiveness.
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CHAPTER 5
ASSESSING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF 
PUBLIC FUNDING FOR AGRICULTURAL 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
5.0. Assessing the Effectiveness of Public Funding for Agricultural R&D
Until the 1960s little or no economic evaluation was undertaken for the majority o f public 
investments (Tyson, 1989). However, in the early 1960s the first social-cost benefit analysis 
was undertaken in respect of investment on the Victoria underground line. Since then there 
has been a movement towards calculating the social costs and benefits incurred in any public 
investment. Embracing concepts o f discounting time preferences, studies value the level of 
investment against returns on projects in other areas, or against the costs o f interest on 
capital. Typically, this is set at 8% which was considered by a Select Committee on public 
investment as:
‘ ‘broadly consistent, having regards to different circumstances in relation 
to tax, investment grants, etc., with the average rate o f  return in real terms 
looked fo r  on low risk projects in the private sector in recent years. "
(HMSO, 1967, para. 10.)
Similarly, the HM Treasury (1991) recommended this as the minimum rate o f return on 
public investments. Accordingly, in terms o f national wealth creation, it seems suitable to 
compare the internal, or ‘social’, rate o f return for agricultural R&D investment against this 
benchmark return in order to assess the effectiveness o f investment. Thus, in terms o f the 
remaining hypotheses, it aims to answer whether rates o f return to public agricultural R&D 
are high and, if so, whether expenditure may justifiably be increased. In addition, the 
analysis o f rates of return can be divided into periods for comparison o f research 
effectiveness. This can be used to address one hypothesis in Chapter 3 which states that 
public agricultural R&D has benefited from increased Government influence over its 
management and funding. By choosing periods that are highly relevant to agricultural 
research management, this hypothesis can be tested.
However, while this seems to be appropriate for evaluating the ‘economic’ returns on public 
investment in agricultural R&D, Government policy has recently emphasised that research is 
intended to contribute to the improvement of the quality of life. Consequently, the second 
section of this chapter is concerned with the non-economic consequences o f technology 
adoption on UK agriculture. This permits the final hypothesis given in Chapter 3 to be 
tested, namely that a trend towards lower agricultural productivity growth is a reflection of
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an increasing proportion of research funding being directed to improving the ‘quality of life’ 
rather than ‘wealth creation’. In relation to these ‘non-economic’ benefits, the argument for 
the public support o f science solely as a means to advancing the frontiers of knowledge is 
considered. As a result, the last section o f this chapter evaluates the effectiveness o f public 
funding in terms of knowledge created in agricultural areas.
5.1. Deriving the Internal Rate of Return to Public Agricultural R&D
Calculating the internal rate of return as an investment is a relatively simple task and is 
computed as the discount rate which will result in a value o f zero for the net present value 
(Alston, Norton and Pardey, 1995). Thus, the aim is to identify the value o f r, which 
satisfies the condition:
where
B  is the benefit in time period t,
C is the cost in time period t, and 
r is the internal rate o f return on investment (IRR)
Within the literature on agricultural research evaluation, the IRR is usually referred to as the 
social or marginal rate of return (Davis, 1981; Thirtle and Bottomley, 1988). However, as 
all studies use a similar accounting function, the point is purely technical. Most work on the 
IRR for agricultural R&D centers around equation (13) (Griliches, 1964):
[ F M P /( l  +  r y ’] =  0  (1 3 )
The value marginal product (VMP) o f research is determined by multiplying the estimated 
research coefficient by the average product o f research. This is usually the sum of research 
expenditure divided into the sum of benefits from the output series, deflated by an
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appropriate deflator. Secondly, with n determined as the mid-point o f the research lag, the 
internal rate of return (IRR), denoted by r, is found by iteratively solving equation (13). 
Within agricultural research evaluation, a number of differing techniques have been 
employed. Evenson (1967) imposed an inverted V shaped lag onto the returns, but Cline 
and Lu (1976) derived an inverted ‘U’ shape for marginal benefits. As the latter mimics the 
polynomial lag imposed on the research expenditure series, it seemed appropriate to adopt 
this latter lag structure. Accordingly, the equation used is specified below (Davies, 1981):
VMP
, f = 0
1 - 0  (14)
where = a  j /  and represents the weights o f the polynomial lag.
;=0
Thus, the partial research coefficients (a) are divided by the sum o f partial coefficients to 
derive an inverted ‘U ’ shaped lag. Generally, the series is divided into blocks of time and 
the IRR estimated for each period. Considering the phases in public research management 
outlined in Chapter 2, research and productivity relationships should be evaluated for these 
stages to assess how changes in management have affected the returns to research. Ideally, 
the periods should be i) 1948-1972, which was a period o f relative autonomy, ii) 1972-1985, 
which was a period o f stable funding with an emphasis on project funding, and iii) 1986- 
1996, which saw the removal of near-market funds and an increasing emphasis on basic 
research. However, allowing for the lag effect on research, the data was too short in the last 
period to assess effectively rates o f return. This is especially true in the case of extension 
which, with a nine-year lag, would mean expenditure beginning in 1986 would not be fully 
felt until after 1993. Consequently, it was decided to divide the study period into longer 
units, namely a pre-Rothschild era, 1948-1972 and a post-Rothschild era, 1973-1996. The 
major problem with this method is that knowledge spill-overs may occur between periods, 
e.g. expenditure on basic research in 1965 would be accounted for in the first phase, but may 
only have its full effect in the second stage. Therefore, some distortion o f present periods, 
especially arising from past investments in basic research, may occur under different 
research management regimes. Whilst not wholly comparable, a similar method was also 
used for private sector expenditure. In this sense the term ‘social return’ becomes more
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misleading as, unlike public investments, the majority o f returns are internalised within a 
firm. Using equation (14) and iterating for r gives the values presented in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1. Internal Rates o f Return for UK Agricultural Research, percent
Period Publicly-Funded Privately-Funded
Total R&D and 
Extension
Applied R&D and  
Extension
R&D
1948-1972 9.9 15.6 46.9
1973-1996 6.2 9.2 29.8
1948-1996 8.1 12.5 38.4
From Table 4.9 there were two sets of coefficients for both total R&D and extension as well 
as applied R&D and extension, but the lower estimated coefficient has been used in both 
cases to account for the integration o f private sector R&D within the equation. In addition, 
the lower-bound coefficient for private sector expenditure was used from Table 4.9 to 
provide the most conservative estimate o f rates o f return for that sector.
What emerges from Table 5.1 is that there are distinct differences in returns on investment 
between sectors. Generally, returns to public R&D investments tend to be low, whereas 
these are high for the private sector. In terms o f the applied R&D series returns are around 
13%, which agrees with the findings o f Doyle and Ridout (1985) and Wise (1986) for a 
shorter period of study. However, this is lower than recent estimates, using a different 
method, by Khatri and Thirtle (1996) which put it at around 20%. More critically, returns to 
total R&D and extension are nominal at 8%, which could be due to including basic research 
within the series. As discussed previously, basic research has a more abstract relationship 
with productivity grovrth and the benefits may not be measured correctly within the standard 
production function approach adopted here.
Returns to the public sector are dwarfed when compared against private sector R&D 
expenditure, which yields a return o f 38% for the whole period. It should also be 
emphasised that this is the lower bound coefficient and using the higher bound would realise 
higher returns. Consequently, from the above findings, it seems that private R&D 
expenditure is far more successful at yielding a return on investment in terms o f productivity 
growth. The implication o f this is that increased involvement by the private sector in the 
administration o f agricultural R&D seems to be justified as it is more effective. Naturally, 
there are problems with this interpretation as private and public R&D expenditures have
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different goals and are not strictly comparable. Similarly, the whole process of transferring 
knowledge between public and private sectors has been ignored. As the private sector 
conducts little basic, as opposed to development, work the IRR calculation will not include 
the public investment in creating the knowledge which the innovating firm modifies into 
exploitable technology. This whole process o f the public-private transfer o f research 
knowledge is discussed more fully in Chapter 6.
In respect of the two time periods, the IRR for both series is apparently reduced by around 
40% following entry into the Common Agricultural Policy. This seems to correlate with the 
findings of Wise (1986) and Doyle and Ridout (1985), who both found downward rates of 
return over time to agricultural R&D investment. Similarly, it contradicts the findings of 
Khatri and Thirtle (1996), who projected no change in the rates o f return to research before 
and after 1973. Nevertheless, to state that these reductions in rates o f return are due to the 
imposition of the Rothschild framework is debatable, considering that entry into the CAP 
occurred at the same time.
There are various possible explanations for this trend when considering these time periods. 
Firstly, Harvey (1988) pointed out that returns to R&D might be expected to exhibit 
diminishing marginal returns to increasing expenditure principally because o f increased 
sophistication in research, i.e. as research becomes more technically advanced then more 
money needs to be invested to reap the same level of technical advances. Similarly, there is 
the possibility that returns were reduced because, in the latter period, research programmes 
changed emphasis away from strictly productivity-enhancing research. A growing emphasis 
on improving the public good within agricultural research programmes may have had the 
effect o f reducing its effect on productivity growth. Hence, there may be benefits from 
public R&D which are not captured by standard TFP measurements. This is explored in a 
later section o f this chapter.
There is no doubt that some, if  not all, o f the factors outlined above have caused downward 
trends in rates of return to agricultural R&D after 1972. However, this does not rule out the 
effect o f research management changes on the productivity o f research investment. 
Nevertheless, there is no incontrovertible evidence that changes to the management and 
funding of research have had little discernible positive effect on the productivity o f research 
investment. In relation to this, a further point made by Fox (1985) is worth noting. 
Specifically, if  his estimate for excess burden were correct, then the estimated returns 
should be decreased by around a third. This would reduce both estimated rates o f return for 
public R&D series and question the justification for increased support, after taking into
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account the cost o f taxation collection. Furthermore, it could be contended that excess 
burden o f taxation would increase with the implementation o f the Rothschild framework. 
Specifically, the increased costs o f establishing peer-review mechanisms for public R&D 
would reduce returns still further.
5.1.1. Summaiy
Using the standard methodology for measuring returns to research yields, an internal rate of 
return of between 8 and 13% for various aspects o f public agricultural R&D and extension 
has been obtained for the UK in the period 1948-1996. Compared to a minimum return of 
8% for public investment, continued public support for applied agricultural R&D and advice 
appears to be justified. However, with the inclusion of basic research the wider justification 
for public funding is more debatable as estimated returns were certainly below 8% in 1973- 
1996. Hence, in terms o f previous arguments, the inference is that a shift in public funding 
from basic research to applied R&D and to extension might be justified.
Nevertheless, a degree of caution has to be voiced over the validity o f these results. 
Specifically, in the UK, collection of research and advisory data, especially in the earlier 
years, is fraught with uncertainties. Similarly, although social-cost benefit analysis is a valid 
tool o f ex-post Government decision making, indications are that the Government 
undertakes ex-ante evaluation o f specific research projects in terms o f the costs and benefits 
for targeted groups, mostly farmers, consumers and agri-businesses. In addition, previous 
studies, using different methods o f estimating the IRR, have yielded results between minus 
38% and plus 700%, which throws doubt over the exercise as a basis for policy making.
Another reason why these results have to be questioned is the validity of using productivity 
growth as an indicator of the success o f the agricultural R&D policy. Since the mid-1980s 
there have been policy changes as regards the relationship between agriculture and society. 
Specifically, there has been a concerted effort by both UK and European policy makers to 
promote socially and environmentally beneficial practices within the farming industry. 
Consequently, measures have been directed at rural, environmental and other public-good 
goals, as opposed to gaining increases in productivity. Within the European Union, a 
similar shift of policy emphasis has occurred (CEC, 1998). Consequently, the effectiveness 
of agricultural R&D in terms of improving the quality of life must be examined. This is the 
concern o f the following section.
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5.2. Agricultural R&D and Improving the Quality of Life
Whilst productivity growth has been the central objective o f agricultural R&D policy, the 
environmental and social costs o f improvement have only recently become a concern of 
policy makers. This is evidenced by the majority o f studies into agricultural R&D, which 
have solely focused on productivity growth. The environmental and social costs of 
agricultural productivity have not been incorporated into the majority o f these studies. 
However, the environmental damage caused by such increases has led to a very real 
degradation in the quality of life for both rural and urban areas. In essence, awareness has 
been growing regarding the levels of nitrate within water supplies, the effects of ammonia 
on the quality of air and the overall effects on human health o f chemical application to 
agricultural products. There is, therefore, a growing concern that, while productivity growth 
has been significant in agriculture, the full costs of this have not been accounted for by 
traditional approaches to measuring agricultural growth. Archibald (1988) points out a 
number o f implications that may be relevant to this study:
' ‘Firstly, productivity growth may over or understate the gains from  
technology without the inclusion o f  externalities, as some resource 
costs are not included. Secondly, ...as producers are increasingly 
required to bear more o f  the costs o f  production and to internalise 
externalities, the total, or social, costs and benefits from  technology 
must be determined. Thirdly, as interest focuses on the long-run 
profitability o f  technology, the biological and physical sustainability 
o f  technology becomes critical. ”
Archibald (1988, pg. 366)
Consequently, a growing number o f studies have attempted to isolate and remove the effect 
of externalities from agricultural productivity indicators, both at aggregate and at 
commodity levels. Thus, Archibald (1988) examined growing pesticide resistance within 
the cotton-growing sector o f California. Oskam (1991) studied the effect o f chemical 
residues in air, water and soil at an aggregate level for the Netherlands. This last study 
found that annual average rates o f TFP growth decreased by between 2% and 10%, 
depending on assumptions about the price o f external effects. Ball et al. (1994) 
concentrated on the effects o f nitrogen pollution and found that agricultural growth rates 
were reduced by around 12 to 28%.
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Thus, as no study has been conducted for UK agriculture, there is a need to remove the 
externalities, which may have been caused over the period 1948 to 1996, due to productivity 
growth in the UK agriculture. This would therefore help to give a truer understanding of 
TFP growth and its consequent research effectiveness.
5.2.1. UK Agricultural Total Factor Productivity Including Externalities
Whilst various methods have been employed for integrating externalities into productivity 
series (Hailu and Veeham, 2000), the methodology used by Oskam (1991) seemed more 
appropriate for this study. This was because data used for the derivation o f the productivity 
series in Chapter 4 could be modified for inclusion of externalities. Accordingly, equation 
(2) can be modified to include externalities, thus;
In />• =  X  ) -  2  C ,  In(G ,,„ /  G„ ) (15)
where
P* is the adjusted productivity ratio for periods t and t+1,
Egt is the (positive or negative) share o f the value o f the external effect g, relative to total 
externalities, and
= (Xgi + ) /  2 is a moving average o f two successive years, where Xgi is the value
share o f the gth external cost or benefit in total external costs or benefits.
Generally, equation (15) employs Tornqvist indices where each series o f externality 
(positive or negative) is weighted against the sum of externalities. This is then added to the 
output series to accommodate the inclusion o f both negative and positive externalities*. 
However, tack o f available data restricted the opportunities for analysis. Consequently this 
study concentrated on two specific negative externalities, i.e. pesticide and nitrogen 
pollution, and the value o f externalities were subtracted from the output series.
Data were obtained from Pitman (1992), who provided estimates o f chemical application for 
certain years within the post-1945 period. To construct a series, figures for inorganically 
produced nitrogen supplied for home consumption were obtained from the CSO Annual 
Abstract o f Statistics. However, it has to be conceded that these are an over-estimate as they
129
also included fertiliser application for non-agricultural uses, such as forestry and local 
amenities. In addition, the level of nitrogen produced by livestock through manure had also 
to be computed. This was done by collecting actual figures for livestock, again from the 
CSO series for 1948 to 1996, and then multiplying them by estimates o f the nitrogen 
produced by each type o f animal taken from estimates given in SAC (1998, pp. 106). From 
these estimates the total levels o f nitrogen were converted to an index and used to complete 
the series given by Pitman (1992) for the period 1948 to 1996. From these data the 
quantities of nitrogen absorbed by crops and plants had to be deducted. This is a 
contentious issue, as nitrogen loss, or leaching, varies according to the levels o f application 
o f fertiliser, soil type and weather. In a review o f the literature on this subject. Pitman 
(1992) offered an estimate o f around 17% of all nitrogen applied being lost through leaching 
on arable land and 15% on grassland.
Levels o f pesticide application were more difficult to derive as ADAS only began sporadic 
surveys o f their usage from the early 1970s. Consequently, a moving average had to be 
constructed between surveys to derive a series. However, after experimentation, it was 
found that more convincing results were produced by assuming gradually declining usage 
from 1972 to 1948. This seemed reasonable as pesticide application rates in the 1940s and 
1950s would have been low. Following Oskam (1991), no account was taken of the level of 
pesticide taken up by crops and plants.
Once quantities for nitrogen and pesticide applied had been derived, the most contentious 
stage o f the exercise was to establish prices for non-market activities. A number of methods 
were available for this, notably: i) contingent valuation, which offered direct valuation of 
environmental damage, principally through survey work (Hanley, 1990; Johanson, 1987); ii) 
hedonic pricing, whereby goods were priced on the basis of their individual characteristics 
(Lancaster, 1966); iii) the use o f marginal costs o f environmental measures in other parts of 
the economy (Dressers, 1988); and iv) estimates made o f the costs per unit for measures to 
be taken in the future (Oskam, 1991). This last method proved attractive as various 
environmental measures had recently been planned and costed and these provided valuations 
for environmental schemes which could be translated into the prices for these non-market 
goods.
Specifically, ENTEC (1998, pp. 14), in a Government commissioned evaluation o f Nitrate 
Sensitive Areas, listed payments to farmers were given o f between £60 per ha per year for
’ The inclusion o f positive externalities such as improved animal welfare would, o f course, have the effect o f  
increasing social productivity growth.
130
arable land, and £590 per ha per year for unfertilised, ungrazed areas, rich in diverse species. 
For nitrogen use, the median price given by ENTEC (1998) o f £340 per ha was used. This 
is the level of subsidy paid for land in Nitrate Sensitive Areas, on which producers have 
agreed to limit nitrogen use to 150 kg/ha with optional grazing. Similarly, pesticide use was 
priced at the cost o f running the organic aid scheme of MAFF. Whilst this cost varies by 
type of farming activity, generally the average cost o f this is agreed to be £400 per ha over a 
five-year period (MAFF, 1998b, para. 8).
To be consistent with previous series, the valuations were converted to 1970 prices, using 
the agricultural output price indices, giving a figure of £81.5 per ha. A simple calculation 
was then performed to derive the full cost to society. For example, given the total amount o f 
nitrogen applied in the UK in 1996, the amount lost through ammonia volatilisation and 
denitrification (at 17%) was therefore 111.7 kg/ha. Thus, the cost per kilogram of nitrogen 
use was £81.5 divided by this figure, which gives £0.73 per kg/ha. This was then multiplied 
by the arable area in the UK to give a valuation on harmful nitrogen loss in 1996. A similar 
method was used to value the environmental cost o f pesticide usage. Taking the payment of 
£400 over a five-year period, this gave a cost per year o f £80 per ha (or £19.2 in 1970 
prices). Average pesticide applications in 1996 were estimated to be around 6.5 kg/ha. 
Dividing the cost by the amount of pesticide gave a figure o f £3.1 kg/ha. This was then 
multiplied by the amount of arable land in the UK to give the total environmental cost of 
pesticide application. Combining both series, the projected costs of environmental damage 
for both arable and grassland for selected years are presented in Table 5.2, Aggregating 
these two data sets yielded the total costs o f environmental damage arising from increased 
nitrogen and pesticide usage within UK agriculture.
Table 5.2. Cost of Nitrogen and Pesticide Application within UK Agriculture, £ million in
Nitrogen Use Pesticide Application
Arable Land Grassland Arable Land Grassland
1948 237.36 6.21 86.18 2.37
1972 540.06 61.59 86.39 2.60
1995 458.29 88.83 104.75 1.26
There are obvious problems with the derivation o f these costs. Specifically, median prices 
for nitrogen application were used. Changing these prices will obviously have an effect on 
the overall assessment of the cost of fertiliser and pesticide application. In addition, due to
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data availability, the series did not take into account the effect o f  positive externalities. This 
would have had the effect o f depressing the earlier part o f  the series, whilst increasing the 
estimates from the late-1980s onwards when UK and EU policy makers began to emphasise 
environmental and social concerns.
Nevertheless, considering the costs o f  nitrogen and pesticide application, equation (15) 
could be used to derive what Oskam (1991) referred to as a ‘social’, as opposed to a 
‘p rivate’, TFP index. A comparison o f the two series, using the Tornqvist method, are 
presented in Figure 5.1.
Figure 5.1. Comparison Between Social and Private Total Factor Productivity Indices, 
1948-1996, 1970=100
200
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120  -
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■ m— Social
Figure 5.1 shows the series derived for total factor productivity within the UK, ‘corrected’ 
(social) and ‘uncorrected’ (private) for the costs o f  environmental externalities. What 
emerges is that the two series offer a contrasting view o f agricultural growth after entry into 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Before 1972 the social TFP index seems to 
shadow the private series. Nevertheless, after 1972, whilst the private TFP grows steadily, 
the increasing use o f pesticides and nitrogen fertilisers has a strong negative effect on the 
‘social’ TFP measure. This agrees with findings on the growing environmental insensitivity 
o f  agricultural production, exacerbated by generous supports for increasing output, and so 
may present a more accurate indication o f TFP levels, after accounting for environmental 
damage. The adjusted average annual rates are presented in Table 5.3 for the three periods 
1948 to 1972, 1972 to 1996 and 1948 to 1996.
132
Private TFP Social TFP
1948-1972 2.37 2.11
1973-1996 1.09 0.69
1948-1996 1.73 1.41
Overall, the introduction of externalities reduced annual productivity growth by around 20% 
over the period 1948 to 1996, which is a more extreme decrease than that reported by 
Oskam (1991) for Dutch agriculture, but corresponds with estimates by Ball et a l  (1994) for 
US agriculture. When considering between period differences, the contrast between private 
and social rates is more evident. The majority o f growth for the social rate apparently 
occurred in the period before entry into the CAP. Whilst intensity was growing during that 
period, the share o f non-market ‘outputs’ in respect o f total outputs may have been minimal. 
This is in stark contrast to the period post-1972, when increasing use o f nitrogen and 
pesticides appears to have cut radically ‘social’ growth rates by around 35%.
5.2.2. Agricultural R&D and Social Total Factor Productivity
Having derived the social TFP index, it could then be assessed against the previously 
constructed time series and used to give a truer return to public investment in agricultural 
R&D and advice. Consequently, using the same procedure as that outlined in Chapter 4, 
elasticities were ascertained. For brevity, the two public research series, both total 
and non-basic were included, along with the private sector research series (R '^').
Using equations (9) and (11) as a basis, various fits were found by minimising the Schwartz 
criterion. Equation (16), using a fourteen-year lag for total public research and advice, and a 
six-year lag for private sector research expenditure, was selected:
\n&P’, = A A i n  R,11“'’ +'Za^MaR,r,  + f i tM nE+/3^W +^  (16)
/= 0  1=0
Similarly, substituting the non-basic series for the total research and advisory expenditure 
series changed the specifications o f the equation, giving lags o f eight-years for the non-basic 
series and six-years for the private series. This is shown in equation (17):
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i=0 i= 0
Overall, fitting both equations (16) and (17) proved more problematic than for the private 
TFP series, with lower, but still significant, Durbin-Watson statistics and low t-statistics for 
the Weather variable. The results are presented in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4. Comparison o f Regression Results using the Social and Private Total Factor
Productivity Indexes, incorporating a private series_____________________________________
Variable Coefficient
Lag Eq(9) Eq.(J6) E q .(ll)  Eq.(17)
Constant A - 3.08
( 1 2 . 9 9 )
3.11
( 1 5 . 2 4 )
3.06
( 1 2 . 3 2 )
3.12
( 1 4 . 6 0 )
Weather W " 0.004
rzz /o
0.001 0.003 0.001
r7.2d[)
Education E - 0.18 0.22 0.18 0.20
C3.2Z)
Total Public R&D 
and Advice
p p b a d v 14 0.05
( 2 . 9 0 )
0.05
(3 .2^
Public Applied 
R&D and Advice
j ^ p a d v 8 0.06 0.06
(2.g,^
Private R&D R P V 6 0.09 0.07 0.12 0.11
rZ6P)
Adj.
D W  Statistic
0.97
2.54
0.98
1.65
0.98
2.28
0.98
1.44
t-statistics in brackets. Critical t values for 30 degrees o f freedom, one-tailed test, are 90% = 1.31, 95% = 1.70 
Lag is for equations (16) and (17).
In Table 5.4 actual results for the ‘social’ TFP series are compared against the elasticities 
derived for the private TFP series (from Table 4,13). However, it has to be conceded that 
the two series are not strictly comparable, as the private series had been derived by the 
Laspeyres procedure and the ‘social’ TFP series based on the Tornqvist formula. 
Nevertheless, what can be seen is that coefficients are generally unaffected for most o f the 
variables, except for private R&D which shows a decrease of around 10% to 20% depending 
on which public R&D variable is used. It seems reasonable to suggest that the private sector, 
which is closer to the market than public R&D, would suffer the most decline in rates of 
return when productivity growth is reduced in the adjusted series. It would also seem
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reasonable to expect that the applied R&D and advisory series would be affected by a 
reduction in productivity growth rates, as this is near the market research. However, Table
5.4. shows no difference between coefficients for the 'private' and 'social' series for this 
variable.
The second stage in this process was to derive the internal rate o f return on R&D 
investment. Following equation (14), the returns are illustrated in Table 5.5.
Table 5.5. Comparison o f Internal Rates o f Return for Agricultural R&D and Extension,
percent____________________________________________________________________________
Period  Publicly-Funded_______________  Privately-Funded
R&D and Applied R&D and R&D
Extension Extension
Private Social Private Social Private Social
1948-1972 9.9 8.3 15.6 13.5 46.9 31.5
1973-1996 6.2 5.6 9.2 7.2 29.8 22.6
1948-1996 8.1 7.0 12.5 10.4 38.4 27.1
Table 5.5 compares the rate o f return derived from using the ‘social’ TFP index against 
those derived in Table 5.1. Whilst the coefficients for the public R&D series were 
unaffected there is a still a decline in rates o f return due to using the adjusted TFP and
output series in the IRR calculations. Thus, rates o f return for total public R&D and
extension were reduced by 14% with the equivalent figure for applied R&D and extension 
of 17%, and for privately-funded R&D of 30%. Accordingly it seems reasonable to suggest 
that the variables with the highest returns are those which most obviously affect productivity 
change and they can be seen to have been most affected, when considering externalities. 
Thus, in the case o f the private sector series, it emphasises the idea that the commercial 
sector is primarily responsible for negative externalities and this is the main justification for 
the public sector as a provider o f non-market goods. In this sense, it would be expected that 
accounting for externalities in the productivity series would most affect private sector 
returns. This seems to be the case in the above results.
What should be noted is that rates o f return also decrease after entry into the Common
Agricultural Policy. This seems reasonable as the negative effects o f intensification may be 
more evident with the introduction o f support for unrestrained output growth as evidenced in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Using the above methodology, this should reduce the value of 
agricultural output net o f environmental costs accordingly. This has critical implications for
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public R&D funding as, after 1972, rates of return for both series fall below the Treasury 
benchmark o f 8%.
5.2.3. Summary
In assessing the quality of life within productivity indices, lack of data availability and the 
non-quantifiable nature of most life improving factors have led to the omission of the non­
productivity effects within most previous analyses of agricultural productivity. However, 
accounting for some of the environmental costs caused by nitrogen and pesticide use 
reduced the rate o f TFP growth within UK agriculture itself. More critically, it led to a 
reduction in the rates o f return for R&D expenditures, when compared with the ‘private’ 
TFP series.
Significantly, it supports the contention that it is the private sector which causes negative 
externalities, as evidenced by the fact that the largest fall in returns after their removal from 
the productivity series is projected for private R&D. However, it has also had effects on the 
public R&D and extension series, which both suffer a decline in rates o f return. In the case 
o f both o f the latter series, returns fall below levels, normally considered as satisfactory by 
the Treasury, after entry into the Common Agricultural Policy. Consequently, it seems 
when assessing the negative effects o f agricultural production that justifications for 
continued public funding o f R&D become less easy to support unquestioningly.
5.3. Research and the Advancement of Science
Another means o f evaluating the effectiveness o f agricultural R&D is via its contribution to 
the advancement of science. A variety o f literature has emerged which analyses the level of 
publications or citations produced by a research institute or a country in general. This is 
explored in this next section.
With the withdrawal o f near-market research and development funding, the focus o f the 
public sector is increasingly seen to be the advancement o f basic knowledge. Citation or 
publication analyses are the predominant means for measuring advances in this stock o f 
knowledge. Bibliometric studies are concerned with counting the number o f citations with 
which papers within a certain field have been accredited. Whilst it must be accepted that 
incorrect results are cited in papers aiming to change scientific views and also the academic 
climate may force more citation o f own papers, citation analysis is presently the only way in 
which a measurement can be made o f the effectiveness o f investment into knowledge 
production.
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May (1997) made international comparisons o f research output in terms o f the level o f total 
citations and o f a ‘relative citation index’ (RCI), which took a country’s average number o f 
citations per paper multiplied by the ratio o f all citations to all papers. These findings for 
agriculture and related fields are presented in Table 5.6, which shows the country rankings 
in each o f the main agriculturally-related discipline areas by citation and by M ay’s quality 
index.
Table 5.6. Top Five Position o f International Citations in Agriculture and Related
Field By Total Citations By RCI
Agriculture
Biology and Biochemistry 
Molecular Biology 
Plant and Animal Science
US,JP,UK,CA,GE
US,UK,JP,GE,CA
US,UK,GE,FR,JP
US,UK,CA,GE,AU
SE,UK,DE,CA,NE
US,SW,SE,UK,GE
SW,US,GE,UK,IS
UK,SE,DE,US,AU
Source: May (1997).
On the whole the UK science base emerges as having a healthy position in most scientific 
fields, proving to be the World leader in areas such as plant and animal science, as well as 
having a strong presence in most fields related to agriculture. By comparison, o f the other 
four leading OECD countries studied earlier, only the US has a similar presence as 
measured by the quality index and then only in fields related to agriculture, but not 
agriculture itself. Consequently, on this evidence it would seem that the changes in research 
funding and management in the UK have had little overall effect on the output o f the science 
base, and may have improved its standing in several disciplines within the World.
5,4. General Conclusions
This study has taken the form of analysing three main outputs o f a publicly-supported 
agricultural research system. Thus, by examining its ability to enhance the economic, 
social and scientific needs o f the UK population, the effectiveness o f public agricultural 
R&D funding has been explored. The conclusions related to these issues are outlined 
below.
5.4.1. Agricultural R&D and Productivity Growth
The improvement o f agricultural productivity since the Second World War has accounted 
for an increased stability o f production for farmers. Whilst this was necessary in the years
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immediately preceding the end o f the Second World War, it is questionable whether it is 
desirable given the present circumstances o f society in general. Consequently, framed 
against this background, ex-post analysis o f how R&D expenditure affects productivity can 
only go so far towards providing a policy basis for continued, or indeed expanded, 
investment in the future.
Nevertheless, using the fairly standard methodology, rates of return on public agricultural 
R&D and extension reach socially acceptable levels. In relation to the first hypothesis, this 
must be seen as an argument for continued public sector support in this area. As regards 
previous arguments about the under-funding of agricultural R&D, the current econometric 
analysis is less supportive, with the nominal returns derived for total agricultural R&D and 
extension expenditure being, generally, around 6% to 10%. As this study showed, this may 
be due to the fact that basic research has not impacted in the same way on productivity 
growth and may require to be handled differently. However, by omitting basic research 
expenditures from the fitted relationship, the estimated returns to applied R&D may be 
overstated. This must also be true o f the other elements o f R&D activity within the TFP 
equations. Nevertheless, it is difficult from this study to presume that the estimated returns 
to R&D can be interpreted as indicative o f either over- or under-funding. Similarly, 
arguments advanced for increased public R&D expenditure are flawed by the fact that there 
seems to be little agreement over the degree by which R&D expenditures should be 
increased. Work on assessing the level o f the ‘social optimum’ for agricultural R&D have 
adopted various techniques which have furnished numerous wide-ranging results, 
questioning the viability o f the exercise (see for example Knutson and Tweeton, 1979; 
White and Havlicek, 1982).
When comparing the public and private sectors, the internal rate o f return for private 
investment in R&D was estimated to be far higher than public investment. This would 
suggest that private sector research has a stronger influence on productivity than the public 
sector. This could be interpreted as an indication that the increased reliance by policy 
makers on private sector R&D is justifiable in terms o f its ability to enhance productivity. 
Within this it could also be argued that this evidence provides tenuous support for the belief 
that using public funds to subsidise industrial R&D would have been more desirable than 
supporting a public research base over the last fifty years. Thus, offering incentives and 
public contracts through open bidding, as opposed to institutionally funding science, may 
have been more successful. This may have had the added advantage o f reducing ‘crowding 
out’ by public research institutes, which may have been making available technology at little
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or no cost, and so deterring commercial R&D investment in some areas. Accordingly, an 
effective means of research management would involve some form of commercial influence. 
One policy option may be to stabilise public funds, with the private sector contributing 
increasing levels o f support, so bringing agricultural R&D closer to the ‘social optimal’. 
Whether this has been and can be achieved is explored further in Chapter 6.
5.4.2. Changing Management and the Agricultural Research Service
Changes in the management o f agricultural R&D have reduced rates o f return to 
agricultural R&D investment. Whilst there are many problems with this interpretation, it 
does seems to indicate that public agricultural R&D has not benefited from increased
Government influence over its management. Consequently, it seems to support the
contention o f scientists that autonomy in research and institutional funding o f agricultural 
R&D is the best practice for the management o f an agricultural R&D system.
In this sense, indications o f the recent changes to science policy are perceived to have been 
mostly beneficial to UK agricultural research. This is predominantly because there has been 
some return to autonomous decision making within public research institutes. Whilst 
project funded for specific work, the bulk o f publicly-funded agricultural research is now 
basic in nature. Scientists within institutions have, therefore, a level o f control within the 
allocation o f resources for pursuing scientific problems. In addition, research funding has 
now stabilised and is growing at a steady rate.
As regards the advisory service, there is some indication that the findings in Chapter 3 are 
supported. Coupled with R&D expenditure, public advice has only shown a low rate of 
return. Thus, this may favour increased reliance on the private sector to deliver technology 
transfer. This is because it is contended that it will be better targeted by commercial 
providers and better utilised by the recipients, who have to pay for this element of research. 
Similarly, in favour o f privatisation, it has to be maintained that, within the context of 
changes in agricultural policy, it is difficult to argue for a continuation in support for 
productivity enhancing research by the public sector. As an increasing share o f agricultural 
support is directed at non-agricultural activities, the refocusing o f the public advisory 
services away from productivity goals must surely carry a greater justification for public 
expenditure, regardless o f returns obtained in the previous period.
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5.4.3. The Role o f Non-Market Agricultural R&D
The role o f the public and private sectors in agricultural R&D have been brought into sharp 
contrast by recent policy shifts towards non-output enhancing goals. Thus, the final 
hypothesis to be tested, namely that a trend towards lower agricultural productivity growth 
is a reflection o f an increasing proportion o f research funding being directed to improving 
the ‘quality o f life’ rather than ‘wealth creation’, becomes prominent when analysing rates 
o f return to agricultural R&D investment.
From the evidence outlined above, it seems the inclusion o f certain externalities have had 
negative effects on measures o f productivity, as well as on returns to agricultural R&D. 
What emerges strongly when analysing these returns is that the private sector has 
apparently been responsible for the majority o f externalities. Hence it emerges that the role 
o f the public sector becomes critical as a provider o f public-good technology which aims to 
reduce externalities. Essential to this is the adoption process. On the evidence o f the past 
50 years it could be argued that the public sector has failed to transfer this technology to the 
private sector for exploitation. Thus, it seems that there is a need for both sectors to 
cooperate more in future on reducing the social and environmental externalities o f technical 
progress.
In terms o f overall effectiveness, this study has raised two key questions over the direction 
and role of publicly-funded agricultural R&D. First, in terms of the changes to science 
policy, the continuation o f public funding across the board for agricultural R&D has to be 
questioned. This was explored in Chapter 1. Second, it seems that a major factor in 
increasing the effectiveness o f public R&D will be the private sector. Therefore the role 
which the private sector could play in public research agendas has to be investigated further. 
This is explored in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 6
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL R&D 
AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
6.0. Public Agricultural Research and the Private Sector
Increasingly, the public agricultural research service has relied on the private sector for its 
funding. This trend accelerated from 1979 onwards, when the Thatcher administration 
initiated a series o f measures aimed at reducing the burden o f public expenditure. Within 
science policy these measures have found expression in two ways, namely i) forcing the 
public sector to seek external money by reducing funds for commercially relevant near­
market research and ii) refocusing the markets for public research by encouraging increased 
exploitation of the science base through links with commercial companies.
Consequently, it seems the private sector has been forced to take on the burden of displaced 
public funds. Thus, the findings o f the previous chapter, which outlined the roles that public 
and private sectors should play, become critical to the success o f Government science 
policy. With the removal of public funds from certain areas of the agricultural research 
service, the private sector needs to step into the research areas which have suffered through 
these cuts. To understand this firstly requires an understanding of the nature o f technology 
creation. This is outlined below.
6.1. The Nature of Technology Creation
Agricultural R&D can be conducted by a large number of bodies, both public and private. 
Specifically, Pray and Echeverria (1991) have identified four major groups from which 
agricultural technology can emerge. These are presented in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Potential Sources o f Agricultural Technology
Institutional Location
Domestic Foreign
Public Ministry
Research Institute 
Research Council 
University
Ministry
Research Institute 
University
International Agricultural 
Research Institute
Private Co-operative 
Foundation 
Commodity Institute 
Plantation
Processing Company 
Input Company
National Company 
Multi-National Company 
Co-operative
Source: Pray and Echeverria (1991)
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Consequently, it seems that R&D can emerge from both profit and non-profit orientated 
institutions either at home or abroad. However, whilst the processing and input industries 
are responsible for introducing the majority of technological innovations, they rely on 
exploratory work which could have emerged from either a public research institute or a 
commodity board funded by farmers. Consequently, even in areas that are driven 
predominantly by the commercial sector, such as in mechanical or chemical research, there 
may be some degree o f public sector R&D work involved. This diversity has been further 
emphasised by Thirtle and Echeverria (1994), who found that, out o f a possible 36 
theoretical combinations for producing technology, only 3 were conducted solely by either a 
public or private sector body. This was because, with the privatisation o f research institutes, 
the existence o f levy funding, and public investments in private research institutes, the 
distinction has become blurred between public and private sector agricultural R&D.
The inference o f this work is that the private sector should not be seen as a substitute for 
public funding, but as a complement. This is emphasised by Evenson (quoted in Pray and 
Echeverria, 1991), who stated that the role o f the private sector was to conduct the majority 
o f work on ‘usable technology’, whereas the public sector largely produced ‘pre­
technology’. In addition, he identified an area o f research, termed ‘prototype technology’, 
with which both the public and private sectors would be concerned, and their level of 
involvement was dictated by the size and technological competitiveness o f markets. 
Therefore, there seems to be a ‘public-private research continuum’, in which both sectors 
have clearly defined roles at the extremes, i.e. the public sector in basic research and the 
private sector in commercial exploitation, with blurring and overlap o f roles in-between. 
This conceptualisation is illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Figure 6.1. Public-Private Research Continuum for Agricultural R&D
Public
Funded
Basic
Applied
Research
Development Private
Funded
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The diagonal line in Figure 6.1 indicates the source of R&D funding, whereas the vertical 
lines reveal the amount of expenditure by sector. Accordingly, as basic research cannot be 
directed, i.e. towards either productivity-enhancing or public-good research, the majority of 
its funding emerges from the public sector. However, there is some overlap with the private 
sector because, in areas such as biological and chemical research, the private sector 
conducts some exploratory work. Similarly, the reverse is true for development work. The 
shaded area, consisting o f applied strategic and specific work, can be considered as similar 
to Evenson’s ‘proto-type technology’. That the activities between the public and private 
sectors are less delineated within this category leads to a confusion over their respective 
roles. Government policy towards commercialisation relies on the expansion o f the private 
sector within this shaded area, and the public sector’s role is seen as supporting this work.
Accordingly, the central concern o f this chapter is to establish the role o f the private sector 
and its relationship with the public agricultural research system. Specifically, it seeks to 
establish whether their roles have changed since the mid-1980s. Firstly, it attempts to assess 
the attitudes o f the private sector towards public research institutes, and whether public 
science is a viable base from which innovations can be developed. This is followed by an 
attempt at quantifying the level o f transference o f public knowledge through collaborative 
activity and the public domain. The second part o f this chapter has the aim of establishing 
the role and trends o f private R&D activity. This leads directly from the work in the 
previous chapter on justifications for public sector R&D and seeks to establish whether the 
model developed there conforms to expectations regarding private agricultural R&D. 
Similarly, it aims to estimate the overall trends in expenditure after the mid-1980s, in order 
to establish whether the private sector has responded to Government policy initiatives for 
increasing the presence o f commercial expenditure directed towards UK agricultural R&D.
The majority of this chapter relies on the results o f a survey conducted on the UK 
agricultural sector during 1996. The methodology of this survey was outlined in section
3.2.3.1. Whilst this gave an understanding o f research expenditures, it also presented an 
opportunity to explore the activities o f the private sector in-depth. The full questionnaire is 
given in Appendix 2 and the results are given below.
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6.2. Collaborative Activity Between Public and Private Sectors within UK  
Agricultural R&D
The more specific transfer of research emerges when some form of collaboration occurs 
between the public and private sectors. Whilst links have occurred throughout the history of 
the agricultural research system, they have recently formed an intrinsic part o f Government 
science planning. By introducing a number of collaborative schemes to provide a greater 
incentive for firms to invest in co-funded research, it has sought to increase technology 
transfer to the commercial sector. Thus, the next section is concerned with the attitudinal 
aspects o f this activity. Specifically, it aims to outline reasons for firms becoming involved 
with the public sector.
However, before this is done, a definitional point has to be made concerning the suppliers of 
public agricultural R&D. This is predominantly conducted by Biotechnology and Biological 
Science Research Council (BBSRC) institutes and units. Similarly, in Scotland, their 
equivalent are the Scottish Agricultural and Biological Research Institutes (SABRI). In 
addition, the agricultural colleges and the Departments o f Agriculture within Universities 
conduct agriculturally-related research, often with funding from the BBSRC. The 
Government also has a collection o f establishments that conduct statutory research or in 
support of its policy goals. However, recent moves to privatise institutes in the public sector 
has led to a confused situation. Thus, when the survey was conducted in 1996, ADAS was 
still in the public sector. Similarly, the Horticulture Research Institute still regarded itself as 
a public sector research establishment (HRI, 1996) and was considered as such in terms of 
the survey analysis.
6.2.1. Attitudes to Collaboration
Firms were asked to give their opinion on linking with the public sector. The firms which 
had undertaken some form of collaboration were asked to give an indication of their reasons 
for involvement with public agricultural research institutions. Similarly, those firms which 
had chosen not to become involved with the public sector were asked to give their reasons. 
The reasons for collaborating given by firms are presented in Figure 6.2.
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Figure 6.2. M otivations o f  C om m ercial Firm s for C ollaboration  w ith the Public Sector, 
percent
E xp ertise  Required 
in a Certain Area
Inadequate Scale o f  
Internal R esources
Sim ilarity in R& D  
P rogram m es
Greater A ccess  to  
Public Research
Raise C om pany's  
Research P rofile
L ess E x p en siv e  than  
Internal R esources
0% 20% 40% 60% 80%
Q  Very Im portant  
■  Im portant
□  S lightly Im portant
□  N ot Im portant
100%
Figure 6.2 is concerned w ith m otivations for collaboration . C onsidering  solely the areas that 
firm s identified as ‘V ery  Im portan t’, the m ost prom inent reason that em erged for using the 
public sector w as its expertise in a specific  area. In term s o f  reasons having little bearing on 
the decision to link, around 25 respondents did not consider public research less expensive 
than the ir ow n in-house activ ities. S im ilarly , 19 responses did not consider linking as a 
m eans to raising the ir own research profile.
The predom inant reason for involvem ent w ith the public sector therefore  seem s to be the 
acquisition  o f  expertise in a specialist area. The public institu tions o ffer a very specialised 
service, g iving in-depth expertise in lim ited subjects, w hich equates w ith the aim s o f  the 
B B S R C ’s re-organisation , w hich focused on creating  a base for m ulti-d iscip linary  research 
(B B SR C , 1994). S im ilarly , the H igher Education Institu tes have undergone changes in their 
organisation , re-focusing scientific  and technological departm ents to increase their relevance 
to the needs o f  industry (C harles et. al., 1988). It therefore seem s that the changes have 
developed a m ore focused R& D base for exploitation o f  private agriculture.
Firm s indicated that size o f  internal resources w as not an issue in collaboration  and this 
suggests that the m ajority  o f  firm s do not consider them selves su ffic ien tly  restricted  by size 
to m ake it a conscious decision to becom e involved w ith the public sector for o ther reasons. 
Instead sim ilarity  in research  seem ed to be rated an im portant reason for co llaboration . This 
point w as analysed by sector and, w hilst high sim ilarity  w as evenly  voiced by m ost sectors,
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agri-eng ineering  proved an exception  w ith only  27%  o f  all firm s cla im ing  any sim ilarity  
betw een the ir w ork and that o ffered  by the public sector. A reason for th is could  be the agri­
eng ineering  secto r conducts a high degree o f  developm ent w ork in com parison  to o ther 
sectors (see section  6.4). A s such, th is seem s to be one indication  tha t research  into ag ri­
eng ineering  m ay have suffered the severest decline, fo llow ing  the cu ts in public research 
under the near-m arket policy. H ow ever, it has long been considered  tha t the engineering  
secto r has been the least able to  benefit from  public agricu ltural research  (L esser and Lee, 
1993). M oreover, research  w ork on vehicles is highly  appropriab le  and it is questionable  
w hether public research  should  in tervene in th is field.
It is in teresting  to exam ine w hy firm s elected  not to initiate co llabora tive  arrangem ents with 
public research  institu tions. Figure 6.3 presen ts schem atically  the reasons given by firm s for 
not becom ing  involved w ith public secto r research  institu tions.
F igure 6.3. O bstructions to  C o llaboration  o f  C om m ercial Firm s for C o llaboration  w ith the 
Public Sector, percent
M anagem ent o f  
C op yrigh t/S ecrecy
Public R & D  has no  
C on cep t o f  Risk
C om pan y has Full 
F acillities  In-house
N o  O verlap  o f  
Interest in R& D
Public R & D  is T o o  
Broad
L o w  A w areness o f  
Public R & D
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□  Very Im portant 
■  Im portant
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H ow ever, the resu lts are less c lear w ith  around 40 to 50%  o f  firm s sta ting  that all reasons 
given in the survey w ere not im portant. N evertheless, w hat does em erge is that, w hen 
considering  the category  o f  ‘very im portan t’ on its ow n, the predom inan t im pedim ent to 
co llabora tion  is the  m anagem ent o f  copyrigh t and confiden tia lity  w ith in  public institutions. 
The env ironm ent and cu lture  o f  public R& D  is such that secrecy  m ay be d ifficu lt to 
m aintain . S im ilarly  the length o f  tim e needed to negotiate con trac ts  is seen as causing  a
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prohibitively high legal cost on the type and level o f collaboration conducted. Any increase 
in collaboration between public and private R&D sectors also poses a problem for the 
direction and objectives of public R&D. The multi-disciplinaiy nature of public R&D, 
which encourages discussion between researchers, may be hindered by concerns over the 
management of secrecy. Moreover, a potential conflict between the support of the public 
science base and the encouragement of funding could emerge. As the Government aims for 
more influence by industry (MAFF, 1996), there is a danger that the multi-disciplinary 
element of public research will be affected adversely.
6.2.1.1. Summary
The attraction o f public sector collaboration is that it offers a high level o f expertise in 
specialised areas. However, a potential conflict exists as public R&D, which encourages 
discussion between researchers, may hinder collaboration with the private sector through 
concerns over the management o f confidentiality.
Nevertheless, what the survey o f private companies revealed was that the size o f public 
R&D may be less important than the quality o f research produced. Thus, the success of 
collaborative research policies depend on a healthy publie research base, producing relevant 
agricultural R&D. Consequently, the next section examines the attitudes o f firms towards 
public R&D in these terms.
6.2.2. Relevance and Quality of Public Agricultural R&D
To evaluate how firms viewed the quality o f public agricultural R&D they were asked to 
indicate how they perceived each main supplier o f public agricultural R&D in terms of 
international or national standings^
The Biotechnology and Biological Science Research Council (BBSRC) and the Scottish 
Agricultural and Biological Research Institutes (SABRI) were rated highest with around 30 
to 40% claiming their research to be o f an international standing. In contrast, the Higher 
Education Institutes (HEI), the Agricultural Development and Advisory Service (ADAS) 
and especially the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) institutes were most 
likely to be rated of low research standing. This seems reasonable, as the BBSRC and 
SABRIs are strongly focused on agriculture, whereas the NERC provides research directed
’ See Appendix 2: Question 21
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to the im provem ent o f  the environm ent, w hich w ould  not be o f  im portance to  the m ajority  o f  
firm s in the agricu lture  sector. T hese results are presented  in F igure 6.4.
F igure 6.4. Q uality  o f  Public A gricultural R& D by Research Body, percent
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A D A S
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T he firm s w ere also asked for view s on the relevance o f  the research produced in public 
institu tes and the responses are presented in F igure 6.5.
Figure 6.5. R elevance o f  Public A gricultural R& D  by Research Body, percent
BBSRC
SABRI
A D A S
HEI
NERC
00%
□  Very R elevant 
■  R elevant
□  Slightly R elevant
□  N o  R elevan ce
A gain, the BBSRC and SABRI institu tes w ere perceived to be p roducing  w ork w hich was 
highly relevant to the private sector. H ow ever, A D A S, w ith the m ajority  o f  its w ork in 
applied  fields, w as also perceived to  be producing w ork w hich w as very  re levant to around
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20% o f companies in the agricultural sector. About 10% of respondents rated the output 
from Higher Education Institutes o f little or no relevance. However, the bulk of research 
work in the HEI sector is basic research and therefore its potential for commercial 
exploitation may not be so apparent to agricultural firms. A further indication o f the quality 
and relevance o f public agricultural research is the rate of ‘take-up’ o f research results from 
the public domain. This is discussed below.
6.2.2.1. Public Domain Research
Most publicly-funded research o f relevance to firms emerges through the public domain. 
Thus, the majority o f basic or strategic investigations into products and processes are 
generally disseminated in academic journals or publicly available reports. However, as this 
is usually considered to be background research, it is difficult to assess its impact on the 
commercial sector. Accordingly, in order to measure its effect, firms were asked if they had 
made use o f the results o f public domain research in the last three years. The data collected 
gave a rough indication o f the level o f ‘take-up’ o f public domain research. The results are 
shown in Table 6.2.
Sector Yes No
Agrochemicals 67 33
Veterinary and Medicine 61 39
Plant and Crops 67 33
Animal Science 71 29
Agri-Engineering 32 68
Total 62 38
In total around 60% of companies claimed to have embodied public domain research into 
their products. Disaggregating between sectors shows that, whilst most sectors hover 
around this 60% mark, agri-engineering has a lower level o f take-up. It can be no 
coincidence that the high level o f development research needed within this sector means that 
public R&D was highly vulnerable to cuts due to the near-market policy. Therefore, whilst 
the public sector produces basic research on engineering, this does not seem to have been 
valued successfully by the commercial sector.
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Firm s w ere then asked to state how  useful they  found public ly-funded  research  in term s o f  
the techn ical know ledge gained o r o f  new  product developm ent. T he percen tage for each 
sec to r for those firm s c laim ing  to  have found public research useful in som e w ay is show n in 
F igure 6.6.
F igure 6.6. U sefu lness o f  Public D om ain R esearch to  the P rivate Sector, percentage o f  
firm s m aking use o f  public R& D
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Veterinary & M edicine  
Plant & Crop 
Anim al Science  
Agri-Engineering
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M ost firm s claim ed in the survey  to  find public  dom ain research  ‘u se fu l’ to  som e degree. 
H ow ever, only  in anim al science and veterinary  and m edicine w as public  R& D  rated as 
‘very  u se fu l’ by a sign ifican t p roportion  o f  private firm s. C onsequen tly , it seem s that 
public ly-funded  w ork on pharm aceu tica ls and the physio logy o f  livestock  is show ing som e 
level o f  com m ercial re levance. N evertheless, a m ore revealing  ca tegory  seem s to be the 
num ber o f  firm s w ho found agricu ltural research  on ly  ‘sligh tly  u se fu l’. A nim al science had 
the low est level o f  d issa tisfac tion  w ith  public  research , w hich seem s to  im ply that it is the 
m ost successfu l area  o f  public research . H ow ever, w hilst the p lan t and crop sector show ed 
the h ighest level o f  firm s find ing  public dom ain  research  useful, it a lso  has one o f  the 
h ighest percentages c laim ing  it to  be only  ‘sligh tly  u se fu l’. S im ilarly , the  sam e tendency  is 
seen w ith agri-engineering , w ith around 20%  stating  that public research  w as o f  lim ited 
value. T his m ay indicate a m isd irection  in research  w ithin these areas.
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6.2.3. Summary
The public research base seems to have some degree o f influence on linkage with private 
research activity. Thus, the low levels o f privately-funded basic research recorded may 
indicate that industry prefers to modify internally research produced by the public sector. 
High take-up rates of around 60 to 70% were recorded for most firms within the agricultural 
industry, indicating highly effective and targeted basic research. The exception to this is 
agri-engineering which, with its heavy reliance on development work, implies a divergence 
between present-day private and public R&D priorities. In terms of the recent changes to 
the research system, there is some indication that the relevance and quality of UK 
agricultural R&D are highly regarded by most commercial firms. This is especially obvious 
with regard to the BBSRC and SABRIs.
Whilst the assessment o f attitudes may be indicative o f the views o f private sector firms of 
public sector research, a more quantifiable effect is the level o f exploitation o f the public 
research base through formal linkage mechanisms. Thus, the amount and type of contract 
work, as well as collaboration and sponsorship between the two sectors gives an indication 
o f the direct economic effect o f publicly-funded agricultural R&D. Consequently, the next 
section looks at collaboration in terms o f expenditure levels and type.
6.3. Level of Collaboration Activity
Companies were asked to give an indication o f their level o f involvement with public 
institutions in respect o f their agricultural research activity during the three years from 1993 
to 1996. Overall, 65 firms, 55% of the total, claimed to have had some form of association 
with public agricultural research institutions. The remaining 45% consisted of 45 
companies conducting no external research at all and 8 companies that only had interests in 
foreign public sector research facilities. When questioned further the majority o f these latter 
companies cited organisational reasons for their decision. However, several large firms did 
mention the lack o f expertise available in the UK for certain aspects o f their research 
activities.
Firms, which had developed links with the public sector, were asked to state the percentage 
of total R&D expenditure given to collaborative work. This involved indicating a rough 
estimate within ranges^ and, as such, the results have been presented in terms of a lower and 
upper limit. The results o f this analysis are shown in Table 6.3.
See Appendix 2: Question 7
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Table 6.3. Private Sector Research Expenditure on Activities Conducted with Public
Agricultural Research Institutes, £ million and percentage of total R&D expenditure________
R&D Spend, Collaborative Research
£ million Spend, percent
Agrochemicals 6.8 - 10.7 8 - 11
Veterinary & Medicine 5.2 - 7.9 32 - 29
Plant & Crops 2.0 - 5.1 6 - 10
Animal Science 3.8 - 7.8 25 - 28
Agri-Engineering 1.1 - 1.2 8 - 7
Total 18.9 - 32.7 11 - 15
What emerges is that around 11 to 15% of total private research spend was directed towards 
collaboration. In absolute terms this was a total spend of between £19 million and £33 
million pounds. Therefore, in proportion to their total R&D spend, the majority of 
collaborative activity seems to have been conducted by firms in animal science or veterinary 
and medicine. This is confusing as, whilst the veterinary and medicine sector emerged as 
one o f the most research intensive sectors, animal science ranked low in terms o f total R&D 
research expenditure. The least active were firms in agri-engineering, reinforcing the 
impression that there is some incompatibility in research priorities between the public and 
private sectors in this area. However, whilst the above table reveals levels of collaborative 
activity, it does not show the areas in which the private sector is involved. This is the 
concern o f the next section.
6.3.1. Type of Collaboration
Activity between the public and private sectors can encompass a number o f different formal 
links. Collaboration usually exists as a one-way activity between a firm and a public sector 
research institute, e.g. a contract with a specified outcome. However, other interactions 
have emerged, for instance, a BBSRC and HEI establishment working with a consortium 
from industry. Collaboration can also be conducted with international public or private 
institutions. Nevertheless, within this analysis any collaboration that involves a 
predominantly UK based private sector establishment and a UK public sector institution 
qualifies for inclusion. Accordingly, there are four types o f collaborative activity could be 
identified, namely i) sponsorship, ii) collaboration, iii) contract work, and iv) the use o f 
information services. These are defined in Table 6.4,
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T a b le  6 .4 . T y p e  o f  F orm ai C o lla b o ra tio n  A c t iv ity
Type o f  
Collaboration
Definition
Contract Work The hiring o f  Governm ent facilities to undertake a specific activity for a 
firm, e.g. field trials, m icro-biological analysis and consultancy work.
Sponsorship Funding research in public institutions for new product or process
development, or the m odification o f  an existing product. The commercial 
sector usually invests all or the m ajority o f  the expenditure and has control 
over the direction and the rights to the research.
Partnerships The sharing o f  research activity between the com m ercial and public
sectors to generate new technological information. The results o f  research 
partnerships that are exploited are usually shared on a proportionate basis 
to investment.
Information The use o f  library facilities, referencing o f com pounds and routine
Services________ consulting such as disposal o f  chemicals.
Com panies, which had conducted some collaborative work, were asked to give details o f  
their activity with public institutions by type, based on these definitions. The numbers o f  
firms involved in collaborative activity o f  some kind were aggregated and, as some firms 
conducted activity in more than one sector, the results were converted into percentages. 
These data are illustrated in Figure 6.7.
Figure 6.7. Commercial F irm ’s Activity with Public Agricultural Research Institutions, 
percent
In form ation  Services  
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Sponsorship
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C ontract W ork  
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Contract work includes analytical services, such as spectrometry and biochem istry, testing 
and trials, as well as consultancy. In total 52 firms undertook some form o f  contract work, 
which proved to be the most popular use o f the public sector. Around 45 firms, 35% o f the 
total, conducted some form o f  sponsorship. Partnerships, consisting o f  a number o f 
different Governm ent schemes are intrinsic to commercial exploitation o f  the research base, 
as they involve the linkage o f  funds and expertise between public and private sectors. 
However, only 19% o f  the sample conducted some form o f  true partnership activity. Lastly, 
limited use seemed to be made o f information services, such as library and com puter 
databases. Only 6 firms claimed to use public research institutions for such a service. Each 
o f  these forms o f  collaboration are explored in more depth below.
6.3.1.1. Contract Work
Contract work usually involves routine research m ethods and makes use o f  the facilities o f a 
public sector research institute. Therefore, the work has little pretence to expand knowledge 
frontiers. The percentage breakdown o f  contract work placed by the private sector in public 
research institutes in 1996 is outlined in Figure 6.8.
Figure 6.8. Total F irm ’s Contract W ork with the Public Sector, percent
Consultancy ^  Analytical Serv ices
21% 29%
Other
Trials
Analysing this in more detail reveals that the m ajority o f  firms, around 44%, conducted 
trials with the help o f  public sector research institutes. This consisted o f  both testing, e.g. 
soil analysis, and conducting trials for new products and fieldwork, such as growing newly 
developed seed varieties. Around 29% o f  firms contracted the public sector for analytical
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services, which included the use o f  biochem istry and m icrobiology activities, as well as data 
processing and mass spectrometry. Consultancy formed around 21%  o f all firm s’ contract 
work, whereas only 6% were reportedly concerned with other activities, predominantly the 
licensing o f  public research.
6.3.1.2. Sponsorship
Sponsorship activity by commercial firms was divided into three categories for survey 
purposes, namely i) process developm ent, ii) product developm ent advice, and iii) product 
innovation. In terms o f  the first category, around 48% o f firms had been involved with 
product developm ent in the last three years, which was defined as 'using the public sector 
fo r  the development o f  a firm 's current product to realise new opportunities '. Similarly, 
44%  o f firms had used the public sector within the last three years for product innovation. 
This involved em ploying the public sector for the initial exploratory research before its 
commercial developm ent within the firm. However, only a small proportion o f  firms (8%) 
had links with public institutes in order to conduct research into process development. This 
involved modifications to previous mechanical and chemical processes. Figure 6.9 
sum m arises these three categories o f  sponsorship activity, disaggregated by sector.
Figure 6.9. Num ber o f  Firms Involved in Sponsorship with Public Agricultural Research 
Institutes
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The most prominent sponsors o f public institutions, in respect o f product development, seem 
to be those operating in the animal science sector. Thus, considering that private companies 
involved in animal science have a low level o f research expenditure, it is understandable that 
they would only seek public sector assistance as a means o f helping to modify present 
products, with little consideration for more fundamental changes. Contrary to this, the 
veterinary and medicine sector shows the highest level o f involvement in respect of using 
public research institutions for product innovation. These differences in the nature of 
collaborative activities may have a logical explanation. Whilst firms with low research 
intensities, such as those in animal science, see the public sector as a means to modifying 
products, firms with high R&D intensities, as those in veterinary and medicine sectors, 
invest the most in active research with the public sector. This is also evident in the plant 
and crop sector, which has a high level o f involvement with public research institutes in 
respect of product innovation.
6.3.I.3. Partnerships
Firms were asked if they were involved with any Government schemes aimed at forming 
partnerships between both sectors. The LINK scheme, a programme which has been in 
place for a number o f years, proved the most popular amongst the firms surveyed, with 43% 
saying that they participated. The Co-operative Awards to Science and Engineering scheme 
(CASE) ranked second, with 16% o f firms having some involvement. However, the 
majority o f sectors had a number o f schemes specific to their area and few conclusions can 
be drawn. Realising Our Potential Awards (ROPA) are relatively new and only 5% of firms 
surveyed had any involvement with this scheme. O f those categorised as ‘Other’ the most 
prominent included the BBSRC Collaboration with Industry and Teaching Company 
Schemes.
In total, the sectors involved in the largest numbers of partnership schemes were the plant 
and crop (20 firms, 31% of the sample) and the agrochemical sectors (18 firms, 28% of the 
sample). This again may indicate that these sectors, which have high research intensities, 
are most likely to have the greatest involvement in research partnerships with the public 
sector. These results, disaggregated by sector, are presented in Figure 6.10.
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Figure 6.10. Num ber o f  Firms Involved in Partnerships with Public Agricultural Research 
Institutes
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6.3.1.4. Information Services
Only a small proportion o f  the com panies within the survey claim ed to have used 
information services as part o f  their research. The majority o f  firms that used these services 
(63% ) sourced them from within the UK. Use o f non-UK information was stated to be due 
to either organisational reasons or the specialist nature o f problem s requiring specific 
databases or services. Around 28% o f  com panies reported that they used European 
information services, e.g. CORDIS or Biotechnology Registration, w hereas only 9% referred 
to non-European services. However, the very recent establishm ent o f  web-sites by UK 
research institutions, which offer com prehensive research services, may have improved the 
level o f  public R&D information services used, compared to the level observed in the 
survey.
6.3.1.5. Summary
In terms o f  actual com m itm ent to collaboration, an average o f  11% o f  total private research 
expenditure is devoted to this activity. Furthermore, it emerges that firms with high research 
intensities were spending significant proportions o f their budget on work directed towards
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creating more fundamental knowledge, whereas the work of those with a low research 
expenditure seemed more adaptive in nature.
Overall the majority o f work is conducted through contracting, whereas activities, which 
involve more scientific explorations such as sponsorships and especially partnerships, are 
conducted less by the commercial sector. This may suggest that the public sector is not 
being used for its expertise, so much as a cheaper source o f research facilities. Thus, it 
questions how the commercial sector views publicly-funded agricultural research institutes. 
Specifically, Government science policy is based on the assumption that the commercial 
sector understands public science and its ability to improve industrial competitiveness. 
However, attitudes towards the public sector do not seem to reflect this. Consequently, 
there is a need to establish whether trends in collaborative activity support this belief. This 
is the concern of the next section.
6.3.2. Trends in Collaborative Activity
Data from the public sector on the level o f private industrial funding is difficult to obtain. 
Explicit figures from the HEI’s generally or for agricultural departments specifically are not 
available. Similarly, ADAS, whilst in the public sector, does not reveal levels of industry 
funding. However, the BBSRC gives a figure for overall external income, which includes 
money from levy boards and European Government contracts. The BBSRC has had a 
growing percentage o f its income emerging from external sources over the last ten years (see 
Table 6.5). However, whilst industry funding o f public R&D has increased, it is only 
nominal and to some degree this tallies with the survey findings discussed earlier.
1986/7 1991/2 1993/4 1995/6
Industry Contribution (£ M) 5.9 6.5 10.8 12.3
Percentage o f  Total Income 5 6 7 8
Source: AFRC (Various Years)
When surveyed the large companies were asked to say whether they were spending a higher 
proportion o f their total research budget on public sector collaboration than ten years ago. 
Around half, 46%, were spending more, with 42% seemingly unaffected by the changes and 
12% spending less on UK research collaboration. Accordingly, it seems that, whilst around
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half the firms are increasing their investment, in absolute terms their actual expenditure on 
collaboration only represents a small increase from ten years ago. Consequently, from the 
above evidence, the policy mechanisms are being taken up, but the slow rate at which 
linkage has occurred over the decade strongly indicates that the mechanisms for 
collaboration have not been a dramatic success and have not fully compensated for the 
reduction in public sector funds for the public research institute.
6.3.2.1. Summary
Trends in collaborative activity have shown only a nominal growth since the cuts in near­
market expenditure occurred. This seems to indicate that the Government policy for 
collaboration has not been particularly successful. Accordingly, there is a need to establish 
how private sector expenditure has changed recently. Thus, the remainder o f this section 
seeks to answer the issues presented in the previous chapter. Firstly, in relation to the model 
outlined in section 5.3, the programmes o f private sector research can be analysed to assess 
whether the assumed role for commercial activity is being undertaken. Secondly, in view of 
the spending activity o f the private sector, an evaluation o f the trends in research activity 
can be made. Overall, this will allow an understanding o f whether the private sector is 
responding to the Government initiatives regarding commercial R&D funding initiatives 
from the mid-1980s onwards.
6.4. The Role of Private Sector Agricultural R&D in the UK
In section 3.2.3.2. the level of private sector research expenditure was estimated from the 
survey at between £365 and £507 million for 1996. In addition, firms were asked to 
estimate the proportion o f their R&D expenditure allocated to the four main types of 
research, defined in section 5.3, namely:
Basic research involving the acquisition o f new knowledge with no particular application 
in mind;
Applied strategic research involving research into a subject area which has not yet 
advanced to a stage that an application can be clearly specified;
Applied specific research involving research specifically directed to producing an 
exploitable outcome; and
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Development involving the use o f existing knowledge to create new products and 
processes.
These figures were tallied and then re-weighted (see Appendix 3) and are presented in Table 
6.6. However, after analysis it was found that there were limits to the survey definitions, as 
interpretations of ‘basic’ and ‘strategic’ research within firms were usually subjective. 
Therefore the cumulative amount o f basic and strategic research was presumed to give a 
clearer indication o f the spread of research spend by type.
Table 6.6. Breakdown of Private Sector Research on Agriculture by Type in 1996, 
percentage of total R&D spend*
Sector Basic and Applied  
Strategic Work
Applied Specific Development
Agrochemical 5.2 16.2 78.6
Veterinary and Medicine 5.9 84.9 9.8
Plant & Crop 4.0 19.4 76.7
Animal Science 6.9 33.1 59.9
Agri-Engineering 4.4 6.1 85.6
Totals 5.4 42.3 52.3
* Totals may not tally through rounding
Considering basic and applied strategic research on its own indicates that the agrochemical, 
veterinary and medicine and animal science sectors have the highest level of expenditure on 
this type of research. However, the average level o f private spend on such work in all areas 
is only 5%, with agri-engineering and plant and crop sectors having lower levels than this. 
Firms in the veterinary and medicine sector spend far more on applied than development 
work. At the other extreme, agri-engineering firms spend around 86% o f their total R&D 
money on development work. This corresponds with the general opinion that commercial 
agri-engineering tends to be solely concerned with modifications o f previous innovations 
(Lesser and Lee, 1993).
A comparable survey o f the US private agricultural sector found that around 15% of total 
R&D expenditures were devoted to ‘relevant basic research’, which seems to compare with 
the category of ‘basic and applied strategic’ work, while around 43.5% was spent on applied 
work and 41.5% on development work (Crosby, 1987). Accordingly, although US firms 
spend a very high proportion o f their research budget on applied and development work,
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they still spend twice as much on basic research as UK companies. W hilst comparisons 
between countries are fraught with difficulties, this may indicate that at present UK 
com panies have a greater reliance on the public sector for underpinning basic research. This 
is an important area to consider after the recent changes in science policy and requires 
further investigation. Thus, the next section examines the activity o f  private sector R&D, 
disaggregated by type, into aspects o f  crop, animal and mechanical science.
6.4.1. UK Private Sector Research Activity
Firms were asked to detail their main areas o f scientific investigation and give some 
indication o f expenditure in these areas. However, as these were only indications, their 
derivation and re-weighting are contentious (see Appendix 3 for further details). Therefore, 
there is a degree o f conjecture in the results that follow. Nevertheless, it will permit an 
overview o f the research activity in comparison to the conceptual model outlined in section
5.3. Thus, this section aims to test the theoretical model derived in the previous chapter 
against the findings o f  the survey.
6.4.1.1. The UK Private Sector in Plant and Crop Science
Figure 6.11 shows the level o f  private research expenditure directed tow ards plant and crop 
science.
Figure 6.11. Private Sector R&D Expenditures in Plant and Crop Science, percent
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Around 49% o f this research expenditure was directed towards ‘arable crop science’ in 
1996. Approxim ately £134 million was spent in this area, w hereas around £99 million 
(36% ) was concentrated on ‘plant science’. The smallest category, ‘soils and fertilisers’, 
experienced a spend o f  around £40 million, or 15% o f  the total plant and crop expenditure.
In line with the delineation o f  public R&D in the previous chapter, private expenditures on 
R&D can be disaggregated further in order to compare their activities. Thus, in terms o f 
arable crop science, basic and applied strategic agrochemical R&D was approxim ately 5% 
o f  total expenditure (from Table 6.6), representing around £7 million for the year 1995/6. 
Applied and developm ent work, at £127 m illion, is around 12 times higher than this. This is 
further illustrated in Figure 6.12 which outlines expenditure on research by type within the 
crop and plant sectors.
Figure 6.12. UK Private Sector R&D W ithin Crop and Plant Science, breakdown by 
research type, £ million
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In com parison, in the area o f  plant science private com panies spent around £99 million, 
which was predom inantly directed towards plant breeding and genetics. If  the plant and 
crop sector devoted around 4% to basic and strategic research, then private expenditure 
would have been only around £4 million. The remaining £95 million o f private R&D 
spending was devoted to applied and developm ent research. W ork on soils and fertilisers 
constituted around £40 million o f  the private research spend, out o f  which only £2 million 
was directed towards basic and strategic work.
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W hilst it seems that the m ajority o f  work in the fields o f plant and crop science is centred on 
developm ent work, some degree o f  research is conducted in exploratory fields. Thus, 
fundamental arable crop science, which involves activity in both biological and chemical 
investigations, was allocated around £7 million pounds in 1995/6. Accordingly, whilst the 
argument for publicly-supporting basic and applied strategic research appears strong from 
the evidence in Figure 5.4, some degree o f productivity-enhancing research is still 
conducted in the commercial sector. This may, therefore, weaken the apparent justification 
for the presence o f the public sector in these fields. Nevertheless, there is contrary evidence 
that supports the idea that public research has no conceivable role in the conduct o f  applied 
and, especially, developm ent work in these areas (Thirtle, 1986; Umali, 1992). The 
exception to this is in respect o f  work in bio-fuels and environm ental research. In this 
respect, some indication was found in the survey o f  private sector activity into ‘farm-yard 
w aste’, as well as ‘environmental w ork’. However, as can be seen from Figure 6.12, 
expenditure allocated towards ‘soils and fertilisers’ was the lowest out o f  all three fields. 
This lack o f commercial activity seems to strengthen the justification for the presence o f the 
public sector in applied specific work on the environmental aspects for crops and plants.
6.41.2. The UK Private Sector in Livestock Science
Figure 6.13 shows the breakdown o f  private expenditure in the livestock sector in 1995/6.
Figure 6.13 . Companies Involved with Livestock Production in 1995/6, breakdown by 
research sector, percent
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The largest areas o f expenditure were on ‘physiology’ at £75 m illion, ‘animal disease’ at 
£46 million and ‘grassland and rum inant science’ at £34 million. By com parison, ‘dairy 
production’ attracted £32 million, while the lowest area o f private R&D investment was 
‘animal breeding’, which absorbed around £23 million.
In terms o f disaggregating by research type. Figure 6.14 shows the allocation to each field. 
Thus, basic research into ‘animal physiology’, using the figure o f  5.9% for basic research in 
veterinary and medicine sciences, accounted for around £4.4 million o f  private funds in 
1996. Similarly, around £2.7 million was spent in the same period for basic and applied 
strategic work on ‘animal disease’. However, this was overshadowed by large investments 
in applied specific work in both fields o f  around £103 million, which was much higher than 
developm ent work and may indicate the requirem ent for a strong biological and chemical 
facility in order to compete in this field. Basic and strategic work in ‘grassland and 
rum inant science’ and ‘dairy science’, received around the same level o f  private R&D 
funding by type, while the lowest investment was in R&D into ‘animal breeding’, at less 
than £1.6 million.
Figure 6.14. UK Private Sectors W ithin Livestock and Related Science, breakdown by 
research type, £ million
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In terms o f  the model o f  public R&D, it seems that the justifications for publicly-funded 
R&D in livestock is weaker than it is for crop and plant science. Thus, whilst environmental 
considerations are param ount in the public arena, the appropriability o f biologically and 
chem ically based pharmaceuticals reduces the need for public support in these areas. Thus,
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it seems that the onus for funding livestock R&D remains, to a large degree, with the private 
sector. Figure 6.14 shows a strong emphasis on applied specific and development work. 
However, research in fundamental fields remains minimal. In total, basic and applied 
strategic work in the animal sciences accounted for only £13 million in 1996. Consequently, 
it seems that the public sector is critical as the provider o f fundamental research. In this 
respect, whilst chemical research carries a weak justification, there is a more obvious case 
for public support o f applied strategic research into investigations to reduce residues in meat 
and to ensure livestock health.
6.4.1.3. The UK Private Sector in Agri-Engineering Science
The majority of private research in the agri-engineering sector is concerned with work on 
vehicles, which constitutes a high degree o f the total private R&D expenditure, as shown in 
Table 6.7.
Table 6.7. Private Research Expenditure in the Agri-Engineering Sector in 1995/6, 
£ million
Agri-Engineering 40.6
Agricultural Vehicles 34.6
Other Agricultural Areas 2.8
Agricultural Computing and Software Design 2.4
Farm Buildings 0.8
If  the amount of basic and applied strategic research spent in this field was equivalent to 4% 
o f the total (see Table 6.6), then £1.8 million o f private money was directed in 1995/6 
towards these areas. However, the theoretical model derived in section 5.3 found that there 
was a weak justification for the continuation o f funding for agri-engineering. Indeed, the 
only area which appeared to justify public support was animal welfare. The closest 
indication o f private R&D expenditure in this area is the £0.8 million allocated to farm 
buildings. As this constitutes only 2% of the total private research budget, it seems to 
strengthen the support for public R&D in this area. A further point has to be made regarding 
managerial research, which was given strong support in Figure 5.4. There is some 
indication that work is being conducted on computing and software design, which 
internalises this management activity to some degree. Consequently, support for managerial 
research in livestock and crops, especially at the development end of research, may be 
weakened by this evidence, as there is some opportunity for private appropriation of the 
research in this area.
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6 .4 .I.4 . S u m m a iy
The analysis o f the UK private sector in agriculture reveals a skewed spread o f R&D 
expenditure both by area and type. For the most part, large expenditures are allocated to 
applied specific and development work with little attention to funding fundamental research. 
In this respect, it seems the public sector has become paramount in supplying the 
fundamental work needed for the future exploitation o f these industries. This seems to be 
especially the case in fields such as ‘soils and fertilisers’ and ‘animal breeding’, where 
public basic research spending seems to be critical. Moreover, this reliance on the public 
sector may have been affected by recent changes in research management. Consequently, 
the next section examines how the private sector has responded to changes in the level and 
output of public agricultural R&D which were instigated from the mid-1980s onwards.
6.4.2. Trends in UK  Private Sector Agricultural R&D
In terms o f replacing lost public funds the private sector can be divided into two distinct 
groups, namely i) the private non-profit making bodies and ii) private companies involved in 
the agricultural input industries. Within the UK, a number o f non-profit making bodies exist 
which conduct agricultural related R&D. Firstly, charitable organisations may fund research 
to further the understanding o f a particular area. The institutions with the highest profile 
among these are the Wellcome Trust and the Rockefeller Foundation, who together have 
donated large amounts o f funds for the furtherance of knowledge on biological processes 
and interactions. However, whilst some o f the discoveries may have a spin-off benefit to 
agriculture, these are mainly directed towards human science. More specific interest groups, 
which fund a small number o f R&D projects in more agriculturally-related areas, also exist. 
O f these, such UK bodies as ‘Friends o f the Earth’, the ‘Pesticide Trust’ and various 
heritage bodies conduct a degree o f research related to public-good issues.
Secondly, and most prominently, a number o f representative organisations exist which have 
been formed to collect levies from producers and processors. Many agricultural commodity 
markets have been subject to the control o f these representative boards since the Marketing 
Acts o f the 1930s. However, after the 1993 Agriculture Act, a number o f new bodies 
emerged, whilst previously existing organisations have been re-modelled, with the overall 
aim o f encouraging levy funders to make up for reductions in public R&D expenditure. As 
such the boards tend to concentrate on strategic work o f benefit to the sectors involved 
(Thirtle, Piesse, and Smith, 1997). Their level o f expenditure by body and commodity is 
illustrated in Table 6.8.
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Table 6.8. Statutory Bodies Currently Established in the UK and their Spending Activity in 
1995/6, £ million
Levy Board Commodity Group R&D Spend (£M)
British Potato Council Potatoes 1.8
Home Grown Cereals Authority Cereal and Oilseeds 4.7
Meat and Livestock Commission Beef meat, Sheep and Lambs, 
Pork and Bacon
1.9
Processors and Growers Research 
Association
Peas and Beans 0.2
Milk Development Council Dairy Produce 3.0
Horticultural Development Horticultural Produce 3.0
K u^cB eet Research and 
Education Council
Sugar Beet 2.2
Apple & Pear Research Council Apple & Pear 0.4
National Hops Association Hops 0.1
Total Levy Board Expenditure 17.3
Sources: (Various)
Thus, Table 6.8 reveals that around £17,3 million were spent during the period 1995/6 on 
research relevant to the agricultural industries. The Home Grown Cereals Authority 
apparently spent the largest share o f this, around £5 million pounds. However, it was 
stressed at the time that this was a once only payment, as a commitment to its role in 
increasing UK competitiveness (HGCA, 1996). In addition, this was recorded in a period of 
relative stability within agriculture and may be seen as an upper limit to the levy board’s 
commitment to agricultural R&D. Consequently, it seems that the figure o f £17.3 million 
may be providing an over-optimistic picture o f levy board funding in the long run within the 
UK. Nevertheless, even if the figure is accepted, then only around half o f the £30 million 
removed in public near-market funds has been replaced by levy board funds (Read, 1989),
In terms o f the expenditures o f private companies conducting agricultural R&D, the only 
figures available for private agricultural research expenditure in the last decade are estimates 
made by Thirtle et a l  (quoted in Thirtle, Piesse and Smith, 1997) for private activity during 
1987/8. These are presented in Table 6.9 as a means to compare against the findings o f this 
survey. Whereas some problems occur in definition they still give some indication of 
changes to expenditure in the private sector.
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Sector Research Spend Total Research Spend in 1995/6
1987/88^ Range Change (%)
Agrochemical 151 123 - 150 -19 - -1
Veterinary & Medicine 32 26 - 30 -20 - -7
Plant & Crop 32 111 - 165 243 - 410
Animal Science 24 70 - 115 193 - 384
Agri-Engineering 84 37 - 47 -56 - -44
Totals 323 365 - 507 13 - 57
Totals’!' 267 185 - 227 -31 - -15
 ^ Removing Plant and Crops and Animal Science sectors
From the above table it seems that private expenditure has risen by between 13% and 57% 
since 1987/8. However, the trends between sectors are not similar, with those for plant and 
crops and animal science being very different from the rest. With the removal o f these two 
sectors, the remaining categories have all experienced a decline in R&D expenditure, apart 
from agrochemicals at the upper limit, which is projected to have remained relatively 
constant. Analysing private R&D expenditure, apart from plant and animal science, gives 
an overall decline o f between 15% and 31% from 1987/8. In absolute terms, this could 
mean that research levels have decreased by around £82 million at their most extreme. Even 
at the upper limit, where expenditure is £227 million, compared to the 1987/8 figure o f £267 
million, private expenditure appears to have decreased by around £40 million.
However, clearly given the way that the 1987/8 and 1995/6 figures were obtained, care is 
needed in interpreting this trends. Perhaps more meaningful is a survey o f firm’s 
perceptions o f their changing level of R&D investment. Thus, the firms were asked to give 
an indication o f whether their R&D intensities by type had either increased, remained the 
same, or decreased over the last ten years. What emerges is that the allocation o f funding by 
each type o f R&D has remained relatively constant compared to ten years ago. This was
Thirtle, Piesse and Smith (1997) figures inflated to 1996 prices using the RPI.
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especially so at the basic end o f  research, in that around the same num ber o f  firms claimed 
to have increased their expenditure as those reducing their spending levels. Figure 6.15 
illustrates how expenditures have changed in relation to the four key types o f  research.
Figure 6.15. Trends in Private Expenditure by Type from 1985/6 to 1995/6, percent
c 40
P 30
□  Increase  
■  Sam e
□  D ecrease
Basic Strategic Applied D evelopm ent
However, a shift can be seen to have occurred towards applied research and development. 
Around 40% o f firms claim to be increasing their levels o f  expenditure in applied specific 
work, whereas around 35% have expanded their developm ent activities. If this were the 
case in reality, then it would indicate expansion into near-m arket areas. However, this 
seems a contradiction in terms, when the possible large contraction in private R&D 
expenditure is considered. It may mean that this increased focus on applied R&D by some 
firms has been to the further detrim ent o f  basic and strategic work. This may account for the 
low levels o f  basic and strategic work in the UK, compared to US firms and may indicate an 
increased reliance on publicly-funded basic research.
6.4.2.1. Summary
The private sector conducts the m ajority o f  agricultural R&D within the UK. However, 
indications are that its com m itm ent to research is falling in real term s as opposed to ten 
years ago, especially in basic and strategic research. With regard to actual expenditures as a 
whole, it seems that the reduction in public funds o f  £30 million has only been compensated 
by levy funding o f  £17 million, which has left a gap o f £13 million pounds. In addition, 
with a fall o f  between £40 million to £82 million in commercial funding, total R&D
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expenditures within UK agriculture have fallen by around £53 to £95 million pounds over 
the period 1987/8 to 1995/6. Consequently, whilst there is some evidence that this has been 
in basic and strategic areas, it is difficult to believe that the commercial sector has 
compensated to any degree by expanding into near-market research.
Accordingly, this leads to a number o f issues which require further investigation. Firstly, 
there is a need to understand why the private sector has reduced funding to such an extent. 
Thirtle, Piesse and Smith (1997) attributed the fall that they observed between 1988/9 and 
1993/4 to economic recession. ITowever, the UK economy in the 1990s has been relatively 
stable and recent rises in economic growth seems to run counter to the continued fall in 
R&D expenditure in the 1996 period. Nevertheless, an associated reason could be that the 
attitude towards investment in agricultural R&D has changed. With the continued decline 
and losses reported in various agricultural commodities, firms may have begun to either 
centre research on developing countries, which offer more exploitable opportunities, or have 
withdrawn completely from the agricultural sector itself. If  this were the case, then it seems 
Government attempts to induce the private sector to increase its spend on agricultural R&D 
appear to have been misdirected.
More crucially, the commercial sector’s relationship with publicly-funded agricultural R&D 
may have changed. Reductions in public funds could have had the reverse effect to that 
anticipated and led to a corresponding reduction in commercial funding o f agricultural R&D 
in the UK. This has been emphasised by Umali (1992), who contended that an expanding 
private research facility could only occur with support from a healthy public agricultural 
R&D base. Taking account o f the evidence that UK firms may be more reliant on externally 
produced basic research than those in the US, this may explain the phenomena o f reduced 
private expenditures. Accordingly, in the UK it may be the case that the public and private 
sectors are more interdependent in terms o f agricultural R&D than in the US, and 
consequently research investment has suffered as a result o f the cuts in funding o f the late 
1980s.
6.5. Conclusion
The aim of the private sector is usually to maximise profits. In theory, because o f this it 
rarely considers the long-term effects o f its strategies in order to recoup higher returns. 
Therefore, research and development, as a means to underpinning this objective, will 
generally be short-term in nature. It seems the role o f the public sector is quite distinct from
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this, providing long-term research with the aim of increasing knowledge rather than profits. 
However, this could be disputed as public investments before the 1980s towards applied 
research and development, as well as advice, testify to the Government directly aiming to 
support increases in industrial productivity and competitiveness. Accordingly, the removal 
of near-market funding and a subsequent emphasis on basic research may reveal an attempt 
by Government to delineate the roles for public and private sectors as distinct providers of 
agricultural R&D.
Given this new divide, the above analysis has tended to concentrate on how results are 
transmitted from public agricultural research institutes to the commercial sector. More 
specifically, it has attempted to quantify and assess the means by which the private sector 
integrates research from either the public domain or through direct collaboration. The 
implications which emerge from the analysis can be divided into two. Firstly, the role o f the 
commercial sector has been explored in terms of its relationships and attitudes toward public 
agricultural R&D. Secondly, the impact of commercialisation policy on the structure and 
practice o f public agricultural research institutes has been examined. These two areas are 
considered below.
6.5.1. The Role o f the Commercial Sector in Public Agricultural R&D
The removal o f near-market funds opened a gap which the Government believed would be 
filled by the private sector. Critically, however, the level o f private agricultural research 
spending has decreased since these policy changes. An answer to this phenomenon may lie 
in the corresponding ‘health’ o f both sectors. In a review of the economic benefits o f public 
basic research, Martin et al. (1996) contended that advanced industrial countries needed 
their own, well developed basic research capabilities. It would seem from this analysis that 
the removal o f applied and development work has also had an effect on the activities of 
private research funding.
Furthermore, reductions have been very evidently mapped in the areas o f basic and strategic 
work. Rosenberg (1990) and Pavitt (1991) see private basic research activity as an ‘entry 
ticket’ to the world’s stock o f knowledge. Thus, the fall in private R&D expenditure may be 
an indication that interest in agricultural research by the UK commercial sector may be 
declining. Therefore, in this sense, any policy prescription for correcting this would have to 
be aimed at encouraging new markets through public research. Similarly, it was found that 
the public sector conducts the majority of basic research in most UK sectors. This was quite 
extreme in certain areas and may either indicate a dependence on externally produced basic
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research or, in line with the findings above, a reliance on applied and development work. 
Thus, if the former were the case then the vigour o f the public sector is critical to the future 
development o f industry. However, if the latter is correct, then reductions in activity o f the 
public sector will have little immediate effect on commercial sector R&D.
After the near-market cuts, it is interaction between sectors which becomes critical. It is the 
contention of numerous writers (see for example Kogan and Henkel, 1983; Thornley and 
Doyle, 1984; Pavitt 1991), that both applied and basic work offer opportunities for further 
growth. In this sense, if  the public sector conducts no applied or development work, it is 
likely that a significant proportion o f its basic research findings will not be exploited and 
developed. Thus, with the private sector apparently concentrating on near-market work, the 
public sector is essential to undertaking the basic research required for a company’s applied 
activities. To a degree this impinges on the findings o f Gibbons et. ah (1994), who argued 
that, as collaborative activity emphasises commercial applicability, the distinction between 
the aims o f the public and private sectors becomes blurred. Therefore, close interaction 
through collaboration may offer more success for publicly-funded basic research, which 
would be better targeted to the needs o f the private sector.
However, the level o f collaborative activity within the UK was found not to be large enough 
for Government policy in this area to be deemed a success. Furthermore, this may be due to 
a lack o f policy coherence. Thus, Webster (1988) has pointed out that the AFRC was 
particularly suited to private sector collaboration, because its work has been traditionally 
applied in nature. With the removal o f near-market funds, therefore, one would expect these 
trends to decrease. Consequently, there is a possibility that the near-market policy may have 
reduced the opportunities for expansion of collaboration and may account for its slow 
growth rate.
6.5.2. The Commercialisation of Public Agricultural R&D
Public agricultural research now has a more clearly defined role. It must provide the basis 
for increasing the U K ’s competitiveness by opening and creating markets which can be 
successfully exploited by industry. With the reductions in applied and development work, 
public research has several channels to increase this exploitability. Specifically, this 
consists o f offering services for and collaborating with  an industrial partner. Similarly, its 
original activity o f providing knowledge through public channels has more importance 
within this context.
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However, what emerges from this and the previous chapter is that there are definite sectoral 
differences in respect o f agricultural R&D. Consequently, the role o f public R&D within 
commercialisation policy will be distinctly affected by whether it is aimed at livestock, crop 
or mechanical areas. When analysed at the sectoral level, the mechanical sciences seem to 
be the most susceptible to commercial influence. Predominantly, this is because it is 
difficult to establish any strong justification for the continuation o f public support. Thus, as 
most o f the private research in the agri-engineering sector is concentrated on farm vehicles, 
it seems to discount the relevance o f the public sector in this area.
Where the public sector remains paramount is in enhancing the public good which, in the 
case o f agri-engineering, is centred around animal welfare. However, this argument begins 
to weaken as improved animal welfare emerges as an appropriable product o f agri­
engineering R&D, such as modified housing and feeding facilities. That the survey found 
only a limited representation o f the private sector in this field may reflect the need to 
understand background research, i.e. animal behavioural studies. Thus, it may be the case 
that basic research is not conducted due to its non-appropriability and, reiterating Pavitf s 
(1991) contention over firms which conduct no basic research, companies have no facility 
for understanding this knowledge. This gives the public sector a vital role as a provider of 
this knowledge. Consequently, it seems that collaboration between sectors in this field will 
allow behavioural studies to be translated into appropriable innovations.
Like mechanical areas, support for public livestock R&D has only concentrated on 
providing for the basic and applied strategic work needed to develop solutions to animal- 
related problems. Within this, biological investigations have been favoured over the 
development o f chemically-based research. In terms o f livestock R&D, it was found that 
certain areas o f the private sector allocated a substantial proportion o f funds towards the 
applied sciences, which might indicate the interactive nature between different types of 
research in this field. Consequently, the public sector will have a role in supporting these 
explorations, through providing publie domain research related to biological investigations.
As regards crops, it was noted that there are several strong justifieations for the continuation 
o f public sector support. Thus, work which enhances the public good should not have to 
depend on private sector support. This was especially so for R&D into biological control o f 
pests and diseases which may reduce the need for applying chemicals. As a consequence, 
chemical research has been found to carry a weak justification for public funds. Similarly, 
the large amounts o f private money allocated to arable crop science would suggest that the
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removal o f public funds in this area would not ereate a problem. It therefore seems that 
there is some divergence between public and private sector goals in plant and crop science. 
The possibilities for collaboration may be severely reduced because o f this. However, one 
area where both sectors have similar aims is in the development o f bio-mass, which offers a 
relatively environmentally-friendly means to producing fuel. Consequently collaborative 
activity could occur in this area, which may reduce the justification o f publicly-funded 
applied specific work in this area.
Finally, an important area that should be considered within the overall understanding o f the 
commercialisation o f research institutes is the role that the public sector scientist plays. 
Critically, the motivations for a publicly-funded scientist could substantially differ from 
those o f an industrial scientist. At the risk o f some simplification, the work o f a public 
researcher aims at increasing the spread o f knowledge concerning a certain subject area, 
whereas a scientist within a company forsakes a degree of freedom and choice in research 
projects in lieu o f other reasons, e.g. higher remuneration and access to better facilities. 
With the onset of increased commercialisation, scientists, refused the right to publish or 
discuss their work, may conceivably seek opportunities elsewhere. This could principally 
occur by movement to the commercial sector, thus reducing the opportunities for creating 
useful knowledge within the publie science base.
Related to this, Webster (1988) and Read et al. (1988) have both voiced concerns over the 
probity o f industrial involvement. If  it affects a public scientist’s time to an extent where it 
infringes on work funded by the taxpayer or, more critically, if  publicly-funded research 
areas become focused towards industry rather than public needs, then serious questions have 
to be asked over the validity o f encouraging a policy for commercialisation.
The fact remains, however, that reduced funds for agricultural R&D are a reality and the 
science base needs to be inereasingly maintained by external sourees. On the above 
evidence the levels o f linkage have grown only slightly. This is regardless o f the fact that 
the commercial sector values the expertise and relevance of UK public research. Similarly, 
citation rates for agricultural and agricultural related research disciplines are still high (May, 
1997). Nevertheless research suffers from long lags between actual expenditure and final 
output, which have been estimated from 16 years and upwards, and therefore it is only now 
that the consequence o f the cuts in public R&D funding in the mid-1980s will be felt. 
Accordingly, due to the dichotomy between levels o f expertise and trends in commercial 
funding, collaboration may begin to decline. The Government response to such a situation
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may be to push more money into the system, but the expertise and image o f scientific 
excellence once lost may be a difficult thing to regain.
Overall, the last two chapters have re-emphasised the results o f some o f the hypothesis 
tested in Chapters 3 and 4. Specifically, whilst it was found that changes in research 
management were generally to the detriment o f agricultural research effectiveness, what has 
emerged from this chapter is that a highly relevant public research base remains. Whilst, it 
is difficult to ascertain whether this has improved because o f the changes in research 
management, the high regard in which the commercial sector holds public research 
institutions hardly indicates that the relevance and quality of public research has declined.
Similarly, in line with the findings o f Chapter 5, applied research is intrinsic to the success 
o f agricultural policy goals and its gradual removal, along with development and 
transference, seem to be to the detriment o f public agricultural R&D. In particular, the high 
rates o f return recorded for applied R&D and extension in Chapter 4 are given more weight 
by these findings. Thus, there is strong evidence that, for the public agricultural research 
service to continue to be successful, all areas along the research continuum must continue to 
be funded. This appears to be a point which recent policy decisions seemed to have ignored. 
The implications o f this are discussed in the conclusions.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS
7.0, Conclusions
Several key areas have emerged from this analysis which impinge on the central question of 
whether support for agricultural R&D is a justifiable activity for the public sector. Firstly, 
the claim that, not only is public agricultural R&D justified, but that it merits increased 
expenditures, has been explored. Secondly, the role o f the Government in agricultural R&D 
has been examined with regard to whether its changes have been successful. Finally, 
throughout this analysis the role and activity o f the private sector has been investigated. 
Consequently, the conclusions examine these issues as a series o f questions, with the aim of 
defining the role o f publicly-funded agricultural R&D. These questions can be identified as: 
i) is agricultural R&D under-funded?; ii) for what type and area o f agricultural R&D is 
public support justified?; iii) have all the shifts in research policy had a positive effect on 
the productivity of agricultural R&D?; iv) what is the role o f the private sector in 
agricultural R&D?; and v) how should public sector agricultural R&D be conducted in the 
future? The chapter closes with an examination o f future research issues that still need to be 
addressed.
7.1. Is Agricultural R&D Under-Funded?
Resources for agricultural R&D in the UK, as in most of the developed world, are becoming 
increasingly scarce. The contention o f most economists is that, as returns to R&D are high, 
there is clearly under-investment in agricultural R&D and funds should be increased. This 
study has found a return to applied agricultural R&D and extension above the recommended 
limits for a public investment. However, this has to be compared with negative returns 
which were derived for total public agricultural research expenditures. Therefore, this study 
could find no irrefutable evidence which supports the idea that agricultural research is 
under-funded.
However, more critically, it may not be the case that high returns necessarily indicate a need 
to increase public research funding. This is especially so in the case o f agriculture which 
has enjoyed substantial public support over the last 50-year period, as the high returns could 
easily reflect artificially inflated prices. In this respect the Malmquist indexing procedure, 
which only relies on quantities, would have been a more useful indicator o f TFP growth. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 4 lack o f data restricted analysis to the Laspeyres and 
Tornqvist TFP indices. Furthermore, the destructive externalities caused by agricultural 
industrialisation have raised questions over the direction of agricultural production. It has to 
be conceded that, as research has been the engine by which misguided policies for excessive 
farm outputs have been realised, then the role o f publicly-funded agricultural R&D, in terms
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of increasing social welfare, has to be questioned. Similarly, to expect the taxpayer to pay 
twice, both for production subsidies and for output-enhancing research, has further 
implications for social welfare.
In addition, it is not necessary to increase R&D investment to realise technological progress. 
Certainly, there is growing evidence that inter-country spill-overs are an important facet of 
the technological process (see for example Thirtle and Townsend, 1997), In particular, the 
New Zealand government has consciously adopted a ‘piggy-back’ approach, whereby other 
countries’ research knowledge is explicitly incorporated into the agricultural system. Thus, 
whilst the obvious limitation to this strategy is that it relies on other countries to continue to 
provide research in the public domain, it seems that a reduction in research funding may not 
impede economic growth, as R&D results can be imported.
What is clear from the above argument is that there is no satisfactory evidence suggesting 
that high rates o f return indicate under-funding o f agricultural R&D. However, what 
emerges from the remainder o f this study is that a clearer argument can be made for public 
support o f selected areas of research. This is discussed further in the next section.
7.2. For What Type and Area of Agricultural R&D is Continued Public Support 
Justified?
Agriculture, as an industry, seems to be in perpetual decline. Therefore, in economic terms, 
Government spending within this sector to realise gains in industrial growth seems 
misdirected. In addition, no identifiable growth has occurred in real incomes throughout the 
last 50-year period (Harvey, 1987). That this occurred in a period when investment in 
agricultural R&D was increasing seems to discount the ability o f technological innovation to 
reverse the economic position o f farmers. Indeed it is only when the wider social impact o f 
farming is taken into account that justifications for public support seem to be credible. 
Thus, the diversity o f costs and benefits to separate user-groups complicates the debate over 
whether public funding for agricultural R&D is justified. It therefore seems that, in trying to 
establish the need for continued public support, both the type and area of agricultural R&D 
performed have to be considered.
It seems to be irrefutable that the public sector should fund basic research. The support of 
work into both the natural and social sciences helps primarily to expand the frontiers of 
knowledge. Thus, support can be justified not only as a means to creating wealth, but also 
as an aid to creating knowledge. Ruttan (1982) contended that the two were not mutually
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exclusive, but complementaiy. Accordingly, it is difficult to argue for a reduction in 
research funds for basic science, when it would quite clearly have a negative effect on 
knowledge resources in the natural and social sciences.
In this respect, this must also apply when considering exploratory work which has an 
agricultural slant, i.e. applied strategic research. This is primarily because it supports the 
advancement o f knowledge within the agricultural sciences which, like basic research, 
makes it difficult to identify any specific outcome. Consequently, the funding of applied 
strategic research should be considered as a means to providing an adequate knowledge base 
to the agricultural sciences. In addition to supporting knowledge development, it also offers 
opportunities for further development both by the public and private sectors. In terms of 
actual public support for basic and applied strategic work, these areas have experienced an 
increase in public expenditure since the early-1990s. Therefore, as the funding of this 
exploratory work is justified on a priori grounds, there seems to be little apparent 
divergence between theory and practice.
However, when considering specific applied research, a delineation emerges between work 
which should be publicly-funded and work which should be the concern o f the private 
sector. The majority o f public work in these fields is funded either through MAFF for 
England and Wales, SOAEFD for Scotland, and DANI in Northern Ireland. However, only 
MAFF (1996) produces figures for research funding for this period in any specific detail. 
As such. Figure 7.1 outlines the areas o f MAFF funding that were justified on the basis of 
the theoretical framework developed in Chapter 5 and compares them against expenditure in 
areas which received little support for continued public funding.
Figure 7.1. Comparison o f Theoretical Framework for Public Funding o f Specific Applied 
R&D against Work funded by MAFF in 1996, £ million
Justified No or Partial Justification
Managerial Livestock & Crops 3.7 - ' 3.1 . ^
Other 1.2
Biological Livestock 1.8 16.47
& Chemical Crops 10.7 ' 10.5. ' " .
Mechanical Livestock 4.2
Source; MAFF (1996;
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In terms o f managerial research, the framework found that most work, which either 
enhanced the public good or supported diversification, was justified. Around £5 million was 
spent on research concerned with countryside management, wildlife conservation and farm 
woodlands in 1996. However, the £3 million pounds spent primarily on ‘improved 
marketing’ was adjudged to carry no justification. In terms o f biological and chemical 
research, public good work on crops (which includes statutory work on fertilisers, pesticides 
and research into organic farming) gains the same level o f funding as that for research into 
crops which aims to improve economic performance. The largest deviation from the 
theoretical framework emerges in respect o f livestock research where public good work into 
veterinary medicines was over-shadowed by investment o f around £16 million into 
productivity-enhancing fields. The only area which seems to truly follow the theoretical 
framework was agri-engineering, where around £4 million was spent on animal welfare, 
with MAFF making no direct payments for specific applied R&D engineering work aimed at 
improving economic performance during the 1996 period (MAFF, 1996).
Overall, what emerges from the above analysis is that the balance o f MAFF research 
funding is not entirely consistent with the theoretical framework developed forjudging the 
justification o f public funding o f agricultural R&D. Similarly, whilst figures for Scotland 
are difficult to dissaggregate into specific fields, this observation could equally apply, if 
around 60% of their research budget continues to be allocated towards improving 
productivity (Scottish Office, 1994). Therefore, the inference is that funds are being mis­
directed within the research budget. A re-allocation o f funding by MAFF might also counter 
the contention that agricultural R&D is under-funded, as expenditure in those areas which 
should be supported would be substantially increased, at the expense o f areas which 
arguably should not be conducted by the public sector.
7.3. Have all the Shifts in Research Policy had a Positive Effect on the Productivity of 
Publicly-Funded Agricultural R&D?
The 1960s saw an emergence o f accountability mechanisms within Government which have 
evolved into increasingly more sophisticated systems of appraisal for the distribution of 
money between areas o f public investment. That shifts in research management have been 
reflected in downward rates of return may indicate that the changes have had a negative 
effect on the productivity o f research. However, it is equally plausible that the decline in 
returns are independent o f the shift in the management o f research funding.
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In particular, there are indications that changes in the modes of funding have had little effect 
on institutional performance (Herbetz and Muller-Hill, 1996; Bourke and Butler, 1999). In 
addition, the high rates o f return estimated for applied R&D and, especially extension, belie 
any suggestion that shifts in policy have adversely affected research performance. Thus, 
this study tends to support the contention that research management changes have not 
appreciably affected research output, either positively or negatively. Instead they have only 
served to increase apparent accountability. Given that R&D management costs have 
increased as a result, the unanswered question is whether the benefits justify the transaction 
costs.
7.4. What Is the Role of the Private Sector in Agricultural R&D?
As outlined in Chapter 6, the private sector can be divided into two distinct groups, namely 
the statutory boards and the commercial sector. In terms o f the statutory boards, examples 
from other countries reveal that levy board funding can provide cohesive support for the 
strategic work specific to productivity gains. An argument against this is that the success of 
this funding route relies on the specific institutional circumstances o f a country’s 
agriculture. Hence, it could be argued that the UK could not develop a system which offers 
a viable base for levy board funding for agricultural R&D. This has been evidenced recently 
with the 1993 Agricultural Act. Whilst the Government increased the number of statutory 
commodity bodies, there was no corresponding increase in research funding from these 
organisations. Similarly, relying on levy board funding is very susceptible to changes in 
economic conditions and, considering the recent downward trends in farming incomes, it is 
difficult to accept that they offer a viable means to conducting stable research activity within 
the UK.
On the other hand, commercial investment in agricultural research has grown with the onset 
of biotechnology in the mid-1980s. Mainly due to the commercial opportunities from this 
process, firms have shown increased activity in basic biological research. Consequently, 
whilst productivity-enhancing applied research and development is predominantly the 
domain o f the commercial sector, the growing investment in the basic sciences by private 
firms must impinge on public sector R&D activity itself. However, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether this increased private investment will continue. As evidenced by the survey of 
private research providers, there has been a contraction of UK commercial R&D activity 
since the mid-1980s. As such, the main impetus for the provision o f basic and strategic 
science in all areas o f agriculture still continues to depend on the public sector.
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As regards the future role of the private sector, funding o f applied research and development 
work in the field o f productivity enhancement must be the sole prerogative of firms in the 
agricultural and food industries. That companies have not responded to the contraction of 
near-market research funding may indicate a lack o f sufficient incentives to conduct R&D. 
These may be improved through subsidies for industrial research activity. This is discussed 
in the next section.
7.5. How Should Public Sector Agricultural R&D be Conducted in the Future?
There are strong indications that an autonomous research system, based on institutional 
funding, has been the most effective means for managing the UK agricultural research 
system. To some degree this autonomy has returned, due to the increased concentration on 
basic research, which has primarily been determined by the agricultural research institutes, 
during the 1990s. However, project funding has remained the basis o f conducting and 
managing public applied R&D (OST, 1993). That the adoption o f this mechanism for 
research funding has had no discernible positive effect on rates of return must question the 
value of continuing it, due to its costs of operation. However, criticism of the earlier system 
found that, with institutional funding, UK agricultural research spent too much time on basic 
research, with little applied and development activity (Ulbricht, 1977). Therefore, in order 
to avoid this trend recurring, it seems that some kind o f steerage mechanism remains 
necessary, as it is important for the public sector to produce viable technology which 
enhances environmental, rural and social goals. In addition, this study has found little 
evidence to justify the removal o f applied research and development from public agricultural 
research. Rather the balance o f funding between basic and non-basic fields should be 
reconsidered, with more public funds directed toward applied R&D.
What also emerges from this analysis is a case for the public sector investing in 
productivity-enhancing research in the commercial sector. Thus, commissioning projects 
for applied R&D through competitive bidding may allow more effective targeting o f R&D 
than can be achieved by institutional funding. Subsidising industry may also obviate the 
problems of ‘crowding out’ and duplication in public research, by concentrating on 
providing strategic research which complements, rather than deters, industrial research 
activity.
However, there are numerous drawbacks to allowing the private sector to conduct work for 
the Government. Firstly, there is the very obvious problem of reducing available knowledge 
in the public domain. This could be avoided by demanding the publication o f research
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findings, which are certainly not technology specific in the basic and strategic sciences. 
Secondly, there is the danger o f firms diverting programmes towards their own 
technological needs. Thus, some monitoring system has to be introduced which would, 
hopefully, avoid these problems. Intrinsic to this would also be the development of joint 
applied research programmes, involving close consultation between industry, farmers and 
the public sector. Whilst this would increase transaction costs, if the high rates of return to 
private R&D estimated in this study are to be believed, then public investment would still be 
more effective than relying on a purely publicly operated Agricultural Research Service, if 
estimates o f return from public R&D in the last 50 years are accepted.
An argument which supports this is that during times o f economic depression private 
agricultural research tends to be reduced. Therefore if industiy could be subsidised during 
these periods to continue investing in areas which offer growth, it might reduce the effects 
of recessionary conditions. Indirectly this has been achieved within the food sector. Little 
non-statutory food research is conducted by the public sector and research programmes tend 
to be directed by industry, with the public sector offering funding to encourage this (MAFF, 
1996).
Overall, what emerges is an explicit division between the roles of the public and private 
sectors in agricultural R&D. The public sector research institutes should have continued 
institutional funding for basic and strategic activity, whereas applied R&D for the public 
good should be project-funded by Government Similarly, the private sector should enjoy 
increased funding from public sources to support the development o f the competitiveness of 
the UK farming industry.
7.6. Recommendations for Future Research
This analysis has questioned the assumptions on which public funding o f agricultural R&D 
is based and established an argument for the continuation o f public applied R&D which 
enhances the public good. However, there are several issues which have emerged from this 
analysis and which require further study. These are listed below;
1) It is quite evident from previous studies into UK public agricultural R&D that the role 
and activities o f the private sector have been ignored. However, there are a number of 
reasons why this should not be the case in future studies, namely; i) the expenditure o f 
the private sector has become increasingly important since the mid-1980s for the conduct 
o f agricultural research in the UK; ii) it is evident that both sectors need to be aware of 
their research activities in order to become more effective, and thus avoid exeessive
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duplication and ‘crowding-out’; and iii) the increase in interest toward bio-technology 
has blurred the traditional distinctions between the roles o f public and private sector 
R&D activity. Thus, the private sector has begun to invest substantial amounts of money 
into basic research, normally seen as the domain o f the public sector. Consequently, 
studies into the activities o f the private sector need to be conducted on a regular basis in 
order to provide policy makers with more information for establishing public research 
goals.
Furthermore, as the interaction between the public and private sectors has increased since 
the mid-1980s, more work is needed on quantifying this effect. W hilst this study has 
identified levels o f collaborative work undertaken, along with public domain research, an 
important aspect o f study is the amount o f synergy and duplication between public and 
private sectors in agricultural R&D. This would help to establish the effectiveness of 
collaborative ventures, along with helping to provide a truer indication o f the level of 
return to public agricultural research investment.
2) It is apparent that the methodology for estimating returns to R&D needs to be modified 
further. Thus, whilst existing methods have various conceptual problems when applied 
to agricultural R&D, there seems to be no accepted methodology by which returns to 
research can be assessed. In this respect, the various issues over causality and 
stationarity addressed in Chapter 3 need to be consistently employed in order to create a 
level o f statistical acceptability. Similarly, the credibility attached to academic studies 
is undermined by the wide variation in the marginal internal rate of return to R&D 
dependent on the method o f calculation. Thirtle and Bottomley (1988) found that a 
variance o f around 20% occurred between three standard methods for calculating the 
internal rate of return to UK agricultural R&D. Davies (1981) noted a similar distortion 
caused by the use of discounting procedure. This latter issue could also benefit from an 
improved methodology. In this respect, it is worth noting that growing criticism has 
emerged over the issue o f calculating the internal rate o f return. The most prominent 
writer on this subject, Kula (1992, 1997), has suggested various alternatives for 
discounting public investments. His principal criticism is that previous methods do not 
adequately reflect the effect o f public investments on the future, and he outlines several 
methods to overcome this. These suggestions have implications for the analysis of rates 
of return to agricultural R&D and should be explored further.
185
3) Finally, an interesting field which has only recently been investigated in the UK context 
is the effect o f international spill-overs on the productivity o f research. Recent 
explorations by Thirtle and Townsend (1997) have found significant spill-over effects 
between the UK and other national agricultural research systems. The effect o f these 
spill-overs has led Huffman and Just (1999) to call for increased international co­
ordination in agricultural R&D. Thus, future quantification o f this effect will, with 
reducing public resources for UK agricultural research, become increasingly important to 
policy-makers for the successful administration and conduct o f agricultural R&D in the 
future.
186
List of References
Advisory Board of Research Councils and Advisoiy Council on Applied Research and 
Development. (1983). Improving Research Links Between Higher Education and 
Industry, London: HMSO.
Advisory Board o f Research Councils and University Grants Commission. (1982). Report 
of the Joint Working Party on the Support of University Scientific Research. Cmnd. 
8567. London: HMSO.
Agriculture Committee. (1983). First Report of the Agriculture Committee; 
Organisation and Financing of Agricultural Research and Development. Cmnd. 38-1. 
London: HMSO.
Agricultural and Food Research Council. (Various Years). Annual Report. London: 
HMSO.
Agricultural Research Council. (Various Years). Annual Report. London: HMSO.
Alston, J.M., Norton, G.W. and Pardey, P.G. (1998). Science Under Scarcity.
Wallingford: CAB International.
Alston, J.M. and Pardey, P.G. (1998). Principles for Public Investment in Agricultural and 
Natural Resources Research. In: Persley, C.J. ed. (1998). Investment Strategies for 
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Wallingford: CAB I Publishers, pp. 221-248.
Alston, J.M., Pardey, P.G. and Smith, V.H. (1998). Financing Agricultural Research and 
Development in Rich Countries: W hat’s Happening and Why. Australian Journal o f  
Agricultural Economics, 42, 1, pp. 51-82.
Anderson, J. (1994). Foresight Analysis in Research Funding Agencies. Higher 
Education, 28, pp. 39-57.
Anderson, J. and Moxham, J. (1992). Peer Review: A View from the Inside. Science and 
Technology Policy, February, pp. 7-15.
Antle, J.M. and McGulckan, T. (1993). Technological Innovation, Agricultural 
Productivity and Environmental Quality. In: Carlson, G. A., Zilberman, D. and 
Miranowski, J. A. eds. (1993). Agricultural and Resource Economics. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 175-220.
Archibald, S.O. (1988). Incorporating Externalities into Agricultural Productivity Analysis. 
In: Capalbo, S.M. and Antle, J.M. eds. Agricultural Productivity: Measurement and 
Explanation. Washington: Resources for the Future, pp. 366-393.
Arrow, K.J. (1962). Economic Welfare and the Allocation o f Resources for Invention. In: 
Nelson, R. ed. (1962). The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activities. Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, pp. 609-625.
Arrow, K.J. (1969). The Organisation o f Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the 
Choice o f Market Versus Non-Market Allocation. In: US Joint Economic Committee. The 
Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditure: The PPB System. Vol. 1. Washington: 
US Government Printing Office, pp. 59-73.
187
Arundel, A., Van De Paal, G. and Soete, L. (1995). Innovation Strategies o f Europe’s 
Largest Industrial Firms; Results o f the PACE Survey for Information Sources.
Limburg University, Maastricht; MERIT.
Ball, V.E., Lovell, C.A.K., Nehring, R. and Somwaru, L. (1994). Incorporating 
Undesirable Outputs into Models of Production: An Application to US Agriculture.
Cahiers d ’Economie et Sociologie Rurales. 31, pp. 60-74.
Battese, G.E. and Coelli, T.J. (1993). Frontier Production Functions, Technical 
Efficiency and Panel Data: With Application to Paddy Farmers in India Journal o f  
Productivity Analysis, 3, pp. 153-169.
Babaraham Institute. (1997). Annual Report. Cambridge." BI.
Beck, H. (1987). A Description of Research and Development in the UK Agricultural 
Sector. Reading: University o f Reading. EPARD Discussion Paper Number 2.
Beilby, O.J. (1938). Changing Agricultural Production in England and Wales. Journal 
o f  the Royal Agricultural Society o f  England, 100, 2, pp. 62-73.
Bell, R. (1984). Report of a Study on ADAS. London: MAFF.
Biotechnological and Biological Sciences Research Council. (1994). Corporate Plan 
1994-1999. Swindon: BBSRC.
Biotechnological and Biological Sciences Research Council. (1995). Annual Report. 
Swindon: BBSRC.
Bonnen, J.T. (1987). A Century o f Science in Agriculture: Lessons for Science Policy. In: 
Ruttan, V.W. and Pray, C.E, eds. (1987). Policy for Agricultural Research. Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview Press, pp. 395-409.
Bouchet, F.C., Orden, D. and Norton, G.W. (1989). Sources of Growth in French 
Agriculture. American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 71, 2, pp. 280-293.
Bourke, P. and Butler, L. (1999). The Efficacy o f Different Modes o f Funding 
Research: Perspectives from Australian Data on the Biological Sciences. Research 
Policy, 28, 5, pp. 489-499.
Bredahl, M.E., Bryant, W.K. and Ruttan, V.W. (1980). Behaviour and Productivity 
Implications of Institutional and Project Funding of Research. American Journal o f  
Agricultural Economics, 62, 2, pp. 371-383.
Bressers, H. (1988). Effluent Charges Can Work: The Case o f Dutch W ater Quality 
Policy. In Dietz, F. and Heijman, W. eds. (1988). Environmental Policy in a Market 
Economy. Wageningen: Pudoc, pp. 5-39.
Brus, W. (1972). The Market in a Socialist Economy. London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul.
Burns, J., Mclnerney, J. and Swinbank, A. (1983). The Food Industry: Economies and 
Policies. London: Heinemann and CAB.
188
Burrell, A., Hill, B. and Medland, J. (1990). Agrifacts: A Handbook of UK and EEC 
Agricultural and Food Statistics. London : Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Cabinet Office. (Various Years). Annual Review of Government Research and 
Development. London; HMSO.
Carney, D. (1998). Changing Public and Private Sector Roles in Agricultural Service 
Provision. London: Overseas Development Institute.
Central Statistical Office. (Various Years). Annual Abstract of Statistics. London: 
HMSO.
Chang, H-J. (1996). The Political Economy of Industrial Policy. Basingstoke:
Macmillan Press Limited.
Charles, D, Howells, J. Del Castillo, J., Gomez, P, Samano, A. and Tsipouri, L.J. (1988). 
Innovation Sprint: HEI/Research Centre/Industry Links in Europe. Luxembourg: 
Commission o f European Communities.
Christensen, L.R. (1975). Concepts and Measurement of Agricultural Productivity.
American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 57, 5, pp. 910-15.
Cline, P.L, and Lu, Y-C. (1976). Efficiency Aspects of the Spatial Allocation of Public 
Sector Agricultural Research and Extension in the U.S. Regional Science Perspectives,
6, pp. 1-16.
Cease, R.H. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal o f Lavi> and Economics, ?>, pp. 
1-44.
Cochrane W. (1957). Farm Prices. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Coelli, T., Rao, D.S.P. and Battese, G.E. (1998). An Introduction to Efficiency and 
Productivity Analysis. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Commission o f the European Communities. (1998). Proposals for Council Regulations 
(EC) Concerning the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. COM(1998) 158 
Final.
Cooke, G.W. (1981). Plant Breeding. In: Cooke, G.W. ed. (1981). Agricultural 
Research 1931-1981. Old Woking: Agricultural Research Council, pp. 183-202.
Council for Scientific Policy. (1966). Report o f the Council for Scientific Policy. Cmnd. 
3007. London: HMSO.
Council for Scientific Policy. (1967). Second Report of the Council for Scientific Policy. 
Cmnd. 3420. London: HMSO.
Crosby, E.A. (1987). Private Sector Agricultural Research in the United States. In; Ruttan, 
V.W. and Pray, C.E. eds. (1987). Policy for Agricultural Research. Boulder: Westview 
Press, pp. 395-409.
189
Dalrymple, D.G. (1990). The Excess Burden o f Taxation and Public Agricultural Research. 
In: Echeverria, R.G. ed. (1990). Methods for Diagnosing Research System Constraints 
and Assessing the Impact of Agricultural Research - Vol. 2. The Hague: ISNAR, pp. 
117-137.
Dancey, R.J. (1993). The Evolution of Agricultural Extension in England and Wales: 
Some Reflections. Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 44, 3, pp. 375-393.
Davies, J. (1981), A Comparison of Procedures for Estimating Returns to Research 
Using Production Functions. Australian Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 2 5 ,1, pp. 60- 
72.
Dawson, P.J. and Lingard, J, (1987). Input Markets. In: Harvey, D. ed. (1987). The 
Future of the Agricultural and Food System. Reading: University of Reading. EPARD 
Working Paper Number 1, pp. 83-106.
Demsetz, H. (1969). Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint. Journal o f  Law 
and Economics, 12, pp. 1-22.
Department o f the Civil Service. (1979). Review of the Framework Document Cmnd 
5046. Cmnd. 7499. London: HMSO.
Department o f Economic Affairs. (1965). National Plan. Cmnd. 2765. London: HMSO.
Department of Education and Science. (Various Years). Statistics o f Education. Volume 
5: Finance and Awards. London: HMSO.
Department o f Education and Science. (1991). Higher Education: A New Framework. 
Cmnd. 1541. London: HMSO.
Dobb, M. (1970). Socialist Planning: Some Problems. London: Lawrence Wishart.
Doti, J.L. and Adibi, E. (1998). The Practice of Econometrics with E-Views. 2nd ed.
Irvine, California: Quantitative Micro Software.
Douma, S. and Schreuder, H. (1998). Economic Approaches to Organisations. 2nd ed. 
London: Prentice Hall.
Doyle, C.J., Macgregor, M., Davies, S., Chadwick, L. (1994). A Framework for 
Evaluating R&D Projects within SAC. Report Prepared for the Scottish Agricultural 
College and the Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department, June 1994.
Doyle, C.J. and Ridout, M.S. (1985). The Impact of Scientific Research on UK  
Agricultural Productivity. Research Policy, 14,2, pp. 109-116.
Echeverria, R.G. (1990). Assessing the Impact o f Agricultural Research. In: Echeverria, 
R.G. ed. (1990). Methods for Diagnosing Research System Constraints and Assessing 
the Impact of Agricultural Research. Volume 2. The Hague: ISNAR, pp. 1-31.
Ellis, F.B. (1991). Farmer-Funding of R&D, with particular reference to Cereals.
Journal o f  the Royal Agricultural Society, 151, pp. 148-160,
Emry-Jones, W. (1970). The New A.D.A.S. Agriculture, 11, pp. 397.
190
ENTEC. (1998). Economic Evaluation of the Nitrate Sensitive Areas Scheme. London: 
MAFF.
Ernie, Lord. (1961). English Farming Past and Present. 6th ed. London: Heinemann.
European Commission. (1994). European Economy: Reports and Studies. Brussels, 
Belgium: ECSC-EC-EAEC. Report Number 4.
Evenson, R.E. (1967). The Contribution o f Agricultural Research to Production,
Journal o f  Farm Economics, 49, 5, pp. 1415-25.
Fare, R., Grosskopf, S. and Roos, P. (1997). Malmquist Productivity Indexes: A Survey o f 
Theory and Practice. In: Fare, R., Grosskopf, S. and Rossel, R.R. eds. (1997). Index 
Numbers: Essays in Honour of Sten Malmquist. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 
pp. 89-106.
Fernaiidez-Cronejo, J. and Jans, S. (1995). Quality Adjusted Price and Quantity Indexes
for Pesticides. American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 77, 3, pp. 645-659.
Fite, G. (1980). Mechanisation of Cotton Production Since World W ar Two.
Agricultural History, 54, 1, pp. 190-207.
Food and Agriculture Organisation. (Various Years). Annual Trade Yearbook, Rome: 
Food and Agricultural Organisation for the United Nations.
Foreman, S. (1989). Loaves and Fishes. London: HMSO.
Fox, G. (1985). Is the United States Really Underinvesting in Agricultural Research?
American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 67, 4, pp. 806-812.
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University o f Chicago Press.
Gibbons, M. et al. (1994). The New Production of Knowledge. London: Sage,
Godden, D.P. (1985). Technological Change and Demand for Output at Farm Level in 
UK Agriculture 1950-1980. Unpublished PhD thesis. London School o f Economics.
Goodman, D., Bernado, S. and Wilkinson, J. (1987). From Farming to Biotechnology: A 
Theory of Agro-Industrial Development. Oxford: Blackwell.
Grandstaff, S. and Balagot, B. (1986). Tongonan Geothermal Power Plant Project in Leyte, 
Philippines. In: Dixon, J.A. and Hufschmidt, M.M. eds. (1986). Economic Valuation 
Techniques for the Environment. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, pp. 83-101.
Grigg, D. (1989). English Farming: A Historical Perspective. Oxford: Blackwell.
Griliches, Z. (1960). Measuring Inputs in Agriculture: A Critical Survey. Journal o f  
Farm Economics, 42, 5, pp. 1411-1427.
Griliches, Z. (1964). Research Expenditure, Education and the Aggregate Agricultural 
Production Function. American Economic Review, 54, 6, pp. 961-74.
191
Gujarti, D.N. (1995). Basic Econometrics. 3rd ed. New York: Mcgraw-Hill.
Hadley, D. et. al. (2000). A Stochastic Frontier Approach to Farm level Efficiency, 
Technical Change, Productivity and Risk in UK Dairying. Paper presented at the 
Annual Agricultural Economic Society Conference, University o f  Manchester, 14-17 April.
Hailu, A. and Veeman, T.S. (2000). Alternative Models for Environmentally Sensitive 
Productivity Analysis, paper presented at the International Association o f  Agricultural 
Economists, Humboldty University, Berlin, August 13-19.
Hallam, D. (1990). Agricultural Research Expenditure and Agricultural Productivity.
Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 41, 3, pp. 434-439.
Hanley, N. (1990). The Economics of Nitrate Pollution. European Review o f  
Agricultural Economics, 17 ,2 , pp. 129-151.
Harvey, D. (1987). An Overview of the Agricultural and Food Sector. In: Harvey, D. ed. 
(1987). The Future of the Agricultural and Food System. Reading: University of 
Reading. EPARD Discussion Paper Number 1, pp. 39-56.
Harvey, D.R. (1988). Research Priorities on Agriculture. Journal o f  Agricultural 
Economics, 39, 7, pp. 81-97.
Harvey, D. (1991). The CAP and Research and Development Policy. In: Ritson, C. and 
Harvey, D. eds. (1991). The Common Agricultural Policy and the World Economy. 
Wallingford: CAB International, pp. 185-204.
Henderson, W. (1981). British Agricultural Research and the Agricultural Research 
Council. In: Cooke, G. ed. (1981), Agricultural Research 1931-1981. Old Woking: 
Agricultural Research Council, pp. 3-113.
Herbetz, H. and Muller-Hill, B. (1996). Quality and Efficiency o f Basic Research in 
Molecular Biology: A Bibliometric Analysis of Thirteen Excellent Research Institutes.
Research Policy, 24, pp. 959-979.
HMSO. (1967). Nationalised Industries: A Review of the Economic and Financial 
Objectives. Cmnd. 3437. London: HMSO.
HMTreasui-y. (Various Years). Supply Estimates. London: HMSO.
HM Treasury. (1991). Economic Appraisal in Central Government: A Technical Guide 
for Government Departments. London: HMSO.
Home Grown Cereals Authority. (1996). Annual Report. London: HGCA.
Horticulture Research Institute. (1996). Annual Report 1995/6. Warwick: HRI.
Huffman, W.E. and Evenson, R.E. (1993). Science for Agriculture: A Long Term  
Perspective. Ames: Iowa State University Press.
Huffman, W.E. and Just, R.E. (1999). The Organisation of Agricultural Research in 
Western Developed Countries. Agricultural Economics, 2 1 ,1, pp. 1-18.
192
Hussey, D. (1996). Public Funding of Agricultural R&D: Policy Trends and Implications 
for Research Evaluation. In: Brennan, J.P. and Davis, J.S. eds. (1996). Economic 
Evaluation of Agricultural Research in Australia and New Zealand. Canberra: 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. ACIAR Monograph No. 39, pp. 
68-73.
James, C. and Persley, G.J. (1990). Role o f the Private Sector. In: Persley, G.B. ed. 
(1990). Agricultural Biotechnology: Opportunities for International Development.
Oxford: CAB International, pp. 367-377.
Johansson, P-O. (1987). The Economic Theory and Measurement of Environmental
Benefits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Khatri, Y.J. and Thirtle, C.G. (1996). Supply and Demand Functions for UK  
Agriculture: Biases of Technical Change and the Returns to Public R&D. Journal o f  
Agricultural Economics, 47, 3, pp. 338-354.
King, J.W.B. (1981). Animal Breeding Research in Britain, 1931-1981. In: Cooke, G.W. 
ed. (1981). Agricultural Research 1931-1981, Old Woking: Agricultural Research 
Council, pp. 277-288.
Knutson, M. and Tweeton, L.G. (1979). Toward an Optimal Rate o f Growth in 
Agricultural Production Research and Extension. American Journal o f  Agricultural 
Economics, 6 1 ,1, pp. 70-76.
Kogan, M. and Henkel, M. (1983). Government and Research; The Rothschild 
Experiment in a Government Department. London: Heinemann Educational Books.
Kuhn, T.S. (1970). The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. 2nd ed. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Kula, E. (1992). Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment. London: 
Chapman and Hall.
Kula, E. (1997). Time Discounting and Future Generations: The Harmful Effects of 
an Untrue Economic Theory. Westport: Quorum.
Lancaster, K. (1966). A New Approach to Consumer Theory. Journal o f  Political 
Economy, 74, pp. 132-157
Lau, L.J. (1976). A Characterisation of the Normalised Restricted Profit Function.
Journal o f  Economic Theory, 12, pp. 131-163.
Lee, N. (1989). Performance Measurement. In: . In: Devine, P.J., Lee, N., Jones, R.M. and 
Tyson, W.J. eds. (1989). An Introduction to Industrial Economics. 4th ed. London: 
Unwin Hyman, pp. 301-330.
Lesser, W. and Lee, D.R, (1993). Economics of Agricultural Research and Biotechnology. 
In: Rayner, A.J. and Colman, D. eds. (1993). Current Issues in Agricultural Economics. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp. 178-204.
Lilian, D.M. er a/. (1995), Econometric Views. Version 2.0. Quantitative Micro 
Software.
193
Lindner, R.K. (1993). Privatising the Production of Knowledge: Promise and Pitfalls 
for Agricultural Research and Extension. Australian Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 
37, 3, pp. 205-225.
Linder, R.K and Jarret, F.G. (1978). Supply Shifts and the Size o f Research Benefits.
American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 6 0 ,1, pp. 48-56.
Lord, R.F. and Rogers, S.J. (1969). The Current Organisation o f Research, Education and 
Extension in British Agriculture. In: Ashton, J. and Lord, R.F. eds. (1969). Research, 
Education and Extension in Agriculture. Edinburgh; Oliver and Boyd, pp. 1-41.
Mackintosh, M. et al. (1996). Economics and Changing Economies. London; Open 
University and International Thompson Business Press.
Marks, H.F. (1989). Labour. In: Britton, P.K. ed. (1989). A Hundred Years of British 
Food and Farming: A Statistical Survey. London: Taylor and Francis, pp. 15-17.
Martin, B. et al. (1996). The Relationship Between Publicly Funded Basic Research 
and Economic Performance: A SPRU Review. London: TIM Treasury,
May, R, (1997). The Scientific Wealth o f Nations. Science, 275, 7, pp. 793-796.
McCutcheon, R. (1979). Limits of a Modern World: A Study of the ‘Limits to Growth’ 
Debate. London: Butterworth,
Meadows, D.H, et al. (1974). The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome’s 
Project on the Predicament o f Mankind. London: Pan Books.
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (Various Years). Agriculture in the UK. 
London: MAFF.
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food et a l (Various Years). Agricultural Statistics. 
London: HMSO.
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1961). Productivity Measurement in
Agriculture. Economic Trends, pp. ii-v.
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1968). A Century o f Agricultural Statistics 
1866-1966. London: HMSO.
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1969). Productivity Measurement in 
Agriculture. Economic Trends, pp. xxvi-xxx.
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1996). Research Strategy 1996-2000. 
London: MAFF.
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1997). Veterinary Laboratories Agency to 
Remain an Executive Agency. Press Release, 29th January. Number 31/97.
Ministry o f Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1998a). MAFF Scientific Centre of 
Excellence Consolidated at York. Press Release, 21st May. Number 209/98.
194
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. (1998b). Review of the Organic Aid 
Scheme. MAFF: London.
Mullen, J.D., Lee, K. and Wrigley, S. (1994). Financing Agricultural Research in 
Australia: 1953-1994. In: Brennan, J.P. and Davis, J.S. eds. (1994). Economic 
Evaluation of Agricultural Research in Australia and New Zealand. Canberra: 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. ACIAR Monograph No. 39, pp. 
45-57.
National Audit Office. (1990). Advisory Services to Agriculture. Cmnd. 358. London: 
HMSO.
National Audit Office. (1991). Report by the Controller and Auditor General:
Advisory Services to Agriculture. London: HMSO.
Nelson, R.R. (1959). The Simple Economics o f Basic Scientific Research. Journal o f  
Political Economy, June, pp. 297-306.
Nelson, R.R. (1982). Government and Technical Progress. New York: Pergamon Press.
Norton, G.W. and Davis, J.S. (1981). Evaluating Returns to Agricultural Research: A 
Review. American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 63, 4, pp. 688-699.
Office o f Science and Technology. (1993). Realising Our Potential: A Strategy for 
Science, Engineering and Technology. Cmnd 2250. London: HMSO.
Office o f Science and Technology. (1995a). Technology Foresight: Progress Through 
Partnership. Volume 11. London: HMSO,
Office o f Science and Technology. (1995b). Technology Foresight: Progress Through 
Partnership. Volume 4. London: HMSO.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1992). Technology and the 
Economy: The Key Relationships. Paris: OECD.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1994a). Frascati Manual 
1993: Proposed Standard Practice for Surveys of Research and Experimental 
Development. Paris; OECD,
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. (1994b). Manufacturing 
Performance: A Scoreboard of Indicators. Paris: OECD.
Oskam, A. (1991). Productivity Measurement, Incorporating Environmental Effects of 
Agricultural Production. In. Burger er a/, eds. (1991). Agricultural Economics and 
Policy: International Challenges for the Nineties. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 186-204.
Oury, D. (1965). Allowing for W eather in Crop Production Model Building. Journal o f  
Farm Economics, 47, 2, pp. 270-283.
Pardey, P.G. and Craig, B. (1989). Causal Relationships Between Public Agricultural 
Research Expenditures and Output. American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 7 1 ,1, 
pp. 9-19.
195
Pavitt, K. (1991). What Makes Basic Research Economically Useful? Research Policy, 
20, pp. 109-119.
Peacock, A. (1979). The Economic Analysis of Government. Oxford: Martin Robertson.
Peterson, G.E. (1967). The Discovery and Development of 2,4-D. Agricultural History, 
61, 3, pp. 243-253.
Philip, J.R. (1978). Towards Diversity and Adaptability: An Australian View of  
Governmentally Supported Science. Minerva, 16, pp. 397-415.
Phipps, T.T. (1989). Externalities and the Returns to Agricultural Research: 
Discussion. American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 71, 2, pp. 466-7,
Piesse, J. and Thirtle, C.J. (1997). Sector Level Efficiency and Productivity in Hungary 
Primary, Secondary and Tartiary Industries 1985-1991. Eastern European Economics, 
35, pp. 5-39.
Pigou, A.C. (1932). The Economics of Welfare. 4th ed. London: Macmillan.
Pineiro, M. (1986). The Development of the Private Sector in Agricultural Research; 
Implications for Public Research Institutes. The Hague: ISNAR. ISNAR Proagro Paper 
Number 10.
Pinstrup-Anders on, P. (1982). Agricultural Research and Technology in Economic 
Development. London: Longman.
Pitman, J.I. (1992). Changes in Crop Productivity and Water Quality in the United 
Kingdom. In: Hoggart, K. ed. (1992). Agricultural Change, Environment and 
Economy. London: Mansell Publishing, pp. 89-122.
Pray, C.E. (1996). The Impact of Privatising Agricultural Research in Great Britain.
Food Policy, 21, 3, pp. 305-318.
Pray, C.E. and Echeverria, R.G. (1991). Private Sector Agricultural Research in Less- 
Developed Countries. In: Pardey, P.G., Roseboom, J. and Anderson, J. eds. (1991). 
Agricultural Research Policy: International Quantitative Perspectives. Boulder: 
Westview Press, pp. 342-364.
Pyndyck, R.S. and Rubinfeld, D. L. (1998). Econometric Models and Economic 
Forecasts. 4th ed. Boston: Irwin Mcgraw-Hill.
Radford, J. (1996). New Zealand Agricultural Research. In: Brennan, J.P. and Davis, J.S. 
eds. (1996). Economic Evaluation of Agricultural Research in Australia and New  
Zealand. Canberra: Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research. ACIR 
Monograph 39, pp. 25-27.
Rausser, G.C. and Zilberman, D. (1991). Public Agricultural Research in Agriculture: An 
Alternative Institutional Framework. In: Kaul, T.K. and Sengupta, J.K. eds. (1991). 
Essays in Honour of Karl A. Fox. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, pp. 33-53.
Rayner, A.J. and Lindner, J. (1971). Fertiliser Prices and Quality Change. Journal o f  
Agricultural Economics, 22, 2, pp. 149-162.
196
Rayner, A.J., Whittaker, J.M. and Ingersent, K.A. (1986). Productivity Growth in 
Agriculture Revisited; A Measurement Framework and Some Empirical Results.
Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 37, 2, pp. 127-150.
Read, N. (1989). The ‘Near M arket’ Concept Applied to UK Agricultural Research.
Science and Public Policy, 16, pp. 233-238.
Read, N., Quinn, J. and Webster, A, (1988). Commercialisation as a Policy Mechanism  
in UK Agricultural Research, Development and Extension. Agricultural Systems, 2 6 ,1, 
pp. 77-87.
Reay, Lord. (1908). Report on Agricultural Education in England and Wales. Cmnd. 
4206. London: HMSO.
Reinhard, S., Lovell, C.A.K. and Thijssen, G.J. (1996). Econometric Estimation of 
Technical and Environmental Efficiency: an Application to Dutch Dairy paper
presented at the Georgia Productivity Workshop, Athens GA, USA, 4-6 November.
Riley, R. (1981). Plant Breeding. In: Cooke, G.W. ed. (1981). Agricultural Research 
1931-1981. Old Woking: Agricultural Research Council, pp. 115-137.
Ritson, C. (1977). Agricultural Economics: Principles and Policy. London: Crosby 
Lockwood Staples.
Roling, N. (1986). Flexibility versus Targets on Setting Extension Objectives. In: Jones, 
G.B. ed. (1986). Investing in Rural Extension: Strategies and Goals. London: Elsevier 
Applied Science Publishers, pp. 107-112.
Roseboom, H. and Ruttan, H. (1997). The Transformation of the Dutch Agricultural 
Research System: An Unfinished Agenda?. Paper Presented at EAAE Seminar on 
Innovation for Innovation, Zandvoort, Holland, 21-23 April, 1997.
Rosegger, G. (1980). The Economics of Production and Innovation: An Industrial 
Perspective. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Rosenberg, N. (1990). Why Do Firms Do Basic Research (with their own money).
Research Policy, 19, pp. 165-174.
Rosenberg, N. (1994). Exploring the Black Box: Technology, Economics and History.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothschild, Lord. (1971). The Organisation and Management o f Government R&D. In: 
(1971). A Framework Document for Research and Development. {Green Paper).
Cmnd. 4814. London: HMSO.
Roturier, C. (1998). France. In: Persley, C.J. ed. (1998). Investment Strategies for 
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Wallingford: CABI Publishers, pp. 23-38.
Rowett Research Institute. (Various Years). Annual Report. Aberdeen: RRI.
Russel, E.J. (1966). A History of Agricultural Science in Great Britain. London: 
George Allen and Unwin.
197
Ruttan, V.W. (1982). Agricultural Research Policy. Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press.
Schiminelpfennig, D. and Thirtle, C.G. (1998). The Internationalisation of Agricultural 
Technology: Productivity Convergence, R&D Spillovers and Patents in the European 
Union and United States. Paper Presented at the Agricultural Economics Society 
Conference, Reading, UK, 25-28 March.
Schmitz, A. and Seckler, D. (1970). Mechanised Agriculture and Social Welfare: The 
Case of the Tomato Harvester. American Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 52, 4, pp. 
569-577.
Schuh, G.E. and Tollini, H. (1979). The Costs and Benefits o f Agricultural Research: 
The State of the Arts. Washington: World Bank. World Bank Staff Working Paper 
Number 360.
Scottish Agricultural College. (1998). The Farm Management Handbook. 19th ed. 
Edinburgh: SAC.
Scottish Office. (1994). Forward Look of Government Science, Engineering and 
Technology. Edinburgh: Scottish Office.
Scottish Office Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department. (Various Years). 
Agriculture in Scotland. Edinburgh: HMSO/Scottish Office.
Select Committee on Science and Technology. (1988). Agriculture and Food Research: 
Volume 1. House o f Lords Paper 13-1. London: HMSO.
Spedding, C.R.W. (1984). Agricultural Research Policy. In: Goldsmith, M. ed. (1984). 
UK Science Policy. London: Longman, pp. 2-19.
Stout, D.K. (1981). The Case for Government Support in Agricultural R&D. In Carter, C. 
ed. (1981). Industrial Policy and Innovation. London: NIESR, Heinemann, pp. 116-127.
Stuckey, J. and White, D. (1993). When and When not to Vertically Integrate.
Mckinsey Quarterly, 1, pp. 3-27.
Thirkell, J.D. (1993). Co-operation: A Key to Success. Farm Management, 8, 6, pp. 277- 
285.
Thirtle, C.G. (1986). A Summary of Arguments For and Against the Public Provision 
of Agricultural R&D. Manchester: University o f Manchester. Working Papers in 
Agricultural Economics WP/02.
Thirtle, C. and Bottomley, P. (1988). Is Publicly Funded Agricultural Research 
Excessive? Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 39, 1, pp. 99-111.
Thirtle, C. and Bottomley, P. (1992), Total Factor Productivity in UK Agriculture 1967-
1990. Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 43, 3, pp. 381-400.
198
Thirtle, C.G. and Echeverria. R.G. (1994). Privatisation and the Roles o f Public and 
Private Institutions in Agricultural Research in Sub-Saharan Africa. Food Policy, 19,
1, pp. 31-44.
Thirtle, C.G., Palladino, P. and Piesse, J. (1997), On the Organisation of Agricultural 
Research in the United Kingdom, 1945-1994: A Quantitative Description and 
Appraisal of Recent Reforms. Research Policy, 26, pp. 557-576.
Thirtle, C.G., Piesse, J. and Smith, V.H. (1997). An Economic Approach to the 
Structure, Historical Development and Reform of Agricultural R&D in the UK.
Reading; Centre for Agricultural Strategy. CAS Paper 35.
Thirtle, C.G. and Townsend, R. (1997). Efficiency Differences in European Agriculture: 
Multi-National Productivity Indices and the Returns to R&D with Spillovers. Paper 
Presented at EAAE Seminar on Innovation for Innovation, Zandvoort, Holland, 21-23 April, 
1997.
Thirtle C.G. et a l (1998). The Rise and Fall o f Public Sector Plant Breeding in the
United Kingdom. Agricultural Economics, 19, 1-2, pp. 127-143.
Thorn ley, J.H.M. and Doyle, C.J. (1984). Management of Publicly Funded Agricultural 
Research and Development in the UK: Questions of Autonomy and Accountability,
Agricultural Systems, 15, 4, pp. 195-208.
Tracy, M. (1989). Agriculture in Western Europe 1880-1988. 3rd ed. Hemel 
Hempstead; Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Trend, B. (1963). Committee of Enquiry into the Organisation of Civil Science. Cmnd. 
2171. London; HMSO.
Tyson, W.J. (1989). Government Relations with the Public Industrial Sector. In; Devine, 
P.J., Lee, N., Jones, R.M. and Tyson, W.J. eds. (1989). An Introduction to Industrial 
Economics. 4th ed. London: Unwin Hyman, pp. 398-439.
Ulbricht, T.L.V. (1977). Contract Agricultural Research and its Effect on Management. In: 
Arndt, T.M., Dalrymple, D.G. and Ruttan, V.W. eds. (1977). Resource Allocation and 
Productivity in National and International Agricultural Research. Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, pp. 381-393.
Umali, D.L. (1992). Public and Private Sector Roles in Agricultural Research: Theory 
and Experience. Washington: World Bank. World Bank Discussion Paper 176.
Universities Statistical Record. (Various Years). University Statistics. Volume 3:
Finance. Cheltenham: USR.
Watson, J.A.S. (1946). How the N.A.A.S. Will Work. Agriculture, 53, pp. 217.
Webster, A.J. (1988) Changing Structural Relationships between Public Sector Science 
and Commercial Enterprise. Cambridge: Science Policy Support Group.
Wells, S.J. (1969). International Economics. London: George Allen and Unwin.
199
White, F.C. and Havlicek, J.G. Jr. (1982). Optimal Expenditures for Agricultural 
Research and Extension: Implications o f Underfunding. American Journal o f  
Agricultural Economics, 64, 2, pp. 47-55.
Whittaker, J.M. (1983). An Economic Analysis of Productivity Growth in UK
Agriculture. Unpublished M.Phil. thesis. University o f Nottingham.
Williamson, G.E. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free 
Press.
Wise, W.S. (1984). The Shift of Cost Curves and Agricultural Research Benefits.
Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 3 5 ,1, pp. 21-30.
Wise W. S. (1986). Calculation of Rates of Return in Agricultural Research from  
Production Functions. Journal o f  Agricultural Economics, 37, 2, pp. 151-162.
Zucker, L.G. and Danby, M R. (1995). Virtuous Circles o f Productivity: Star 
Bioscientists and the Institutional Transformation of Industry. Cambridge: NBER. 
Working Paper 5342.
2 0 0
List of 
Appendices
Appendix One
Public Expenditures on Agricultural R&D and 
Extension, 1948 to 1996, in nominal terms
Total Research and A dvisory Expenditures for England and Wales (fOOO's)*
Year AFRC
Research
In-House
Research
1 A dvisory  
Services  
(Capital)
A dvisory
Services
(Current)
Special
Investig.
UGC
Research
Grants
Totals
Research
Expenditure
Totals
Advisory
Expenditure
1948 778 67 224 279 381 1,04! 2.268 503
1949 819 70 236 294 402 1.096 2,387 530
1950 86 i 74 249 309 423 1.153 2.512 558
1951 90S 78 262 325 445 1.214 2.645 587
1952 956 82 276 343 468 1.278 2,784 618
1953 1,006 86 290 36! 493 1,345 2 ,930 651
1954 9 98 98 300 388 673 1,375 3,145 688
1955 1,995 122 240 371 219 1,406 3,741 611
1956 1,212 137 300 398 233 1,436 3,018 698
1957 3,626 170 230 291 263 1,466 5,525 521
1958 3,862 182 241 4 0 6 282 1,496 5,822 647
1959 4 ,196 185 185 387 317 1.527 6 ,224 572
1960 4 ,545 190 185 401 33) 1,557 6,622 586
1961 5,605 185 200 443 342 1,587 7 ,719 643
1962 6,044 216 147 431 359 1.617 8,237 578
1963 6 ,508 214 113 440 361 1,648 8 ,730 553
1964 7 ,387 267 130 434 413 1,678 9,745 564
1965 8 ,165 276 170 443 437 1.678 10,556 .613
1966 9,313 288 160 484 510 1,789 11,900 644
1967 9 ,935 271 521 512 544 1,592 1 2 J 4 2 1,033
1968 11,974 332 543 543 389 2.115 14,810 I.,086
1969 13,350 290 596 596 404 1,465 15,509 1,192
1970 15,023 303 452 648 363 1,342 17,031 1,100
1971 16,930 430 308 1,242 440 1,230 19,030 1,550
1972 19,964 470 466 1,477 470 1,277 22,181 1,943
1973 21 ,918 522 424 1,702 908 1,391 2 4 ,739 2 ,126 ^
1974 23 ,682 666 563 1,346 854 1,682 26 ,884 1,909
1975 29 ,196 1,029 680 1,777 1,358 2,315 33 ,898 2,457
1976 34 ,180 974 825 2 ,047 1,812 2,510 39 ,476 2,872
1977 41 ,8 2 0 1,330 1,101 2,650 2,276 2,798 4 8 ,224 3 ,750
1978 4 5 ,590 1,686 1,376 3,252 2,745 3.194 53,215 4,628
1979 53 ,084 1,609 1,530 3,228 2,646 3,559 60 ,898 4 ,758
1980 59 ,910 2,474 2,521 4 ,500 3 ,502 3,875 69,761 7,021
1981 74 ,870 2,640 2,196 4 ,870 4 ,012 4,701 86 ,223 7,066
1982 8 6 ,250 2 ,589 2,626 5,690 5,340 5.526 99 ,705 8 ,316
1983 9 2 ,160 3,368 2,841 6,338 5,846 9.259 110,633 9,179
1984 9 6 ,780 3,856 3 ,234 6 ,999 9 ,305 8,791 118,732 10,233
1985 98 ,820 4 ,344 3 ,628 7,661 9 ,607 9,553 122,324 11,288
1986 104,490 4,669 4,021 8 ,206 11,126 10,586 130,871 12,227
1987 105,070 5,071 3,657 8,645 11,101 7,716 128,958 12,302
1988 9 9 ,100 3,628 4 ,085 10,042 11,521 9,540 123,789 14.127
1989 107,490 2,185 4,513 11,439 10,598 12,129 132,402 15,952
1990 120,290 2 ,467 4 ,814 12,578 12,831 13,507 149,095 17,392
1991 133,510 2,743 4 ,930 13,820 15,455 15,623 167,331 18,750
1992 130,090 2,648 2 ,345 15,202 1.4,320 16,265 163,323 17,547
1993 140,550 2 ,552 4,151 16,723 14,946 18,153 176,201 20,874
1994 145 ,340 3 ,132 4 ,827 18,395 14,950 20,331 183,753 23,222
1995 145,340 3,132 4,827 18,395 14,950 20.331 183,753 23.222
1996 145.340 3,132 4,827 18,395 14,950 20,331 183,753 23.222
Sources: AFRC
Annual
Reports
Supply
Estimates
(Ministry
Research)
Supply
Estimates
(Advisory
Services)
Supply
Estimates
(Advisory
Services)
Supply
Estimates
(Special
Investig.)
Educat.
Statistics
(Ag.IFor/
Vet.)
* Italics Denote Estimates o f  Expenditures
Total Research and A dvisory Expenditures for Scotland (EOOO's)*
Year Depart.
Research
Research
Institutes
(Capital)
Research
Institutes
(Current)
SO AEFD
Flexible
Funding
A dvisory
SAC
R&D
SAC
UGC
Research
Grants
Totals
Research
Expenditure
Totals
A dvisory
Expenditure
1948 22 103 256 179 126 / 509 179
1949 23 108 270 188 133 2 536 188
1950 24 114 284 198 140 2 564 198
1951 25 120 299 208 147 2 593 208
1952 27 126 315 219 155 2 625 219
1953 28 133 331 231 163 2 658 231
1954 29 80 345 252 172 3 6 29 252
1955 36 107 421 270 188 4 755 270
1956 45 78 553 276 193 5 874 276
1957 41 72 533 326 227 8 881 326
1958 37 79 716 369 275 11 1,119 369
1959 36 95 789 377 302 16 1,237 377
1960 26 260 849 393 310 23 1,467 393
1961 26 293 894 407 3 3 0 32 1,575 407
1962 33 325 1,050 461 389 46 1,843 461
1963 29 154 1,137 507 433 66 1,819 507
1964 18 180 1,270 510 453 94 2 ,015 510
1965 15 164 1,398 537 495 134 2 2 0 7 537
1966 15 109 1,610 570 570 177 2,481 570
1967 16 164 1,757 623 675 217 2,830 623
1968 17 348 1,794 651 735 236 3,129 651
1969 30 308 1,912 660 806 226 3,282 660
1970 37 500 2,165 722 957 355 4 ,015 722
1971 38 667 2 ,667 815 1,125 349 4,846 815
1972 41 942 3,213 880 1,320 372 5,888 880
1973 4 4 1,042 3,733 9 5 0 1,550 428 6 ,797 950
1974 78 970 4,199 1,120 1,890 516 7,653 1,120
1975 84 942 5 ,516 1,220 2 ,210 596 9,348 1,220
1976 88 1,132 5 ,980 1,900 3,500 639 11,340 1,900
1977 111 1,290 8 ,060 2,100 3,900 729 14,089 2,100
1978 133 1,376 8,857 2,500 4 ,100 975 15,440 2 ,500
1979 164 1,545 9 ,995 3 ,0 0 0 4 ,200 1,212 17,116 3,000
1980 197 1,648 11,546 3,600 4 ,9 0 0 1,329 19,620 3,600
1981 260 2,009 14,807 4,500 6,200 1,500 .24,776 4,500
1982 247 2 ,826 16,440 5,600 6,500 1,640 27 ,653 5,600
1983 357 2,833 17,812 6 ,400 6 ,2 0 0 1,709 28.911 6 ,400
1984 401 2 ,820 18,336 6 ,417 6,300 2,027 29 ,884 6,417
1985 858 3 ,300 19,528 6,433 6,400 2,348 3 2 ,434 6,433
1986 914 3 ,450 20 ,182 6,450 6 ,500 3,398 3 4 ,444 6,450
1987 1,130 3 ,054 20 ,476 6,467 6 ,600 4,486 35 ,746 6,467
1988 793 2,843 19,706 6,483 6,700 5,138 35 ,180 6,433
1989 1,191 4,479 2 1 ,820 6,500 6,800 6,087 40 ,377 6,500
1990 1,175 7,685 22 ,587 592 6,500 6 ,800 7,306 4 6 ,145 6 ,500
1991 1,468 7,003 23,011 2 ,2 8 9 6,517 6 ,900 7,708 48 ,379 6 ,517
1992 4,916 4,221 24 ,934 2 ,7 3 6 6 ,533 7,000 9,563 53 ,370 6,533
1993 5 ,470 3,921 25,443 3 ,349 6 ,550 7,100 9 ,420 54,703 6,550
1994 5 ,782 3 ,942 25 ,090 4 ,2 6 0 6,567 7 ,200 9 ,500 55 ,774 6,567
1995 5,782 3,942 25,090 4,260 6,567 7,200 9,500 55,774 6,567
1996 5.782 3,942 25,090 4,260 6,567 7,200 9,500 55,774 6,567
Source: Supply
Estimates
(Depart.
R&D)
Supply
Estimates
(Research
Institutes)
Supply
Estimates
(Research
Institutes)
Agriculture
in
Scotland
Agriculture
in
Scotland
Agriculture
in
Scotland
Educat.
Statistics
(Ag./For/
Vet.)
Italics Denote Estimates o f  Expenditures
Appendix Two
Copy of Questionnaire Used to 
Survey Agri-Food Companies
For Coding Use □ □□□□
PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR
AIMS OF QUESTIONNAIRE
The àim qf Ihe fo llW i#  qüestionh|ire is to cdlle^ irrfdpatidn^ 
with public àgriculturai and food research Institutions, Ultimately we wduiq like to 
a sse ss  ways in whlGh these public institutes can conduct research that Is 
complementary to that of the ppivate sector:
As such the questionnaire is divided into the following four part$>
Part One aims to Identify and categorise the level of agricultural research being 
conducted within the private sector.
Part Two follows by determining the levei of collaborative research being conducted 
with the public sector and assessing your reasons for either collaborating or not 
collaborating.
Part Three aims to obtain an indicatif of how much research in the public domain 
has been exploited by private industry arid by your company in p a r tW
Part Four seeks your opinions on the quality and relevance of research being 
conducted within public agricultural research establishments.
Completing the questionnaire
The questionnaire consists o f twenty three questions which can be answered 
by mereiy ticking an appropriate box or boxes. The term 'agricultural 
research' includes both agricultural and food research.
If  you have any queries regarding the questionnaire please contact:-
Andrew Barnes
Department o f Applied Economics
Scottish Agriculturai College
Auchlncrulve
Ayr KA6 5HW
Ayrshire
Tel: 01292 525128 Fax: 01292 525020
E-Mail: A.Barnes@au.sac.ac.uk
PART ONE
1) Please could you give an indication of the size of your gross annual turnover 
associated with your UK-based activities
< £1 Million Qi £ 6  - 1 0  Million Q i £ 2 1 -4 0  Million Q i
£1 - 5 Million O : £11 -2 0  Million a ,  + £40 Million (spec Ify)......
2) Please Indicate the percentage of this turnover attributable to each sector below
<1 0 % 10-25% 26 - 50% 51 - 75% 7 6 -  100%
Food and Drink 
(processing, production 
etc,)
□ 2 □s □ 4 . ■ □ 5
Agrochemical 
(crop chcmicels, Ind. 
tertifisers, organic 
compounds etc,}
□io □ 1 1 □ 1 2 ■ ■ P l 4 -
Veterinary and Medicine 
(animal pharmaceuticals, 
welfare etc.)
01%) Qai P:5 □ ^ 3 ■..□■24
Plant and Crop 
(horticulture, agronomy,, 
farming systems etc.)
Ü 30 □ai Q z2 P 3 4
Animal Science 
(breeding, nutrition, 
lactation and growth 
etc.)
O 4 0 □ 4 1 P 42 □ 4 3 ; P 44
Agri-Engineering 
(buitdings, computer 
systems etc.)
Q$o Psi □  52 □ 5 3 ' P 5 4
Non-Agriculture □ao □ai . ■ M m □#:' :
3) Please indicate the research areas within which you operate
Plant Sciences Soils and Fertilisersss Arable Crop St3ience@o
Breeding and Genetics Oi Fertilisers Os Weed Control P .9:
Plant Virus □ a Farm Waste Oje Pest Coritrol P10 ■
Plant Cell Structures □ 3 Environmental □? Fungal Control P11
Other 0 4 Other Qo Other □12
Animal Breedingas Animal Diseasero Animal Physio 'm 0 .
Behaviour □ l 3 Infectious P u Metatioiisrn/Digesstlon P21
Fertility □ 1 4 Genetic Pis Feed Behaviour P22
Genetics □15 Nutritional P i* Other : P23
Other □  ifl Other P 20
Agri-Engineeringw Food Science» Dairy Productifm w
Vehicles □24 Production P 28 Breeding P32 ..
Buildings □25 Safety P » Feeding Systems P 3 3  '
Computing □ 2e Processing □ » Grassland Management PM .
Other □ 27 Other P3i Other ■ ■ ■ ■ .Pas..
Grassiand/Rumînantsw O lh e r(sp à G ify ) .......... ........... .
Cell biology Qæ ..... ...........................................
Nutrition Üa?         ......a*
Other Qm
4a) Please tick the box which best identifies current R&D expenditure as a 
percentage of gross turnover
0 % 4-6% Da 10-14% : m
1-3% □z 7-9% Ü4 +16% (spe city)....,.. .....a
4b) Please indicate whether this represents a greater, similar or lower percentage 
than ten years ago
Greater percentage than 1 0  years ago O t
Around the sam e percentage a s  10 years ago 
 Lower percentage than 10 years ago 9?
5a) Given the definitions outlined below please indicate the percentage of total 
research expenditure allocated to each category within your company
Basic is defined here as 'Acquiring new knowledge with no particular application in
Applied strategic is defined here a s ’Research in a subject area which has riot yet
advanced to a stage of application that can be clearly specified'.
Applied Specific is defined here a s  'Research with the specific aim of producing an
exploitable outcome'.
Development is defined a s  'Using existing knowledge in creating new products and
0% 1-10% 11-25% 26-50<% 5 1 - m 1  1 6 - 1 0 ^
Basic Qi □z ■ □a Q 4 □ 5 - . . : .a . ■
Applied Strategic O i □ 2 □a 0.4. □s ■ .- Q t
Applied Specific Oi □ 2 O 3 O 4 Os Q i
Development Qi □ 2 □ a  ■ O 4 . 0 5  ■ .  Oé ■ .
5b) Please indicate whether these represent greater, similar or lower percentages 
than ten years ago in respect of basic, applied and development work
Applied Applied Development
Strategic Specific
Greater than 10 years ago Ov Qio Ois
The sam e a s  1(P years ago Oz On
Lower than 10 years ago Qa Oiz ® 7
PART TWO
6) Have you been involved with public institutions conducting agricultural research in 
the past three years either through collaboration and/or sponsorship?
Sponsorship No Os go to question 15
Collaboration Ü 2
7) Please indicate the percentage of your company's research expenditure invested 
in external research to the public sector either within or outside the UK
0% □ 1 11-25% □a 51-75% □s
1-10% Oz 26-50% □ 4 76-100% □e
8) Have you funded research within a UK institution conducting public agricultural 
research within the last three years?
Yes Oi go to question 9 No Oz go to question 10
9) Please indicate the UK public agricultural research institutions you have 
conducted research with in the last three years
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Institute #
(Institute of Arable Crops Researvh, Institute of Animd Health, John Innes Centre, 
Bebraham Research Institute, Grassland and Bnvkonmental f^search in^itdte, 
Roslin Research Institute, Silsoe Research Institute)
Scottish Agricultural and Biological Research Institute 0 2
(Hannah Dairy Research Institute, Macaulay Land Use Research institute,
Moredun Researdi Institute, Rowett Research Institute, Scottish Crop Research 
Institute)
Higher Education Institution □
Agricultural Development and Advisory Service Institute O 4
(Central Science Laboratory, Central Veterinary Laboratory)
National Environment Research Institute Os
(Institute of Hydrology, Institute of Freshwater Ecology, Institute of Terrestrial 
Ecology, Institute of Virology and Environmental Microbiology)
Other{specify)................... ....... .............................. .............. ................... .
10) Have you conducted joint agricultural research with public agencies outside the 
UK in the last three years?
Yes Oi go to question 11 No Ozgo to question 13
11) Please indicate which public agencies you have conducted research with in the 
last three years and if possible under which programme
European Commissio a USOeDârtrnent of Aahculture
Framework Programnr\e ■ Qi Federal Re search Agencies
EUREKA ::
Other {specify). ........
□z s ta te  Agricultural Experimental 
l f ) r . . . . . . » * * . ..
Stations a#
a w
Country{speMy).v......
Programrtie(speeify)..
12) Please rank in importance the reasons why you have conducted agricultural 
research with public bodies outside the UK
Very Important
vt
Slightly Not
Scale of UK research too sm;all
111 ipwi idf
■ ' m
11
□ 2  ■ ■
II i i p u i  iO l  l i  
□>
iiiipui lai IV
Q ,
No relevant expertise in the IJK Qz Q.
Organisational reasons QT ■ Qz . '■ . a .
UK Grant-awards not adequsite
UK Linkage schem es not adesquate ill -  04 ■
Other (Please s p e c i f y ) . ...
13) Please state the nature of your involvement with public agricultural research 
institutions both within and outside the UK
Contract Work Collaborative Work
Analytical Services 
Biochemistry □ 1
■ ■ ...
Sponsorship
New Product Development Q sm
Molecular Biology  ^ Qz .. Product Development Qzi
Data Processing « 3 .■ Process Development ■' -
Spectrometry :Q4 ■ Collaboration
Other ■ Qs Government LINK l i é
Licensing . Qa
PI,
Government ROPA
rs^iing/1 ria!^
Consultancy
W7
□a
ddoiaw woiiaporauon wiin
Industry Scheme : Qzs
Launch Marketing ■ ■ □« CASE Studentship - Dza
Fieldwork □ 1 0 Teaching Company Scheme Qzr
Other □ 1 1 Other Qze
UK Information Services □ 3 0
European Informatioin Services ■■ Qst
Non-European Inforrnation Servie es ■ 0132
14) Please rank in importance your reasons for involvement with public agricultural 
research institutions
Similarity in research
Very
Important
Important Slightly
Important
Not
Important
areas
Less expensive than using
□ 2 □ 3 □ 4
internal resources 
Greater access to public
□ i □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
research 
Inadequate scale of internal
□ 2 □ 3 □ . 4
resources 
Expertise required in a
□ 2 □ 3 □ 4
specific area 
To raise company's
□ i □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
research profile □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
Other (Please specify)...........
Piease go to question 16
15) Please rank in importance your reasons for no involvement with public 
agricultural research institutions
Company has full facilities
Very
Important
Important Slightly
Important
Not
Important
in-house 
Public programmes
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
are too broad 
Public research has no
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
concept of risk 
Management of
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
copyright/secrecy 
No overlap of interest in
□ 2 □ 3 □ 4
research areas 
Low awareness of public
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
programmes 
No approach by public
□ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
Institutions 
No relevant institution
□ 1 □ z □ 3 □ : 4
geographically close □ 1 □ 2 □ 3 □  4
Other (Please specify).........
6
PART THREE
16) Have you made use of the results of agricultural research coming from the UK 
public sector in the past three years?
Yes Qi go to question 17 No Qz go to question 19
17) Have you concluded a patent with a UK public agricultural research institution?
Yes Ü 1 go to question 18 No Oz go to question 19
18a) Please indicate with which public agricultural research institutions you have 
concluded patent agreements
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Institute Qi
(tmtitute of Arable Crops Research, Institute of Animat Health, John Innes Centre, 
Babraham Research institute, Grassland and Environmental Research Institute, 
Rostin Research Institute, Silsoe Research Institute)
Scottish Agricultural and Biological Research Institute Qz
(Hannah Dairy Research Institute, Macaulay Land Use Research Institute,
Moredun Research Institute, Rowett Research Institute, Scottish Crop Research 
Institute)
Higher Education Institution Qa
Agricultural Development and Advisory Service Institute 
(Central Science Lat)oratory, Central Veterinary Laboratory)
National Environment Research Institute Qs
(Institute of Hydrology, Institute of Freshwater Ecology, Institute of Terrestrial 
Ecology, Institute of Virology and Environmental Microbiology)
Other(Please specify).
18b) Please indicate which areas of research the patent agreements cover
Plant Science Soils and Fertilisers □ 2 Arable Crop Science O 3
Animal Breeding Q a Animal D isease □ 5 Animal Nutrition □e
Agri-Engineering □ t Food Science □a Dairy Production □ 9
Grassland/Ruminants Qio Other(speclfy)...........
19) Is there an area o f public agricultural research that has proved useful to your 
company in the last three years?
Yes Qi go to question 20 No Qa go to question 21
20a) Please indicate which areas of public research have been of use to you
Plant Science Ui Soils and Fertilisers □ 2  Arable Grop Science Qa
Animal Breeding Qa Animai Disease □s Animal Nijtrition Qe
Agn*Engineering □? Food Science Qa Dairy Production Qs
Grassland/Rum inants Qio Other(specify),,.........
20b) Please indicate in terms of new product development and/or increases in 
technical knowledge how useful you found the research
Very useful 
Useful □ z
Slightly Useful 
Not Useful à
PART FOUR
21) Please Indicate how you perceive the quality of research carried out in the 
public agricultural research sector of the UK
International
Standing
High
National
Standing
Average 
National 
1 Standing
Low
National
Standing
Higher Education
Institution , : :Pi : ■ ■ □ 2 □ a □ 4
oivkqw H ivivyy ct* iv
Biological Sciences
Research Council 
Scottish Agncultural
□ 1  ■ □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
and Biological 
Research Institute Qi □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
M^rtCutiursii ueveiopmeni
and Advisory Servie □ 2 □ a □ 4  .
iNaiiPnai cnvironrnpni
Research Council □ 2 □ 3 □ 4
.. ■ Qi . . Ü2 □ 3 ■ 0 4
22) Please indicate how you perceive the relevance of agricultural research in the 
public sector in the UK compared to that coming from the private sector
Very Slightly No
Relevant Relevant Relevant Relevance
Higher Education
Institution 
Biotechnology and
. Q i  . . O z Ü 3 ■ 0 4
Biological Sciences
Research Council 
Scottish Agricultural
□ 1  : . : ■. a  ■ □ 3 O 4
and Biological 
Research Institute □ 1  ■ □ . Ü 3 □ 4  ■
Agricultural Development
and Advisory Service □ 1 ◦ z Ü 3 P i
National Environment
Research Council □ 1 □ z Ü 3 □ 4
□ 1 □ 2 □  3 □ 4
23) Given the level o f public expenditure on agricultural research in 1994-5 outlined 
below indicate whether you feel that this expenditure was too high, about right, or 
too low for each of the sectors indicated.
Government Expenditure on Agricultural Research in 1994-5 was;- 
£200 Miliion Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council 
£80 Million Educational Sector
£18 Miiiion Agricultural Development and Advisory Service 
£35 Million Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries Department
Too
High
About
Right
Too
Low
Biotechnology and 
Biological Sciences 
Research Council □z □ 3
Educational Sector □z ■ ■ O 3
Agricultural Development 
and Advisory Service Qz □a
Scottish Office of Agriculture 
and Fisheries
□z □ 3  , ■
Piease feel free to include any other comments that you wish to m akebn any of the 
issues raised
Thank you for your co-operation. All the Information will be treated In the 
strictest confidence.
Please return by 29/11/96 In the pre paid envelope provided
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Appendix Three
Calculation of Survey Data
A3.0. Calculation of Research Expenditure Within the Private Sector
The survey was divided into large and ‘non-large’ enterprises. Non-large enterprises were 
asked to give an indication o f their research expenditure within a number o f ranges. 
However, a problem arose with the categories, in that if the centre o f each range were taken 
as indicative o f the firm’s R&D spend it could either overstate or understate expenditure in 
certain areas. Therefore for each sector an upper, mid and lower limit were calculated using 
the survey data.
Appendix Table 3.1. Sample Private Research Expenditure for the UK Agricultural Industry
Lower Limit Mid-Point Upper Limit
Agrochemicals
Non-large, £M 3.1 7.4 15.0
R&D Intensity (%) 2.5 3.5 4.4
Large, £M 85.8 85.8 85.8
R&D Intensity (%) 7.7 7.7 7.7
Total, £M 88.9 93.2 100.8
R&D Intensity (%) 6.9 7.0 7.2
Veterinai*y and Medicine
Non-large, £M 4.0 8.1 15.0
R&D Intensity (%) 6.3 7.2 8.1
Large, £M 12.2 12.2 12.2
R&D Intensity (%) 12.2 12.2 12.2
Total, £M 16.2 20.3 27.2
R&D Intensity (%) 9.5 9.6 9.9
Plant and Crops
Non-large, £M 6.4 12.5 22.1
R&D Intensity (%) 4.0 5.3 6.6
Large, £M 27.5 27.5 27.5
R&D Intensity (%) 8.1 8.1 8.1
Total, £M 33.9 40.0 49.6
R&D Intensity (%) 6.8 7.0 7.4
Animal Science
Non-large, £M 3.7 8.3 15.9
R&D Intensity (%) 2.3 3.2 4.1
Large, £M 11.8 11.8 11.8
R&D Intensity (%) 1.9 1.9 1.9
Total, £M 15.5 20.1 27.6
R&D Intensity (%) 2.0 2.3 3.1
Agri-Engineering
Non-large, £M 1.9 3.3 5.7
R&D Intensity (%) 3.2 3.9 4.6
Large, £M 12.4 12.4 12.4
R&D Intensity (%) 2.0 2.0 2.0
Total, £M 14.4 15.8 18.2
R&D Intensity (%) 2.1 2.2 2.4
Total Expenditure, £M 168.9 189.4 223.4
R&D Intensity (%) 5.0 5.1 5.5
Appendix Table 3.1 shows the results from the following procedure. For the survey the 
number o f respondents had to be increased to cover the selected sample size. This was 
achieved by using simple ratios. For example, within the agri-engineering sector 55 firms (3 
large firms, 52 non-large firms) were identified within the survey. However, only 1 large 
firm and 15 non-large firms replied. Thus, for the large firm responding, expenditure was 
given as around £4.1 million on agricultural R&D. This was multiplied by 3 (3/1) to give 
£12.4 million. Similarly, the 15 non-large respondents gave expenditure at just under £1 
million at the mid-point. This was multiplied by 3.47 (52/15) to give the value o f £3.3 
million for R&D expenditure within the sample.
A3.1, Re-weighting Procedure
The previous figures only represent a proportion o f the total number o f firms undertaking 
research in agriculture. Therefore, in order to gain a clearer indication o f actual research 
spend for the UK agricultural industry the figures had to be re-weighted. As the numbers of 
firms operating within the UK by sector could not be ascertained, the only alternative was to 
use Census data from the Annual Abstract o f Statistics (CSO, 1998). Appendix Table 3.3 
below gives the turnover data by sector.
Appendix Table 3.3. Sector Turnovers for UK Agricultural Industry in 1996, £ million
Sector CSO Category Industry Turnover
Agrochemicals Fertilisers/Nitrogen 
Pesticides/Agrochemicals
2 ,5 8 f
Veterinary and Medicine Veterinary and Medicine 317^^
Plant and Crops Horticulture
Seeds
2,424“
Animal Science Feeds fo r  Farm Animals 3,116“
Agri-engineering Agricultural Tractors 
Other Agricultural and 
Forestry Equipment
l ,3 8 f
‘ Annual Abstract Census o f  Production 
" Agricultural Inputs (Agricultural Census o f Production)
The large firms represented in the sample were assumed to be responsible for total large 
firm spend. Thus, removing the turnover o f the large firms surveyed from the sectoral
figures, presented above, gave an indication o f the remaining non-large enterprises’ 
turnover. Furthermore, removing known non-large turnovers at the lower, mid and upper 
limits would reveal the level o f turnover o f firms not surveyed. This procedure and 
subsequent data are provided in Appendix Table 3.4.
Appendix Table 3.4. Level o f Industry Turnover by Area, £ million
Sector Industry
Turnover
LESS: Large 
Firm 
Turnover
Lower
LESS: Non-Large 
Firm Expenditure
Mid-Point Upper
Agrochemicals 2,581 1,461 1,338 1,246 1,119
Veterinaiy and 
Medicine
317 217 154 104 32
Plant and Crops 2,424 2,084 1,926 1,851 1,748
Animal Science 3,116 2,512 2,349 2,253 2,125
Agri-Engineering 1,381 759 698 672 635
Assuming this unknown portion o f firms behaved in the same way as the sampled non-large 
firms, then it could be assumed that multiplying known non-large firm R&D intensities by 
the remaining turnover gives an indication o f total research spend. Multiplying the figures 
in the last three columns o f Appendix Table 3.4. by their appropriate non-large firm R&D 
intensity (from Appendix Table 3.1) gives an estimate of R&D spend by sector. These 
results are presented in Appendix Table 3.5 along with totals for non-large firms, large firms 
and each sector’s total spend.
Appendix Table 3.5. Potential Level of Private Expenditure for UK Agricultural Industry,
£ million
Lower Limit M id-Point Upper Limit
Agrochemicals Non-large Estimated 33.43 43.61 49.24
Non-large Sample 3.12 7.43 14.96
Total Non-large 36.55 51.04 64.2
Large 85.80 85.80 85.80
Total 122.30 136.84 150.0
Veterinary and Medicine Non-large Estimated 9.70 7.49 2.59
Non-large Sample 3.97 8.13 15.01
Total Non-large 13.67 15.62 17.6
Large 12.2 12.2 12.2
Total 25.87 27.82 29.80
Plant and Crops Non-large Estimated 77.04 98.10 115.37
Non-large Sample 6.37 12.46 22.08
Total Non-large 83.41 110.56 137.45
Large 27.54 27.54 27.54
Total 110.95 138.10 164.99
Animal Science Non-large Estimated 54.03 72.10 87.13
Non-large Sample 3.73 8.3 15.85
Total Non-large 57.76 80.4 102.98
Large 11.75 11.75 11.75
Total 69.51 92.15 114.73
Agri-Engineering Non-large Estimated 22.34 26.21 29.21
Non-large Sample 1.93 3.34 5.72
Total Non-large 24.27 29.55 34.93
Large 12.44 12.44 12.44
Total 36.71 41.99 47.37
A3.2. Research By Type
As the comparison o f research by type was confined to percentage differences, it was not 
necessary to re-weight or transform data. Instead, only the mid-points were used for the 
non-large firms, as they remained relatively constant over their respective ranges. It was 
found that estimates for basic and strategic work individually were purely subjective and so 
were collated together to provide a more accurate picture o f the sector’s activity (see 
Appendix Table 3.6).
Appendix Table 3.6. Private Research Funding by Area, £ million
Sector Basic and Strategic 
Work
Applied Specific Development
Non-large 0.94 1.89 4.50
Large 4.35 14.86 75.17
Agrochemical 5.29 16.46 79.67
Percentage Spread 5.22 16.23 78.55
Non-large 1.19 2.22 4.42
Large 4.77 83.64 4.86
Veterinary and Medicine 5.96 85.86 9.28
Percentage Spread 5.90 84.93 9.18
Non-large 0.26 4.64 7.19
Large 1.36 3.32 24.28
Plant & Crop 1.62 7.96 31.47
Percentage Spread 3.95 19.39 76.66
Non-large 1.22 2.87 4.01
Large 0.18 3.82 8.09
Animal Science 1.40 6.69 12.1
Percentage Spread 6.93 33.14 59.93
Non-large 0.06 0.35 2.67
Large 0.64 0.62 10.95
Agri-Engineering 0.7 0.97 13.62
Percentage Spread 4.40 6.09 85.55
Non-large 3.67 11.98 22.80
Large 11.30 106.26 123.35
Total 14.97 118.24 146.15
Percentage Spread 5.36 42.33 52.32
A3.3. Research By Priority Area
Firms were asked to give indications o f research spend by priority area. For the non-large 
firms this was based on the average percentage o f turnover for the sample firms and the 
recorded total turnover o f the total sector. As such the expenditures rest on considerable 
inference.
A g r o ­
c h e m i c a l s
Non-large (mid-Point)
V e t  &  P l a n t s  a n d  A n i m a l  
M e d  C r o p s  S c i e n c e
A g r i -
E n g i n .
Large Totals
Breeding and Genetics 0.12 0.40 6.89 0.01 9.97 17.39
Plant Virus 0.10 0.20 1.71 1.81 3.82
Plant Cell Work 0.01 8.16 8.17
Others 0.05 0.05
Plant Science 29.43
Fertilisers 4.41 0.50 0.05 0.18 5.14
Farm Waste 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.27 0.42
Environmental 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.06 0.18 0.46
Other 0.05 0.05
Soils and Fertilisers 6.07
Weed Control 1.28 0.13 0.37 22.21 23.99
Pest Control 1.50 0.83 0.43 0.01 22.21 24.98
Fungal Control 1.34 0.84 0.43 0.01 22.21 24.83
Other 0.05 0.01 0.31 21.12 21.49
Arable Crop Science 95.29
Behaviour 0.37 0.90 0.10 0.38 1.75
Fertility 0.46 0.52 0.98
Genetics 0.33 0.57 0.33 1.23
Other 0.01 0.01
Animal Breeding 3.97
Infectious 0.05 2.88 0.06 8.46 11.45
Genetic 0.45 0.03 8.04 8.52
Nutritional 0.59 0.16 0.93 8.17 9.85
Other 0.07 0.03 0.10
Animal Disease 29.89
Metabolism & Digestion 1.08 0.11 0.05 2.13 36.39 39.76
Feed Behaviour 0.01 0.05 0.52 2.25 2.83
Other 0.01 0.05 1.91 1.97
Animal Physiology 44.56
Breeding 0.13 0.05 0.22 0.40
Feeding Systems 0.05 0.02 0.44 0.41 0.13 15.84 16.89
Grassland Management 0.01 0.14 0.01 1.91 2.07
Other 0.04 0.01 0.05
Dairy Production 19.40
Cell Biology 0.13 15.84 15.97
Nutrition 0.82 0.10 0.06 1.10 0.01 2.09
Other 0.00
Grassland & Ruminant 18.06
A g r o ­
c h e m i c a l s
Non-large (mid-Point)
V e t  &  P l a n t s  a n d  A n i m a l  
M e d  C r o p s  S c i e n c e
A g r i -
E n g i n .
Large Totals
Vehicles 0.40 2.47 12.00 14.87
Buildings 0.10 0.05 0.12 0.27
Computing 0.10 0.05 0.19 0.34
Other 0.32 0.32
Agri-Engineering 15.80
A3.4. Re-Weighted Priorities
Appendix Table 3.7 only shows actual expenditures from the survey respondents. 
Therefore, in order to derive a picture o f the agricultural industry, the figures had to be re­
weighted. Using the mid-points o f research expenditure to derive expenditure by priority 
and multiplying each sector by the appropriate weighting gave a more accurate depiction of 
research in the agricultural industry. These data are presented in Appendix Table 3.8.
Non-large (mid-Point) Large Totals
A g r o ­
c h e m i c a l s .
V e t e r i n a r y  
&  M e d i c i n e
P l a n t s  a n d  
C r o p s
A n i m a l
S c i e n c e
A g r i -
E n g i n .
Breeding and Genetics 
Plant Virus 
Plant Cell Work 
Others
0 . 8 2
0 . 6 9
0 . 0 7
0.77
0.38
61.14
15.17
0.44
0.10 9.97
1.81
8.16
72.80
18.05
8.23
0.44
Plant Science 99.52
Fertilisers 30.29 4.44 0.48 0.18 35.39
Farm Waste 0.14 1.06 0.05 0.27 1.52
Environmental 0.62 1.06 0.05 0.53 0.18 2.44
Other 0.34 0.34
Soils and Fertilisers 39.70
Weed Control 8.79 0.25 3.28 22.21 34.54
Pest Control 10.30 1.59 3.82 0.10 22.21 38.02
Fungal Control 9.21 1.61 3.82 0.05 22.21 36.89
Other 0.34 0.02 2.75 21.12 24.23
Arable Crop Science 133.68
Behaviour 0.71 8.72 0.88 0.38 10.69
Fertility 0.88 5.04 5.92
Genetics 0.63 5.52 0.33 6.49
Other 0.04 0.04
Animal Breeding 23.14
Infectious 0.31 5.53 0.58 8.46 14.88
Genetic 0.86 0.29 8.04 9.20
Nutritional 4.05 0.31 9.01 8.17 21.54
Other 0.13 0.27 0.40
Animal Disease 46.02
Metabolism & Digestion 7.42 0.21 0.44 20.63 36.39 65.10
Feed Behaviour 0.07 0.44 5.04 2.25 7.80
Other 0.02 0.48 1.91 2.41
Animal Physiology 75.31
Breeding 0.25 0.44 2.13 2.82
Feeding Systems 0.34 0.04 3.90 3.97 1.15 15.84 25.25
Grassland Management 0.07 1.36 0.04 1.91 3.38
Other 0.39 0.04 0.43
Dairy Production 31.88
Cell Biology 1.26 15.84 17.10
Nutrition 5.63 0.19 0.53 10.66 0.04 17.06
Other
Grassland & Ruminant 34.16
Appendix Table 3.8. (Continued). Re-weighted Priority Spend in Related Areas, £ million
_________ Non-large (mid-Point)__________ Large Totals
A g r o -  V e t  &  P l a n t s  a n d  A n i m a l  A g r i -  
_____________________________ c h e m i c a l s  M e d  C r o p s  S c i e n c e  E n g i n . ___________________________
Vehicles
Buildings
Computing
Other
0.77
0.19
0.19 0.48
21.85
0.44
1.68
2.83
12.00
0.12
34.62
0.75
2.36
2.83
Agri-Engineering 40.11
A3.5. Level o f Expenditure on Collaboration
Levels o f expenditure on collaboration were calculated by total lower, mid and upper limits 
indicated by companies (see questionnaire, Q7). This was expressed as a percentage o f the 
total R&D expenditure calculated for each sector (Appendix Table 3.3). These results are 
presented in Appendix Table 3.9.
Appendix Table 3.9. Actual Levels o f Collaboration, £ million and percent
Lower Limit M id-Point Limit Upper Limit
R&D,
£M
Collaborative 
Research 
Spend, f  M
% R& D,
£M
Collaborative 
Research 
Spend, £M
% R & D , £M Collaborative 
Research Spend, 
£M
%
Agrochemicals 88.9 6.8 7 . 6 93.2 8.0 8 . 6 100.8 10.7 1 0 . 6
Veterinary & 
Medicine
16.2 5.2 3 2 . 1 20.3 6.0 2 9 . 6 27.2 7.9 2 9 . 0
Plant & Crops 33.9 2.0 5 . 9 40 2.9 7 . 3 49.6 5.1 1 0 . 3
Animal Science 15.5 3.8 2 4 . 5 20.1 5.1 2 5 . 4 27.6 7.8 2 8 . 3
Agri-
Engineering
14.4 1.1 7 . 6 15.8 1.1 7 . 0 18.2 1.2 6 . 6
T o ta ls 168.9 18.9 1 1 . 2 189.4 23.1 1 2 . 2 223.4 32.7 1 4 . 6
Appendix Four
Data Tables Used Within 
Regression Analysis
Key to Tables
N am e D escription
BASIC Total Public E xpenditures on Basic A gricultural Research, £M  
in 1970 prices
APPLIED Total Public  Expenditures on A pplied  R esearch and 
D evelopm ent, £M  in  1970 prices
AD V ICE Total Public E xpenditures on A gricultural E xtension, £M  in 
1970 prices
PR IV A TE Total Private Expenditures on A gricultural R esearch and 
D evelopm ent, £M  in 1970 prices
LESP Lespeyres Index o f  Total Factor Productivity , 1970 = 100
EX T Index o f  Total Factor Productivity, w ith  R em oval o f  
Externalities, 1970=100
ED AL Index o f  Educational Levels W ithin  the A gricultural 
Population, 1970=100
W EA T H ER Index o f  P recipitation and Tem perature
, ' Year ■ i B asic
£m
Applied
£m
A dvice
£m
Private
£m
LESP
1970=100
EXT
1970=100
EDAL
1970= 100
W eather
Index
1948 ■ 3,8 1,7 1,6 2 ,9 73 72 66 50
1949 3.7 1.7 ' 1,5 2 ,9 76 71 66 50
' 1950 ' ' 3,5 1,6 1,5 3 .9 73 65 66 50
• 1951 3,4 1.6 1,4 4 .6 71 70 66 50
,■ . , ,1 9 5 2 / ' 3 ,4 1.5 1,4 5,2 73 71 66 50
‘ 1953 3,0 1.4 1,3 5 .2 75 72 69 53
■ 1954 2 ,9 1,3 1,3 6,4 77 72 66 65
. 1955 ' 3 ,7 2 ,0 1,2 7.3 72 71 63 50
1956 3.1 1,6 1,2 7 ,0 76 70 60 57
1957 5.1 3,3 1,2 8,6 71 70 55 60
, ;  1958 5.5 3,7 1,4 8,8 71 71 62 56
1959 . 5.9 4,1 1,3 9,5 69 68 63 56
I960  , ; 1 6,5 4,5 1,4 9,9 69 68 68 58
1961 7,1 5,1 1.4 9.7 72 71 67 55
1962 7 ,6 5,6 1.4 10,6 72 71 75 57
:;■ 1963 , 7,8 5,8 1.4 11,1 73 72 73 41
1964 : 8,4 6,4 1.4 12.0 73 70 79 59
1965 8,8 6,8 1,5 12.0 86 83 81 63
; . ; 1966 '■ 9,7 7,5 1,5 12.4 87 84 70 65
1967 9,4 7 .6 1.9 14,3 93 85 85 64
1968 , , 11,1 8.7 2.0 18,0 96 92 103 57
1969, 11.0 9.4 2,1 2 1 ,6 94 93 94 54
1970 ' 11.1 9 .6 1,8 25,4 100 100 100 61
. 1971 11,4 10,3 2 ,2 27,9 110 105 120 49
1972 ■ 11,9 10,8 2,3 29 .9 120 114 117 53
, 1973 . 11,0 10,1 2.1 36,9 125 117 107 50
1974 ' ■ 11,5 10,7 2.0 46,4 117 110 113 61
, 1975 . 15,3 12.9 2 ,4 52.2 117 114 103 48
, 1976 13.3 14.5 2 ,9 67.9 118 113 114 53
1977 , 15,8 16,6 3,3 70,0 120 114 144 59
1978 ■ 16,8 17,7 3,9 63 ,9 121 119 148 59
, 1979 .■ 19,2 18,8 4,0 62.8 119 117 171 66
; : ' 1980 •• 2 0 .4 20,5 5,2 58,1 121 118 197 64
• 1981 24.5 24,3 5,4 54,0 125 122 219 65
1982 26 .7 26,5 6,3 52,0 133 129 231 65
'■ 1983 28.5 27,4 6,8 49 ,4 129 126 241 55
1,984 29 ,2 28 ,4 7,2 43 ,0 139 129 232 60
1985 2 9 ,6 28.8 7,4 62,1 130 126 214 63
1986 35,2 32.1 8.3 89,4 124 120 214 69
; 1987 36,6 32.8 8.4 109.0 126 122 219 57
1988 35,9 30.1 9.1 132.7 127 122 234 63
1989 40,5 31.7 9 .7 130.4 132 126 223 55
1990 ,i 48 ,0 35.3 10.3 127,0 135 126 231 66
1991 ' 55,1 38 .9 10.9 118,7 135 127 231 49
1992 58,4 39,3 10,3 114,8 142 132 268 50
' 1993 62,9 41 ,6 11,6 118.8 153 139 293 50
1994 64.1 42.5 12,4 117,8 158 142 3 2 4 50
'■ 1995 ,: . 63.7 41.6 12,4 114,5 171 154 323 50
1996 ' 65.6 42,4 13,2 113,9 173 157 323 50
Appendix Five
Output From 'E-Views' 
Regression Analysis
Key to Tables
V ariable D escription
C Intercept
w W eather Index
ED A L E ducation Index
A D V IC E A dvisory E xpenditure Series, £ m illion  in  1970 prices
PB RD Total Public A gricultural R& D  E xpenditure Series, £ m illion  in 
1970 prices
A PPLIED Total Public A pplied R esearch and D evelopm ent Expenditure 
Series, £ m illion  in  1970 prices
BASIC Total Public B asic Research Expenditure Series, £ m illion  in 1970 
prices
PRIV Total Private R esearch Expenditure Series, £ m illion  in  1970 
prices
Equation (8)
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\nP, A+ Y ,a ,  In + p , \n E  +p^W + /.i
1=0
LS // D ependent V ariab le  is LE S P  
Date: 0 7 /1 9 /0 0  Tim e: 16:10  
Sam ple(ad justed): 1964  1996  
Included observations: 33  a fte r adjusting endpoints
Variab ie Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob,
C 2 .9 0 7 9 8 6 0 .2 3 6 0 0 6 12 .32165 0 .0 00 0
ED A L 0 .2 5 4 8 6 9 0 .0 66 7 1 8 3.820121 0 .0 00 7
W 0 ,0 0 3 7 9 8 0 .0 01 5 5 6 2 .4 4 0 3 9 2 0 .0 21 0
PDL01 0 ,0 0 1 3 1 0 0 ,0 00 2 9 5 4 .4 3 4 3 7 0 0.0001
R-squared 0 .9 6 6 3 3 4 M ean dependent var 4 .8 4 2 6 8 3
Adjusted R-squared 0 .962851 S.D . dependent var 0 .2 58 5 6 7
S.E . of regression 0 .0 4 9 8 3 6 A kaike info criterion -5 .8 6 4 8 1 7
Sum squared resid 0 ,0 7 2 0 2 6 Schw arz criterion -5 .7 0 3 4 2 3
Log likelihood 5 4 .2 7 4 5 2 F-statistic 2 7 7 .4 6 8 8
Durbin-W atson stat 2 .1 2 7 0 0 5 Prob(F-statistic) 0 ,0 00 0 0 0
Lag Distribution of P B A D V i Coefficient Std, Error T-Statistic
1 0 0 .0 0 1 2 4 0 ,0 00 2 8 4 .4 3 4 3 7
1 1 0 ,0 0 2 3 3 0 ,0 00 5 3 4 .4 3 4 3 7
1 2 0 .0 0 3 2 7 0 ,0 00 7 4 4 .4 3 4 3 7
( 3 0 .0 0 4 0 7 0 ,0 00 9 2 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 4 0 .0 0 4 7 3 0 ,0 01 0 7 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 5 0 .0 0 5 2 4 0 .0 01 1 8 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 6 0 ,0 0 5 6 0 0 ,0 01 2 6 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 7 0 ,0 0 5 8 2 0.00131 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 8 0 ,0 0 5 8 9 0 ,0 01 3 3 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 9 0 ,0 05 8 2 0.00131 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
t 10 0 ,0 0 5 6 0 0 .0 01 2 6 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 11 0 ,0 05 2 4 0 .0 01 1 8 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 12 0 ,0 04 7 3 0 .0 01 0 7 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 13 0 ,0 04 0 7 0 ,0 00 9 2 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
1 jm 14 0 ,0 0 3 2 7 0 .0 0 0 7 4 4 ,4 3 4 3 7
I Jtr 15 0 ,0 0 2 3 3 0 .0 00 5 3 4 ,4 34 3 7
1 • ' 16 0 .0 01 2 4 0 .0 00 2 8 4 ,4 34 3 7
Sum  of Lags 0 .07051 0 .0 15 9 0 4 ,4 34 3 7
Equation (9)
I n f ,  = l n , 4  +  £ a |  + / ? ,  \nE + ppV + fi
1=0 1=0
LS //  D ependent V ariab le  is LESP  
Date; 0 7 /1 9 /0 0  Tim e; 16 :14  
Sam ple(adjusted): 1964  1996  
Included observations: 33  a fter adjusting endpoints
Variab le Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 3 .0 79 4 6 2 0 ,2 3 7 6 2 3 12 .95944 0 .0 00 0
EDA L 0.180311 0 ,0 7 2 3 7 3 2 .4 9 1 4 1 5 0 .0 1 8 9
W 0 .0 0 3 5 9 5 0 ,0 0 1 4 7 5 2 ,4 3 6 7 7 5 0 .0 2 1 4
PDL01 0 .0 00 9 5 0 0 ,0 0 0 3 2 8 2 ,8 98 0 1 2 0 .0 07 2
P D L02 0 .006801 0 .0 0 3 2 3 4 2 .1 0 3 2 3 7 0 .0 44 6
R-squared 0 ,9 7 0 9 2 7 M ean  dependent var 4 ,8 4 2 6 8 3
Adjusted R-squared 0 ,9 6 6 7 7 4 S.D , dependent var 0 ,2 5 8 5 6 7
S.E . of regression 0 .0 47 1 3 2 A kaike info criterion -5 ,9 7 0 8 9 4
Sum  squared resid 0 .0 6 2 1 9 9 S chw arz criterion -5 .7 4 4 1 5 0
Log likelihood 5 6 .69 4 7 7 F-statistic 233 .7751
Durbin-W atson stat 2 .5 4 0 1 3 6 Prob(F-statistic) 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0
Lag Distribution of P B A D V i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
1 0 0 ,0 0 0 9 0 0 .00031 2 .89801
] 1 0 .0 0 1 6 9 0 .0 00 5 8 2 .89801
2 0 .0 0 2 3 7 0 .0 00 8 2 2 .89801
1 3 0 .0 0 2 9 5 0 ,0 01 0 2 2 .89801
1 4 0 .0 0 3 4 3 0 ,0 01 1 8 2 .89801
1 5 0 .0 0 3 8 0 0 ,00131 2 .89801
1 6 0 .0 0 4 0 6 0 .0 01 4 0 2 .89801
1 7 0 .0 0 4 2 2 0 .0 01 4 6 2 .89801
1 8 0 .0 0 4 2 7 0 .0 01 4 7 2 .89801
1 9 0 .0 0 4 2 2 0 .0 01 4 6 2 .89801
1 10 0 .0 0 4 0 6 0 .0 01 4 0 2 ,89801
1 11 0 .0 0 3 8 0 0 .00131 2 ,89801
1 12 0 .0 0 3 4 3 0 .0 01 1 8 2 ,89801
1 13 0 .0 0 2 9 5 0 .0 01 0 2 2 ,89801
1 JW 14 0 .0 0 2 3 7 0 .0 00 8 2 2 ,89801
1 15 0 .0 0 1 6 9 0 .0 00 5 8 2 .89801
1 mr 16 0 .0 0 0 9 0 0.00031 2 .89801
Sum  of Lags 0 ,0 5 1 1 2 0 .0 17 6 4 2 ,89801
Lag Distribution of P R IV i C oefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
1 0 0 .0 0 6 0 5 0 .0 02 8 7 2 ,1 0 3 2 4
1 1 0 ,0 1 0 5 8 0 .0 05 0 3 2 ,1 0 3 2 4
1 2 0 ,0 1 3 6 0 0 .0 06 4 7 2 ,1 03 2 4
1 3 0 ,01511 0 .0 07 1 9 2 ,1 0 3 2 4
1 4 0 ,01511 0 .0 07 1 9 2 ,1 0 3 2 4
1 5 0 ,0 1 3 6 0 0 .0 0 6 4 7 2 ,1 03 2 4
1 6 0 .0 1 0 5 8 0 ,0 05 0 3 2 ,1 03 2 4
1 7 0 .0 0 6 0 5 0 ,0 02 8 7 2 .1 03 2 4
Sum  of Lags 0 .0 9 0 6 8 0 .0 43 1 2 2 ,1 03 2 4
Equation (10)
I n f ,  =  I n .4 +  2 a .  I n + p , \nE + p^W^^
1=0
LS //  D e p en d en t V ariab le  is L E S P  
D ate: 0 7 /1 9 /0 0  T im e: 16 :19  
S am ple (ad justed); 1 9 5 9  1 9 9 6  
Included observations: 3 8  a fte r adjusting endpoints
V ariab le C oeffic ien t Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 2 .7 5 8 5 3 9 0 .2 5 5 5 0 7 1 0 ,7 9 6 3 4 0 .0 0 0 0
W 0 .0 0 3 2 3 9 0 .0 0 1 3 8 2 2 .3 4 3 7 0 9 0 .0251
E D A L 0 .3 0 6 9 1 0 0 .0 6 7 3 4 4 4 .5 5 7 3 3 6 0 ,0001
PD L01 0 .0 0 3 1 6 6 0 .0 0 0 7 9 8 3 .9 6 6 3 3 9 0 ,0 0 0 4
R -squared 0 .9 7 1 9 8 8 M ean  dependent var 4 ,7 7 1 2 8 8
A djusted  R -squared 0 .9 6 9 5 1 7 S .D .d e p e n d e n t var 0 .3 0 4 1 7 2
S .E . of regression 0 .0 5 3 1 0 7 A kaike info criterion -5 ,7 7 1 5 9 8
Sum  squared  resid 0 .0 9 5 8 9 2 Schw arz criterion -5 ,5 9 9 2 2 0
Log likelihood 5 9 .7 4 0 6 9 F-statistic 3 9 3 .2 6 0 0
D u rb in -W atson  stat 1 .7 6 3 0 3 9 Prob(F-statistic) 0 .0 0 0 0 0 0
Lag Distribution of A P A D V i Coefficient Std. Error T -S tatistic
1 0 0 .0 0 2 9 2 0 .0 0 0 7 4 3 .9 6 6 3 4
1 1 0 .0 0 5 3 6 0 .0 0 1 3 5 3 .9 6 6 3 4
1 2 0 ,00731 0 .0 0 1 8 4 3 .9 6 6 3 4
1 3 0 ,0 0 8 7 7 0 ,00221 3 ,9 6 6 3 4
1 4 0 ,0 0 9 7 4 0 .0 0 2 4 6 3 ,9 6 6 3 4
1 5 0 .0 10 2 3 0 .0 0 2 5 8 3 .9 6 6 3 4
1 6 0 .0 1 0 2 3 0 ,0 0 2 5 8 3 .9 6 6 3 4
1 7 0 .0 0 9 7 4 0 ,0 0 2 4 6 3 ,9 6 6 3 4
1 8 0 .0 0 8 7 7 0 .0 02 2 1 3 ,9 6 6 3 4
1 9 0.00731 0 .0 0 1 8 4 3 ,9 6 6 3 4
1 10 0 .0 0 5 3 6 0 ,0 0 1 3 5 3 ,9 6 6 3 4
1 11 0 .0 0 2 9 2 0 ,0 0 0 7 4 3 .9 6 6 3 4
S um  o f Lags 0 ,0 88 6 6 0 .0 2 2 3 5 3 ,9 6 6 3 4
Equation (11)
h \ a P , = Â  + £  a ,  A In +  £ a j A I n f / _ '  + p^h\nE + p p v  +  n
/=0 /=0
LS //  D ependent Variab le  is LE S P  
Date; 0 7 /1 9 /0 0  Tim e: 16:21  
Sam ple(ad justed): 1 959  1996  
Included observations: 38  a fter adjusting endpoints
V ariab le C oefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 3 .0 5 9 2 0 7 0 .2 48 3 3 8 12 .31 8 7 4 0 .0 00 0
W 0 .0 0 3 3 1 9 0 .0 01 2 3 6 2 .6 8 5 9 4 3 0 ,0112
ED A L 0 .1 7 9 1 4 0 0 .0 7 3 0 6 2 2 .4 5 1 8 8 9 0 ,0 19 7
PDL01 0 .0 0 2 0 7 8 0 .0 0 0 7 9 6 2 .6 1 0 0 7 8 0 .0135
P D L02 0 .009341 0 .0 03 0 2 6 3 .0 8 7 4 0 5 0.0041
R-squared 0 .9 7 8 2 6 6 M ean dependent var 4 .7 7 1 2 8 8
Adjusted R-squared 0 .9 7 5 6 3 2 S.D . dependent var 0 .3 04 1 7 2
S .E . of regression 0 .0 4 7 4 8 2 A kaike info criterion -5 .9 7 2 7 1 7
Sum  squared resid 0 .074401 Schw arz criterion -5 .7 5 7 2 4 5
Log likelihood 6 4 .5 6 1 9 6 F-statistic 3 7 1 .3 4 2 4
Durbin-W atson stat 2 .2 8 1 2 3 2 Prob(F-statistic) 0 .0 00 0 0 0
Lag Distribution of A P A D V 1 Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
1 0 0 .0 0 1 9 2 0 .0 0 0 7 3 2 .6 1 0 0 8
1 1 0 .0 03 5 2 0 .0 0 1 3 5 2 .6 10 0 8
1 2 0 .0 0 4 8 0 0 .0 0 1 8 4 2 .6 10 0 8
1 3 0 .0 05 7 5 0 .0 0 2 2 0 2 .6 10 0 8
1 4 0 .0 0 6 3 9 0 .0 0 2 4 5 2 ,6 10 0 8
1 5 0.00671 0 .0 0 2 5 7 2 .6 10 0 8
1 6 0.00671 0 .0 0 2 5 7 2 .6 10 0 8
I 7 0 .0 06 3 9 0 .0 0 2 4 5 2 .6 1 0 0 8
1 8 0 .0 05 7 5 0 .0 0 2 2 0 2 ,6 10 0 8
1 9 0 .0 0 4 8 0 0 .0 0 1 8 4 2 ,6 10 0 8
10 0 .0 03 5 2 0 .0 0 1 3 5 2 ,6 10 0 8
1 11 0 .0 0 1 9 2 0 .0 0 0 7 3 2 ,6 10 0 8
Sum of Lags 0 .0 5 8 1 8 0 .0 2 2 2 9 2 ,6 10 0 8
Lag Distribution of P R IV i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
1 0 0 .0 0 8 3 0 0 .0 0 2 6 9 3 ,0 87 4 0
1 1 0 .0 1 4 5 3 0.00471 3 ,0 87 4 0
1 2 0 .0 18 6 8 0 .0 0 6 0 5 3 ,0 87 4 0
t 3 0 .0 20 7 6 0 .0 0 6 7 2 3 ,0 8 7 4 0
1 4 0 .0 20 7 6 0 .0 0 6 7 2 3 ,0 87 4 0
1 5 0 .0 18 6 8 0 .0 0 6 0 5 3 .0 87 4 0
I 6 0 .0 14 5 3 0 .00471 3 .0 87 4 0
1 7 0 .0 08 3 0 0 .0 0 2 6 9 3 .0 87 4 0
Sum  of Lags 0 .1 24 5 5 0 .0 4 0 3 4 3 .0 87 4 0
Equation (16)
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I n f ,  =  InA+J^a,  In f a ,  InR,^ + ^  InE+P^fVA/i
1=0 1=0
LS / /  D ependent Variable is E X T  
Date: 0 8 /3 1 /0 0  Time: 15:41 
Sam ple(adjusted): 1963 1996  
Included observations: 34  after adjusting endpoints
I
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob,
C
W
EDAL
PDL01
PD L02
3 .1 10 2 8 2  0 .2 04 0 4 7  
0 ,0 01 5 7 5  0 ,0 01 1 0 9  
0 ,2 15 4 3 0  0 ,0 62 1 7 3  
0 ,0 00 9 7 6  0 .0 00 3 0 4  
0 .0 05 5 0 4  0 .0 02 7 5 9
15.24296
1.420536
3 .465011
3 .215284
1.995225
0 .0 00 0  
0 1661 
0 .0017  
0 ,0032  
0 ,0555
R-squared 0 ,9 78 8 4 2  M ean dependent var 4 ,837961
Adjusted R-squared 0 ,975 9 2 4  S ,D . dependent var 0 .2 62 5 5 6
S.E . of regression 0 .0 40 7 3 9  A kaike info criterion -6 .2 6 6 0 7 6
Sum squared resid 0.048131 Schw arz criterion -6.041611
Log likelihood 6 3 ,27 9 3 8  F-statlstic 335 .4 1 7 9
Durbin-W atson stat 1 ,658998  Prob(F-statistic) 0 .000000
Lag Distribution of PB A D V i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
1 0 0 .0 0 0 9 2 0 .00029 3 .2 15 2 8
I 1 0 .0 01 7 2 0 .0 00 5 4 3 .2 15 2 8
1 2 0 .00241 0 .00075 3 .21528
1 3 0 .0 02 9 9 0 .00093 3 .21528
I 4 0 .0 03 4 4 0 .00107 3 .21528
1 5 0 .0 03 7 9 0 ,00118 3 .21528
1 6 0 .0 04 0 2 0 .00125 3 .21528
I 7 0 .0 04 1 3 0 ,00129 3 .21528
) 8 0 .0 04 1 3 0 .0 01 2 9 3 .2 15 2 8
1 9 0 .0 04 0 2 0 .0 01 2 5 3 .2 15 2 8
1 10 0 ,0 03 7 9 0 ,00118 3 .2 15 2 8
1 11 0 ,0 0 3 4 4 0 .00107 3 .21528
1 12 0 .0 02 9 9 0 .00093 3 .2 15 2 8
i 13 0 ,00241 0 .0 00 7 5 3 .21528
I 14 0 .0 01 7 2 0 ,0 00 5 4 3 .2 15 2 8
1 9 ^ 15 0 ,0 00 9 2 0 .00029 3 .2 15 2 8
Sum of Lags 0 .0 4 6 8 5 0 .0 14 5 7 3 ,2 15 2 8
Lag Distribution of P R IV i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
1 0 0 .0 0 4 8 9 0 .0 02 4 5 1,99523
1 1 0 .0 0 8 5 6 0 .0 04 2 9 1 .99523
1 2 0 .01101 0 .0 05 5 2 1 .99523
1 3 0 .0 1 2 2 3 0 ,0 06 1 3 1 .99523
1 4 0 .0 12 2 3 0 ,0 06 1 3 1 .99523
1 5 0 .01101 0 .0 05 5 2 1 .99523
1 6 0 .0 0 8 5 6 0 .0 04 2 9 1.99523
1 1 7 0 .0 0 4 8 9 0 .00245 1 .99523
Sum of Laos 0 .0 7 3 3 9 0 .0 36 7 8 1 .99523
Equation (17)
In P ‘, = In .4 + £ « ,  In f .T " '  + £ « :  I n f . f l + A ' n - ^  + A ^  + f
1=0 (=0
LS // Dependent Variable is EXT 
Date; 08/31/00 Time: 15:18 
Sampie(adjusted): 1956 1996 
included observations: 41 after adjusting endpokits
Variable Coefficient Std, Error t-Statistic Prob. 1
C 3.117884 0.213585 14.59783 0.0000
W 0.001314 0.001047 1.255881 0.2172
EDAL 0.200122 0,061232 3,268276 0.0024
PDL01 0.003342 0,001161 2.879391 0.0067
PDL02 0,010554 0,002857 3.694420 0.0007
R-squared 0,985028 Mean dependent var 4.739101
Adjusted R-squared 0,983365 S.D. dependent var 0.316752
S.E. of regression 0.040854 Akaike info criterion -6.281661
Sum squared resid 0.060085 Schwarz criterion -6.072689
Log likelihood 75,59757 F-statistic 592,1361
Durbin-Watson stat 1,440220 Prob(F-statistic) 0,000000
Lag Distribution of APADV i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
0 0.00301 0,00104 2,87939
1 ' ' ' • t 1 0.00535 0.00186 2.87939
1 2 0,00702 0.00244 2-87939
1 3 0,00802 0,00279 2,87939
1 > 4 0,00835 0,00290 2,87939
1 y 5 0.00802 0,00279 2.87939
1 6 0.00702 0.00244 2.87939
1 7 0,00535 0.00186 2.87939
1 m -- 8 0,00301 0.00104 2.87939
Sum of Lags 0.05514 0.01915 2.87939
Lag Distribution of PRIV i Coefficient Std. Error T-Statistic
I 0 0.00923 0.00250 3,69442
1 1 0.01583 0.00429 3.69442
1 2 0.01979 0.00536 3.69442
3 0.02111 0.00571 3,69442
1 4 0.01979 0.00536 3,69442
1 5 0.01583 0.00429 3,69442
1 6 0.00923 0.00250 3,69442
Sum of Lags 0.11082 0.03000 3,69442
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agricultural R&D. This paper criticises the traditional arguments fo r  the public support o f  
an agricultural research system and forwards a more dynamic means to assessing 
agricultural research in the public sector. Overall, areas o f  public-good enhancing R&D 
carry strong support, whereas more traditional areas o f  productivity-enhancing R&D are 
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measure the effect o f research expenditure against growth in Total Factor Productivity 
(TFP), based on market inputs and outputs. When compared against growing public unease 
over the environmental effects o f pursuing agricultural productivity growth, TFP indices 
become a misleading measure o f growth. This paper integrates some non-market components 
into the TFP index. The costs o f  two specific externalities o f agricultural production, namely 
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The rates o f return to agricultural R&D are reduced by using the 'social' as opposed to the 
traditional TFP index. Whilst both remain at justifiable levels, previous studies appear to 
have over-estimated the effect o f agricultural R&D expenditures. Furthermore, with changes 
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